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Journalism

The Porfirian Influence on Mexic
An Enduring Legacy of Economic C
Director: Manuel Machado, Jr. Ph
The methods used by the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional to control the press are an extension of the
the methods created by Porfirio Diaz in the late nineteenth
century. Porfirio Diaz {1830-1916) ruled Mexico from 1876 to
1880 and from 1884 to 1911. That period coincides with the
development of the modern press in Mexico, both in terms of
technological advancement and government-press relations.
Diaz is the only man in Mexican history to have an era
named after him (The porfiriato, 1876-1911). This thesis
examines his turbulent relations with the press and explains
how his policies continue to influence Mexican journalism.
The financial, literary and economic elite controlled preporfiriato journalism and was the only segment of the public
to use the press as a means of communication. The advent of
technological improvements in the newspaper industry and a
substantial increase in the national literacy rate resulted
in increased influence of the press. Concurrently, Diaz was
forced to respond to a generation of liberal journalists,
using tactics that he developed to control Mexico, a country
that comprised contentious regional, religious and
political factions. Diaz used those divisions in the nation
to his own ends.
Diaz began the policies of government monopoly of
newsprint,newspaper subsidies, government censorship and
manipulation of the law to control the press. At times he
condoned, if he did not instigate, the murder and
imprisonment of journalists who opposed his continuation as
dictator of Mexico.
The checkered relationship between the government and the
press during the porfiriato helps explain government-press
relations in Mexico under the PRI. Diaz developed the
methods that the PRI has used and improved upon to control
the press in Mexico from its inception in 1929 until the
final decades of the 20th century.
Sources for this study included the most influential
newspapers of the porfiriato and ten of the largest daily
newspapers published in Mexico in 1986 and 1987 as well as
interviews with Mexican journalists and archival materials
in Mexico City.
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PREFACE
The history of Mexican journalists is the
history of the struggle between liberty and power;
between the anxiety of being and the necessity of
survival within the reality of things as they are;
in short, of the system; the fight between the
inner self and the force of outside reality.The
same thing occurs in those who govern.
Nevertheless, we know that to write we have to
take sides: the freedom or the power. When we
choose freedom, in these times of unjustified,
undignified repression, we proclaim our own
sentence.
From our hearts we cry: Forward. But our flesh
detains us. Reason tells us that, in the face of
such, we need to fence with our own inner
strength. It doesn't matter that at any moment,
the death sentence may be carried out.
I hope that times change and that this automatic
sentence, little by little, will be modified. Then
we can await the future without condemnation or 1
mystery. Clean. Then, finally, we will be able to
exclaim:
Our mission has been accomplished.^
Rafael Loret de Mola
Denuncia
I went to Mexico in the summer of 1986 looking for the
heroes of Mexican journalism, and found them in abundance,
both past and present. Most of them, like Carlos Loret de
Mola, are dead. Loret, a publisher of several Mexican
newspapers, offended several politically influential people
in Mexico, including Mario Vazquez Rana, the owner of the
United Press International. In February, 1986, Loret died
■^Rafael Loret de Mola, Denuncia, (Mexico, D.F.: Grijalbo,
1987), pp. 237-238.
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mysteriously in a single car accident. The crash was
attributed to Loret's drunken driving. His son, Rafael, also
a journalist, maintains that his father never drank to
excess and that the "accident" was never thoroughly
investigated —

by the press or by law enforcement

officials.
I was concerned mostly with the journalists of pre
revolutionary Mexico. I spent hours reading old newspapers
in the Hemeroteca Nacional, the newspaper archives in the
Biblioteca Nacional at UNAM, and in the Mexican National
Archives housed in the renovated Lecumberri Prison. I also
had the good fortune to be able to investigate in the
archives of Porfirio Diaz at Universidad Iberoamericana the
propagation of press repression. I read the work of Filomeno
Mata, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon, and perused
publication endeavors of Rafael Spindola Reyes, called "the
father of Mexican journalism" because he founded El
Imparcial, the pro-government daily of the porfiriato which
introduced the Linotype and rotary press to Mexico.
The Mexican revolution was a long time in the making, and
the contributions Mexican journalists made to its beginnings
have never been, nor may ever be, properly assessed. That
was not the focal point of this work. The longer I remained
in Mexico the more aware I became that the controls
exercised on the Mexican press in modern times are similar
to those of the porfiriato. My attempt has been to give
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historical perspective to the unwritten constraints under
which the Mexican press operates.
As I did much of the primary research in Mexico City, this
work reflects the problem of centralism in Mexico, yet
Mexico City is and always has been the communications center
of the nation, and its newspapers are the most influential
in the country. Centralism in the press was probably more of
a reality

in 1987 than in the days of Don Porfirio, simply

because the increase in newspaper chains and modern
technology allows publishers who own several papers to relay
information from Mexico City to their publications in other
parts of the country.
Most of my sources were in Spanish and therein lay great
risks for inaccuracy, as a U.S. citizen stands a strong
chance of misinterpreting not only language but culture in
Latin America. To the end of keeping my research in a
manageable framework, I am indebted to Dr. Manuel Machado,
although I must take responsibility for any errors in
translation.
The Mexican press is, and was, controlled. For U.S.
journalist, it is well to remember that the system of
controls, which can be attributed to Porfirio Diaz, lay not
in law, but in economics and is just as possible in a
different form of government. In the course of my
investigation, I came to believe that a general
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understanding of Mexico can be heightened by a study of the
Mexican press.
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Chapter 1
PORFIRIO DIAZ AND THE PRESS: 1876-1890
We needed a man, a conscience, a will to unify
our moral forces and transmute them into normal
progress: this man was President D^az.
- Justo Sierra
There are no monuments to Porfirio Diaz in Mexico City, no
streets or institutions named after him. However, near El
Paseo

de la Reforma the monolithic structures that house El

Universal and Excelsior, the largest newspapers in Mexico,
can be said to be part of his legacy.
Porfirio Diaz, one of the first victims of the Mexican
Revolution, became the focal point of a public relations
program ahead of its time. The foreign press, especially in
the United States, found that the old man made good copy.
Grey-haired and dignified, he posed in his uniform and was
more often referred to as "general" than "president." Diaz
displayed military prowess against the French during the War
of Intervention, but his real genius lay in astute political
and organizational abilities. During his dictatorship, he
was called both the maker of modern Mexico and the greatest
statesman of his time. For 20 years after his fall from
power in 1911, he was vilified by the controlled press he
helped create.

Justo Sierra, The Political Evolution of the Mexican
People, (translated by Charles Ramsdell. Austin, University
of Texas Press, 1969), p. 366.
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Porfirio Diaz rose out of the chaos created by the
political instability of nineteenth century Mexico. Born in
1830 to parents who were neither wealthy nor, as a feature
writer for the New York Times would insist in 1901,
completely creole (Mexican-born Spaniards), Diaz was mestizo
(Indian-Spanish). While he did not emphasize that part of
his heritage, it gave him an advantage when dealing with
other mestizos.
Like many leaders of Mexico, Diaz received his primary
education from the Catholic church. The priests who taught
him hoped he would join the clergy, but Diaz opted for a
more lucrative career in law. He became embroiled

in the

Plan de Ayulta revolt in 1854 and from thenon was a
soldier, rising swiftly through the ranks.
Diaz was not a brilliant tactician, but from the beginning
showed keen organizational abilities. In his first post
under Benito Juarez, who was intermittently president of
Mexico from 1858 until his death in 1872, Diaz organized a
national guard of 400 Indians in his native

state of Oaxaca,

a force sufficient to ensure that the state wouldnot stray
too far from the Juarez government. In 1861, Diaz left the
army to serve in the Mexican congress, but returned to the
military to quell a revolt of conservatives. For this, he
was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, but on
returning to Congress he heard his victory dismissed as a
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matter of small importance. Some historians date his
contempt for parliamentarians from this experience.
During the war of the French Intervention, Diaz returned
to arms, distinguishing himself at the battle of Puebla in
1866 and as the first Mexican military commander to re
establish Mexican control of the capital. Although Juarez,
Diaz' mentor, had regained control of the government, small
revolutions were rife in Mexico and much of the country was
controlled by wealthy individuals. In 1868, Diaz again left
the military and was proposed as a candidate for president
in the 1870 elections against Juarez.
During this period, the press, lacking both modern
technology and a literate audience, communicated only with
the elite. While political broadsides were common, they were
never intended for the masses. The industry began to grow in
the 1860s and much of this fledgling press supported the
Diaz nomination, operating under the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the 1857 constitution. When Juarez won
elections, the press questioned both the integrity of the
ballot count and the idea of self-perpetuation in office and
helped spread porfirista propaganda throughout the country.
Many of Diaz's amiable relationships with members of the
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press, including those with key figures in the opposition
press, date from this period.

2

On November 8, 1871, Dfaz led a revolt against Juarez. In
the Plan de la Noria he charged, "The indefinite, forced and
violent re-election of the Federal Executive has placed the
national institutions in danger." The revolution failed, and
Diaz became a fugitive in his own country for several
months. After the unexpected death of Juarez, Diaz was
granted amnesty and remained a political force. His second
revolution, the Plan de Tuxtepec in 1876, succeeded when he
drove Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, successor to Juarez, into
exile and assumed the presidency still using what would
3
prove to be the ironic battle cry of "No re-election."
Diaz achieved power on a yet-to-crest wave of popularity
at the same time the newspaper industry began its period of
growth in Mexico. Like the wealthy and educated liberals who
flocked to serve in the porfirian administration, the
newspapers coalesced, by and large, around Diaz in 1876.
Diaz's popularity was reinforced when he voluntarily stepped
down at the end of his first term in 1880.

2
James A. Magner, Men of Mexico, (Freeport, N.Y., Books for
Libraries Press, 1942), p. 450; Diario del Hogar, April 28,
1893.
■^Porfirio Diaz, "Plan de la Noria," reprinted in Tomos de Su
Historia, La Revolucion Mexicana, Tomo I, (Mexico, 1985), p.
91.
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Mexican law concerning the press changed considerably
during the interim regime of Manuel Gonzales,

(1881-1884) in

part because Diaz, after giving up his post as governor of
Oaxaca, served as the chief justice of the Mexican Supreme
Court at that time. The Mexican government tried to ensure
the docility of the press through subsidies and a government
monopoly on newsprint. But the New York Times recognized
that opposition journalism and entire newpapers suffered
from government persecution in Mexico as early as 1883.
Diaz, as chief justice (and before he reached an exalted
position in the U.S. press), ruled that judges could hear
appeals concerning bail they themselves had set for
defamation offenses, which were criminal, not civil, matters
according to the 1857 constitution. Dfaz also ruled that it
was legally proper for a judge to consider an amparo
concerning a defamation case over which the same judge had
ruled. Amparos, injunctions against the government over the
loss of constitutional rights, are an important part of
Mexican law. The loftiest ideals of Mexican journalism are
found in these briefs, but little of its history.^

4Diaz
/
relinquished the presidency in 1880 to Gonzales, but
most historians believe that he intended at that time to
return in 1884, which he did. Robert Lynn Sandels,
"Silvestre Terrazas, the Press, and the Origins of the
Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua". University of Oregon
Doctoral Thesis. 1967. p. 49; Richard D. Baker, Judicial
Review in Mexico, A Study of the Amparo Suit, Austin,
University of Texas Press. 1971. p. 111.

5

The last days of the Gonzales administration further
strengthened judicial power when the constitution was
amended to eliminate the two-jury system used in defamation
cases. According to the constitution, one jury determined
guilt, another punishment. Under the amendment, no juries
were involved —

government-appointed judges were given both

responsibilities. Mexican journalists responded by calling
for lifetime judiciary appointments to break the tie between
the government and judges, but to no avail.
Defamation laws were not the only legalities in need of
restructuring to accommodate the Diaz regime. The
constitution of 1857 was changed to allow for the reelection
of Diaz in 1888, and then amended before each national
election until 1910. Most Mexicans were probably relieved:
since 1848 no president had completed a term of office until
D^az was elected in 1876.
In the beginning, Diaz, by his own admission, used
brutality to gain social order. If a jefe (political boss)
of a district was dispatched to capture a criminal and
failed, the jefe suffered the punishment for the crime.
Simple highway robbery brought the death penalty. "We
endured," Diaz later said, "even through cruelty. But it was

^Robert Lynn Sandels, "Silvestre Terrazas, the Press and
Origins of the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua," (doctoral
dissertation. Department of History, University of Oregon,
1967) , pp. 49-50; Carlo de Fornaro, Diaz, Czar of Mexico,
(New York, published by the author, 1909), p. 95.
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all necessary for the life and progress of the nation. If we
have been cruel, the ends justified the means."®
With time, Diaz developed the subtlety necessary for any
long-term government that rules an ethnically diverse
country largely supported by foreign interests. The economic
interests of foreign powers in porfirian Mexico have been
well documented. Diaz, or more accurately the Diaz
administration, became adept at dividing or buying any
possible opposition. A working slogan of the administration
was pan o palo (bread or stick). It rewarded those who
adhered to "and forwarded its policies and punished those who
did not.
Further, Diaz knew his countrymen responded to
personalities and recognized the necessity for an amigo, or
more accurately amigo de caudillo (friend of the boss),
system of government. In porfirian Mexico, the governors
owed their power to the president, the jefe politicos to the
governors and so on down through village governments. For
all its structure, the system was chaotic. Diaz encouraged
bickering so that he might stand above it, granting favors
and gaining loyalty. He fulfilled a need on the part of the
mestizos who craved power by appointing members of that

^Interview with Porfirio Diaz by James Creelman, Pearson1s
Magazine, 1911, as quoted in La Revolucion Mexicana, Textos
de su Historia, edited by Graziella Altamariano and
Guadalupe Villa. Mexico: Secretaria de Educacion Publica.
1985. p. 21.

7

segment of society to positions that would provide not only
salaries and power but opportunities for graft, illegal
seizures of property from campesinos (peasants) and other
forms of self-ehrichment. At the same time, Diaz placated
the creoles and foreigners by ensuring their economic
interests. The large haciendas were left intact, and
7
concessions were extended to industrial activities.
Life improved for much of the Mexican population during
the porfiriato and those advances were attributed to Diaz,
who had opened the country to foreign investment by imposing
a system that ensured stability. Ironically, the three
advances in which Diaz himself took the most pride —
development of the railway system, the growth
middle class and the advance of education —

the

of an urban
played

significant roles in the demise of the porfirian ruling
class. When Diaz became president, there were only 578
kilometers of rail lines in Mexico. By 1909, there were
24,160. The Diaz administration believed, as journalist
Manuel de Zamacona had written in the early days of the
porfiriato, that, "Railroads will resolve all the political,

7
Roger D. Hanson, The Politics of Mexican Development,
(Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1984)
pp. 150-151.
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social and economic problems which patriotism, sacrifice and
the blood of two generations has failed to settle."

O

Ultimately, foreigners completed and operated the
railroads, which they needed to ship minerals to smelters in
the United States. This involvement was resented by many
Mexicans, including journalists. In this conflict, Diaz was
caught in the middle. While it would be political suicide
not to pay homage to the Mexican paranoia concerning foreign
powers, the economic well-being of the regime depended on
them. These investors were willing to pay the construction
costs, which reached 20,000 pesos per kilometer in the
mountainous areas. Costs were less on the desert, but rarely
within the 6000-pesos-per-kilometer subsidy provided by the
Mexican government.

9

Not only foreigners benefited from the railroads. By 1910,
Mexican merchants were paying about one-twentieth of what
they had paid in transportation costs in 1876. By 1905 when
Diaz had the government purchase a controlling interest in
the Mexican Central, American imperialism was a fairly safe
target for Mexican editorialists. Diaz himself was quoted as
saying, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the
United States." Ironically, the Mexican Central was the most

®Jose Francisco Godoy, Porfirio Diaz, Presidente de Mexico,
El Fundador de Una Gran Republica, (Mexico, D.F., Muller,
1910), p. 42.
Q
Hanson, p. 19.
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important line in Mexico and was the first link in an
exclusively U.S. dream of connecting all of South America
with the United States by rail. The purchase of the railroad
probably alienated some important U.S.-based support, but
the real problems of the railroads for the porfirian power
structure had already been created: mobility of the Mexican
population and the emergence of the first large unions in
Mexico.
The railroads provided both advertising revenue and a
means of delivery for Mexican newspapers, but it was the
porfiristas' commitment to education that provided
publishers with a growing market. The number of school
teachers increased during the porfiriato. Equality of
educational opportunity was a long-standing goal of the Diaz
regime. Minister of Finance Jose Limantour said, "Education
is the national service of the most importance: it is
supreme." To the supporters of continuismo, a stable
government depended on a homogeneous people, and that
homogeneity could be created through education. In 1877,
there were 4,715 teachers in Mexico. By 1909, that number
had tripled.^
■^Ibid.; New York Times, May 21, 1901; Despatches from
consular officials in Mexico City. Despatch 41, enclosure 1.
U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National
Archives. Consul General A. Gottschalk to Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Bacon, June 22, 1906.
■^.Jose Mancisidor, Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana,
(Mexico, D.F., Costa-Amic Editores, 1980), p. 36; Milada
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The University of Mexico in the capital became the leading
educational institution. Funded to produce educators, its
philosophy was molded by Justo Sierra, a D^az supporter who
held fast to his own ideals during the ethical decline of
the porfiriato. In 1902, Sierra wrote: "Mexican social
evolution will have been wholly abortive and futile unless
io
it attains the final goal: liberty."
Sierra's students were imbued with the great ideals of
democracy and then went out to encounter and become part of
the poverty of porfirian Mexico. Francisco Bulnes described
the frustration of these educated men: "This poor man had to
be excessively stupid to study for years and earn a salary
roughly equivalent to that of a train conductor." But the
increase in literacy in Mexico created problems beyond the
school-house. Recognizing the dangers of an educated but
unemployed sector of a growing population, the Diaz regime
created a make-work bureaucracy. i ^
Diaz himself recognized the problem of the growing
bureaucracy but was resigned to it. He once responded to a
------------

-.. ...

..,y.---------------- ------------- --------------------- .-----------------

Bazant, Qebate Pedagogico durante El Porfiriato, (Mexico,
Secretarfa de Educacion Publica, 1957) , Page 9? James
Creelman, Diaz, Master of Mexico, (New York, D. Appelton and
Co., 1911) , p. 338.
i2

Alfonso Reyes, prologue to 1940 edition Political
Evolution of the Mexican People by Justo Sierra, pp. 5-15;
Sierra, p. 368.
■^James Cockcroft, "El Maestro de Primaria en la Revoluci^n
Mexicana," Historia Moderna de Mexico, Volume VII. AprilJune, 1967. p. 567.
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question concerning bureaucratic costs, "Feed the beast."
And Mexico did. By the first decade of the twentieth
century, 10 to 15 percent of Mexico's literate population,
which made up about 18 percent of the 15 million total
population, worked for the government. For the most part,
however, government employees were no better off than the
school teachers. If they lacked connections in the power
structure, all they could anticipate was meaningless work at
low salaries and the criticism of the Mexican populace.
Sierra described the Mexican bureaucracy as "that great
normal school for idleness which has educated our country's
middle class."14
The middle class formed an audience for a growing number
of publications in Mexico and the porfiriato roughly
coincides with what historians of Mexican journalism have
labeled "the great period of development." Sporadic and
influenced by government, this development had more to do
with the economics of the newspaper industry than growth of
freedom of the press in Mexico. The increase in journalistic
endeavors reflected socio-economic changes in Mexico under
Diaz, but the mechanics of that industry were largely
defined by statutory law that negated Article 7 of the

14Hansen, p. 150; Sierra, p. 215
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Constitution of 1857, which guaranteed freedom of the
press.15
Article 7 was a reaction to the repressive Lares Laws of (
1853. During Santa Anna's last attempt at ruling Mexico, his
advisers determined that an independent press represented
too great a threat to the stability of the Mexican
government and devised a subsidy system whereby a newspaper
had to be linked with the government in order to exist.
Article 7 guaranteed freedom of the press (even with the
amendments) unless a publication infringed on private life
or threatened public safety, but the porfirian regime
manipulated the press, especially in Mexico City.

1f

The porfirian concern with the press was twofold and some
times contradictory. First, Diaz and his administration
recognized the growing political influence of the popular
press on the national politics of Mexico. Diaz had seen
freedom of the press grow under Juarez, and he had seen that
freedom used to the detriment of that reformist leader and
even more so to Sebastian Lerdo. Lerdo truly believed in the
freedom of the press and in 1872 issued the following
manifesto:
. . . The freedom of the press, which protects
and defends the others, will be inviolable for me,
15 Jose* Bravo Ugarte, Penodistas y periodicos
/
Mexicanos,
(Mexico, D.F., Mexico Heroico Editorial JUS., 1966), pp. 7781; Correo de Chihuahua. Jan 1, 1899;
16Sierra, p. 229.
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as it was, without exception, in the protracted
period during which I functioned as a minister for
the illustrious President [Juarez] whose loss we
lament. . .Of the excesses which the press may
commit, the best corrective is the press itself,
enlightened, free, the echo of all opinions and
all parties.
The industry grew from a few publications read by an elite
minority to 84 publications in Mexico City alone in 1881,
many of which were aimed at the growing ranks of middleclass Mexico, and Diaz wanted that developing power to
continue operating on his behalf as it had against Lerdo.
Lerdo had remained true to his word until the last month of
his regime when, in desperation, he suspended the freedom of
the press. His action was explained in an official circular:
The opposition press overflowed in a scandalous
manner, abusing the liberty which Article 7 of the
Constitution concedes and the unlimited tolerance
of the Executive of the Union.
Said press was serving as an organ of the
revolution, publishing the plans of pronouncement
of the enemies and their illegal decrees. . . This
press disseminated the real or feigned information
of the military operations of the enemy, it
revealed to the enemy the movement of our troops,
their numbers, and their equipment, and daily it
was publishing false triumphs of the
revolutionists and false defeats of the loyal
troops; it was exaggerating the numbers of the
enemy and diminishing those of the government.
Said press, attributing to the President, the
minister, and other public functionaries,
ineptitude, vices, and depraved passions,
attempted to quit them of all respectability.
Alleging that the government did not recognize the
17

Frank Averill Knapp, Jr., The Life of Sebastian Lerdo de
Teja, 1823-1889: A Study of Influence and Obscurity, (New
York, Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 223.
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English debt, affirming that it wasted the public
funds, that it made ruinous contracts, and that it
had compromised the major part of the products of
the maritime custom houses, [said press] spread a
lack of confidence among merchants and
capitalists, preventing the government from
practicing financial operations which would
produce what was necessary to cover its pressing
needs. Finally, this press, declaring itself
openly revolutionary and subversive, has preached
that the present government will be legitimate
only until November 30 next, and that if the
chamber of deputies should declare that there has
been an election, it is lawful for the public to
revolt.
Undoubtedly, the Mexican press under Lerdo helped bring
Diaz to power. Some of the important newspapers in this
struggle, such as El Monitor and El Ahuizote, would be
repressed by Diaz. For the most part, Diaz would use
existing laws to suppress the press. Under Mexican law,
journalists were liable if they published articles that
produced criminal consequences. Because of one basic
porfirian alteration of the law, they also became liable for
articles that might produce criminal consequences. In 1885,
the courts devised the psicologia, a test in which a
journalist's attitude toward the regime was judged. If he
had an attitude considered dangerous to society, he could be
jailed.^
u£az also recognized the importance of the press in terms
of public relations, which could influence foreign

18Ibid, p. 232.
19

Sandels, pp. 51-52.
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relations. When he assumed the presidency, Mexico's image
was of a country that could not guarantee the safety of
foreign investments because of political instability.
Porfirian interests were served not only by creating a
positive image of Diaz himself but also by portraying Mexico
as a sister republic to the United States. The
administration tried to portray the Mexican press as similar
to that in the United States. Sometimes this was difficult,
as illustrated by the A.K. Cutting case of 1886. Cutting was
an American journalist who published El Centinela in El Paso
del Norte, the town that would eventually be renamed Ciudad
Juarez. When a Mexican, Emiglio Medina, decided to begin a
rival newspaper, Cutting placed an ad in the El Paso Herald
saying that Medina's purpose was merely to "swindle
advertisers." Then Cutting had cards reiterating the charge
printed, both in English and Spanish, and distributed them
on both sides of the border. Cutting, accustomed to the
accepted practice of lambasting one's editorial opponents so
common on the American frontier, included on the card the
statement that Medina was a "fraud and deadbeat."

20

Cutting was arrested in Mexico and jailed in the city of
Chihuahua. Refusing to recognize the validity of Mexican
law, Cutting appealed to the American consulate in El Paso
del Norte. Upon hearing this, Medina assaulted a consulate

^ N e w York Times, July 25, 1886.
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officer and was arrested on a weapons charge. Cutting tried
unsuccessfully to bribe the guards to place Medina in his
cell. The incident, which Diaz would later call "something
of no importance in itself," created unforeseen tensions
along the border. The Mexican government increased the
troops stationed in El Paso del Norte from 200 to 2,000 men.
At one point, the Mexican judiciary offered Cutting his
freedom on bail, but he refused, saying, "I'm under the
protection of my government." 21
The U.S. government, though, did not want to get involved,
much to the ire of the New York Times, which editorialized:
"The best proof of the worthlessness of Mexico is the fact
that we have not annexed any part of that country since the
treaty that closed the Mexican war." Several days after that
editorial appeared, Mexicans killed a Mexican-American
accused of being a horse thief. The Times ran the story
under the headline: "Texans will Protect American Citizens
even if Uncle Sam Won't."22
A week later, the judges in Chihuahua, who had made it
known they would "brook no interference from the U.S.
government or, for that matter, Diaz himself," found Cutting
guilty and sentenced him to a year in jail and fined him
21Ibid.; Despatches from Mexico City, 1822-1906. U.S.
Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives.
Consulate translation of Diaz speech to Mexican congress.
September 16, 1886.
22

New York Times, July 28, and August 1, 1886.
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$600. After the public lost interest, Cutting was freed and
quietly slipped across the border.
The New York Times reported that "Medina, who had caused
all the trouble, has leave to sue Cutting." The Times turned
around, though, and editorialized that perhaps the case had
two sides. It would be a long time before Mexican press law
would again be questioned in the U.S. press. 24
Antagonism between the governments and the small press in
Mexico bloomed with the 1888 reelection of Diaz and the
constitutional amendment allowing that reelection. By then,
the power structure of the porfiriato was in place and the
style entrenched. In early June, Diaz began receiving from
his state governors letters advising him that an
uncontrolled press would do damage to Mexico. One
unfavorable article had been reprinted in a Havana, Cuba,
newspaper, and the porfiristas feared that some of the bad
publicity would creep into the U.S. and European press.
The governor of Jalisco recommended jailing three of the
worst offenders in that state, and in Chihuahua, the
governor jailed the author of a letter to the editor. The

2^Ibid., August 8, 1886; Jose C. Valades, El porfirismo:
Historia de un Regimen, (Mexico, D.F., Editorial Patna,
1946), p. 146.
2^Ibid., August 15, 1886.
^Personal archives of Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1916. Universidad
Iberoamericana. File numbers: 006102 (unsigned, undated),
006494 (Romaron Carnova to Diaz, June 30, 1888).
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Chihuahua governor explained in a letter to Diaz that one
writer could result in "grave” danger to society (Diaz made
p£
a note to commend the governor on his positive action).
From all sides, Diaz was being told that the persecution
of journalists was justified to ensure the order and
tranquility of the country. By the end of the summer, Diaz
had received from state governors several more letters
saying they had jailed journalists and publishers. Many of
the letters contained pleas for harsher laws to deal with
the opposition press.

27

Those laws were not forthcoming. Diaz and his
administrators recognized that the mechanisms for
controlling the press were already in place. There were also
extra-legal procedures for dealing with troublesome
journalists, such as assassination, but the outright killing
of newspapermen was not common. Francisco Bulnes wrote that
only five journalists were killed during
those murders were ordered by state gover:
federal administrators. While that number has been disputed
by modern historians, the porfiristas preferred

J

Ibid., 006519 (Governor of Chihuahua to Diaz, July 26,
1^88), 006523 (Lauro Carrillo to Diaz, marginal note from
Diaz, July 26, 1888), 006726 through 00672 (unsigned,
undated report to Diaz from Coahuila), 006814 (Governor of
Monterey to Diaz, July 9, 1888).
^Ibid., 007531 and 07537 (Secretary Particular del
Gobernador de Jalisco to Diaz, August 5 and 15, 1888),
007586 (Rafael Gravioto to Diaz, August 27, 1888).
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incarceration to elimination. Diaz himself recognized that
repentant journalist was more valuable to continuismo than
martyr, and he would sometimes intervene on behalf of
journalists if he believed they had "learned their
lesson.
During the last ten years of the nineteenth century, the
porfirian system was perfected, and Diaz became an
unquestioned darling of the press, both domestic and
foreign. At age 60, D^az had mastered the delicate act of
balancing the power structure. Unfortunately, his
administration gladly sacrificed the viability of the
Mexican press for stability and growth.
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Sandels, pp. 59-60? personal interview with Jane Dale
Lloyd, UIA.

Chapter 2
"EL DESAROLLO GRANDE DE LA PRENSA"
THE GREAT DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS: 1890-1899
We always have to tell the truth, or, better
said, what appears to us that which is true. And
we must say it with strong words that can be heard
like the blast of a cannon. But if we find we are
mistaken, we must shout the new truth more
strongly yet, like the roar of a hundred cannons.
Filomeno Mata
Thirty or forty thousand pesos, in my opinion,
would be enough to change the face of the
country.
Porfirio Diaz
By 1890, the credibility of the Mexican press as a vehicle
for political thought and information was questionable, as
illustrated by the Reyes-Diaz rift of 1891. D^az had decided
to create a party system to imitate the convention system of
nominations in the United States. The task of nominating
Diaz fell to the newly established Liberal Union. General
Bernardo Reyes, not understanding that the organization of
political parties was a public-relations sham, organized his
own party and fell, temporarily, out of favor with Diaz. He
rectified his fall from grace by advising his adherents to

■^Luis Mata, Filomeno Mata, Su Vida y Su Labor, (Mexico,
D.F., Secretaria de Educacion Publica, 1945), p. 59.
2
/
/
Porfirio Diaz to Jose Yves Limantour, Sr. March 17, 1876.
As quoted in Alfpnso de Maria y Campos, "Porfirianos
Prominentes: Ongenes y Anos de.Juventad de Ocho Integrantes
del Grupo de los Cientificos, 1846-1876." Historia Mexicana.
Volume XXXIV, Number 4, April-June, 1985. p. 641.
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vote for Diaz. In all probability, Reyes failed to learn the
truth of the situation by reading newspapers.

3

Politicians and financially successful newspaper

\

publishers existed symbiotically. Porfirian administrators
were more concerned with bribing individual publishers and
reporters for editorial support of the power structure than
encouraging social responsibility on the part of the press.
Government-approved newspapers published pro-Diaz propaganda
and empty sensationalism comparable to that of the Hearst
organization in the United States.^
In 1885, Rafael Reyes Spindola founded El Universal,
demonstrating keen administrative abilities and
unquestionable loyalty to the porfirian administration. The
paper proved successful and was sold to Ramon Prida in early
1892. Prida, though nominally pro-government, remained
suspect since he refused the government subsidy. He
explained that he was not anti-government, but wanted to
support the government independently. Prida was advised by
Romero Rubio, a member of the administration and father-inlaw of the president, "Don't be a Don Quixote. Diaz doesn't
like bad steers." The next year, Prida was among the

3

Herbert Ingram Priestly, The Mexican Nation, A History,
(New York, MacMillan Company, 1924), p. 386.

^Jose Lopez-Portillo y Rojas,
Diaz, (Mexico, D.F., Librer^a

Elevacion y Caida de Porfirio
Espanola, 1921), pp. 342-343.
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journalists who made frequent trips to jail. To be an
independent journalist was tantamount to being a criminal.

5 /

The 1890s marked the emergence of the cientificos as the
most powerful group in Mexico. The cientificos organized
formally in 1891 as the Liberal Union to nominate Diaz in
1892. Some of them, including Justo Sierra, were active
sponsors of an unsuccessful attempt to make judicial
appointments permanent. The group adopted as its name an
originally derisive term that singled them out as men who
would apply science to government. The cientificos were
highly educated and believed that they had reached their
position through the forces of social Darwinism. Their power
was exemplified by the social and political influence they
wielded, even over other porfiristas. They would play a
/r

major role in the development of the modern Mexican press.
Although the number of Mexican newspapers decreased
because of government persecution between 1900 and 1900, the
industry experienced its greatest expansion in terms of
technology and circulation numbers.

The success of la

.
prensa de a centavo ("penny press") of Mexico City

~

V

demonstrated the economic feasibility of small publications,

s
/
Ugarte, p. 73; Carleton Beals, Po f i n o Diaz, Dictator of
Mexico, (Philadelphia, J.B. Lipponcott Company, 1932), p.
271.
C.

Justo Sierra, "Dis^urso sobre inamovidad judicial,
pronunciado en la Camara <^e Diputados." December 12, 1893.
Reproduced in La Revolucion Mexicana. p. 155.
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bolstered by the subsidy system and a seemingly stable
economy.

Angel Pola began the first successful "penny"

newspaper, El Noticioso, in April, 1984. Not all of the
inexpensive newspapers were successful. Reyes Spindola,
before becoming publisher of the government giant, El
Imparcial, produced El Siglo XX, a penny newspaper. He
abandoned the project and wrote that it was impossible to
produce a paper at that price and compete with the
established press that sold its product for three or four
cents. Spindola, one of the most active Mexican publishers,
also published the magazine El Mundo Semanario Ilustrado,
7
the first modern weekly magazine m Mexico.
Spindola, sometimes revered as the father of modern
Mexican journalism, relied on personal relationships with
the powerful elite of the porfirian administration rather
than his publishing skills for career advancement. His most
famous contact was Jose Limantour, the youngest member of
the Diaz cabinet who became minister of finance in 1892. He
had been a key member in the 1880s of the regime's brain
trust that spawned the cientificos. Limantour was credited
with bringing Mexico's economy from a state of virtual
collapse to at least a surface prosperity. He was also

^Moises Ochoa Campos, Resena Histd>rica del Periodismo
Mexicano, (Mexico, D.F., Editorial Porrua, 1968), p. 119;
Jos^ Luis Martinez, "Mexico en busca de su expresi<£n," in
Historia general de Mexico, Volume 2, (Mexico, D.F., El
Colegio de Mexico, 1976) , p. 1068.

responsible for the government's sponsorship of El
Imparcial, which was to change forever the relationship
q
between Mexican journalism and the government.
Reyes Spindola benefited from the cientifico-porfirista
in-fighting. In 1896, Joaquin Barranda, a porfirista who was
at the time out of favor with the cientificos, started a
newspaper and asked Diaz for a subsidy. Diaz referred the
matter to Limantour who suggested the government instead put
a major subsidy in the hands of Reyes Spindola. In a rather
drastic change of tactics, the Mexican government cut back
its subsidies to other newspapers to provide El Imparcial
with the funding necessary to make it the most financially
9
sound newspaper m Mexico.
Given $100,000 (Mex.), Spindola began El Imparcial, the
first newspaper in Mexico to use a Linotype and be published
on a state-of-the-art rotary press. The paper's initial
circulation was between 8,000 and 10,000 daily, about three
times that of the next largest paper in Mexico City. The
government provided a yearly subsidy of $70,000 (Mex.) and
reduced subsidies to other newspapers. Mexican historians
date the beginning of modern journalism in Mexico with the
founding of El Imparcial. All major Mexican newspapers were

^Ochoa Campos, pp. 120-121; "El Partido Democr^tico", Oct.
30, 1909, reproduced in La Revoluci^n Mexicana, Tomo II. p.
145.
9

Sandels, pp. 56-57.
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to be affected by the innovations implemented at that paper,
including modern printing and typesetting methods, improved
design and increased use of wire services.10
Cient^fico Francisco Bulnes later wrote that 1896 was the
year the porfirian regime changed from being a military to a
civil dictatorship. The administration's ambition concerning
the press centered on control rather than suppression. To
this end, the government raised the price of newsprint to
three times what it was in the United States. Subsidies had
reached a point that the press was viewed as part of the
bureaucracy and it was the duty of this bureaucracy,
knowingly or unknowingly, to create the illusion of
democracy. A Mexican writer and contemporary of Reyes
Spindola summed up

this duty in his description of

El

Imparcial: "It was

for Diaz and the cientificos, because it

was supposed to paint them and all their actions in a good
light, and it was,

in part, for the public peace because it

constituted a part

of the porfirian forces to continue the

peaceful dominion of the president." 11
Journalists who failed in their duties often encountered
what Bulnes called "maximum terror." The Diaz administration
made liberal use of the defamation laws. The most common

10Ibid; Ldpez-Portillo Y Rojas, pp. 341-342; Diaz Fernando
Penalosa, The Mexican Book Industry, (New York, Scarecrow
Press, 1957), p. 59.
1;1L<£pez-Portillo y Rojas, p. 343.
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method of administrative coercion was incarcerating wayward
journalists in the Mexico City jails, of which Belen was the
most famous.

i2

Belen Prison was about half the size of a city block and
held from 5,000 to 6,000 men, 300 boys and 600 women.
Sanitation was almost completely lacking; 176 prisoners were
stricken with typhus in a single day. The first days of a
person's incarceration were the worst —

prisoners were

placed in dank, dirt-floored, subterranean cells without
light and only a hole in a corner for a toilet. 13
Ricardo Flores Mag^n, twenty years after serving his first
sentence in Belen in 1893, described the prison:
The dungeon was unpaved, and a layer of mud from
three to four inches thick composed the floor,
while the walls oozed a turbid fluid which
prevented from drying up the expectorations,
countless, careless, former occupants had
negligently flung upon them. From the ceiling
enormous cobwebs overhung, in which huge, black,
horrid spiders lurked. In one corner, opening from
the sewer there was a hole . . . my lungs then
youthful and healthy could resist the poison of
that grave, my nerves, though sensitive, could be
trained by my will to respond with nothing more
than a slight tremor to the assaults and bites of
the rats in the dark. . . .

*1 O

Sandels, p. 60; Ethel Duffy Turner, Ricardo Flores Magon y
el Partido Liberal Mexicano, (hereafter referred to as
"Ethel Duffy Turner." Mexico, D.F., Comisi^n Nacional
Editorial del C.E.N., 1984), pp. 58-59.
^ d e Fornaro, pp. 80-81.
■^Flores Mag6n as quoted by Henry Weinberger in a letter to
the editor, The New Republic, July 5, 1922.
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After the first eight days, those prisoners were allowed
to mingle with the general population in the main part of
the prison. Belen also had the distinction of having an area ,
known as "the editor's room," a special area for journalists
who dared criticize important officials in the Mexican
government. It was said that Filomeno Mata kept a bed there
after 1893.15
In the spring of that year, Mata, founder, publisher and
editor of Diario del Hogar, found himself at odds with the
Diaz administration over the persecution of some young
journalists. The conflict between Mata and the
administration represented fundamental differences regarding
\

the interpretation of the 1857 constitution and was long
standing, as feuds between old acquaintances tend to be. A
long-time Mexico City publisher, Mata reflected both the
growth in the newspaper industry and the economic problems
facing the small publisher lacking strong connections within
the porfirian administration. Throughout its existence,
Diario del Hogar was four pages, sometimes without the
advertising to justify even that. In the beginning, its size
was probably limited more by technological than political
constraints (type was handset and the newspaper was printed
on a hand operated press). Having had an amiable
relationship with Diaz that dated from the president's days

15Beals, p. 272.
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as a revolutionary, Mata left the favored camp in 1888 over
the issue of reelection and from then on saw the growth of
advertising in newspapers more popular with the
government.^
Mata began his career in 1869 at age 24, working under the
tutelage of two established editors, Vicente Garcia Torres
of El Monitor Republicano (founded in 1844) and Ireno Paz of
La Patria (founded in 1877) . These two papers represented
the dichotomy of the Mexican press. La Patria became part of
the claque D^az established in 1888. El Monitor Republicano,
conversely, was noted for its tenacity in reporting
government misdeeds (including the various incarcerations of
Mata) and was closed down in 1896 by the government and
replaced with a pro-government paper, El Monitor. In the
beginning, both publishers had reflected the optimistic
liberalism of the age of reform, as did Mata, the former
college professor from San Luis Potosx whom they introduced
to journalism.^
Mata displayed not only optimism but ambition in his
youth, founding four separate newspapers in the 1870s: El
Sufragio Libre, El Cascabel, La Hoja Electrica, and El
Monitor Tuxtepecano. In 1881, Mata established Diario del
Hogar, originally intended to be a newspaper for families.
*

^Ibid; Ugarte, pp. 52 and 66; personal interview with Jane
Dale Lloyd.
17

Beals, p. 267; Diario del Hogar, December 30, 1896.
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Mata identified his market for the publication, which sold
for five centavos or 75 centavos for a month's subscription,
as the literate, middle-class Mexican family. 18
In his first issue, he began the serialization of two
novels, one translated for the paper from French. Mata was
more interested in making a living than in espousing
political causes. The country seemed politically stable and
Mexico City provided not only an audience for Mata's mild
publication but also work for his job presses. Mata also
accepted a government subsidy. 19
Mata's plans for his newspaper were soon changed.
Criticism of his publication by the hierarchy of the
Catholic Church in Mexico damaged sales and he had to look
beyond the family market. Later, during the Gonzales
interim, Mata criticized government actions interfering with
journalistic activity, ending his political non-involvement.
He did not, however, editorially oppose the reentry of Diaz
to presidential office in 1884 although he did refuse a
government subsidy that year. Throughout most of his career,
Mata refrained from editorially attacking Diaz personally.
Instead, he blamed real and imagined wrongs on those who
surrounded the president. 20

18Mata, pp. 14-15.
19 Ibid, pp. 19-23; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
20Ugarte, p. 68.
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The first overt break between the two men came on June 22,
1885, when Diaz ordered publication of a sedition law
prohibiting articles damaging to the president or his
ministers. The issue was the debt owed Britain. Mata wrote
that he would be the first to censor a press that did not do
its job, but that he wanted more respect for the basic
institutions of society. He prudently drew the line at
disrespect of government but was critical of those
governmental activities that "strike at the fundamental law
of the republic.

>

When Diaz presented himself as a presidential candidate
\

again in 1888, Mata editorially opposed the nomination but
was careful to level his criticism against the idea of reelection and not against Diaz himself. While Mata's
editorial attitude toward Diaz as an individual was always
tempered, he irrevocably split with the administration
because of two incidents. In 1890, Luis Gonzales, the editor
of El Explorador in Morelia, was murdered. The assassination
was ordered by the governor of Michoacan, who, under the
caudillo system as perfected in porfirian Mexico, was
untouchable. The state governors held as much power, if not
more, in their states, as Diaz did over the country. News of
the crime was published in Diario and Mata began devoting

Ugarte, p. 68; Juan G<Smez Quinones, Porfirio Dia 2 , los
Intelectuales y la Revoluci^n, (Mexico, D.F., El Caballito,
1981), p. 29.
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more and more editorial space to the plight of the press in
Mexico. 22
That same year the secret police sacked Mata's home on the
pretense of searching for fugitives, terrifying his wife,
children and aged father. Miguel Cabrera, head of the
growing policia secreta (also known as the bravi), led the
raid. He entered the home, pistol in hand, and threatened
Mata, accusing him of hiding criminals. The secret police
were part of what Mata came to call "a government that has
little love of its people." 23
Mata was not the first journalist to find fault with the
government, and there were other editors more outspoken.
Many publications criticized government actions after the
1892 reelection of Diaz. In early spring of 1893, the
government responded by arresting hundreds of journalists.
The news of those arrests appeared on the front page of
Diario del Hogar, and on March 7 the government charged Mata
and his staff with 37 counts of defamation. A short jail
term did not stop Mata, and on March 18 he again criticized
the government in an article headlined: "What is the
Difference between 1877 and 1893?" The difference, he wrote,

22Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 19.
2^Mata, pp. 39-49; Diario del Hogar, October 28, 1892.
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was that now Mexico had railroads, and while foreigners
built the railroads, Mexico had the debt. 24
On April 1, 1893, the government arrested the editorial
staffs of two publications, Noventa y Tres and El Democrats.
Both had been founded the year before, staffed mostly by
college students who were impatient for change in Mexico. In
an editorial, Mata protested the jailing of the young
journalists. The next day, Diario was not published, and for
the next two weeks the content of the paper was noticeably
unpolitical. This became a telling trend in the paper: when
Mata was incarcerated at Belen, which happened more than 30
times in 1893, the paper was bereft of any news of radical
or press activity, concentrating on innocuous news or
poetry.

25

When Mata was free and working, notices of government
malfeasance or press persecution filled the Boletin section
of Diario del Hogar. Mata was free on April 28 when Diario
reported the final government closure of El Democrata. The
paper had been closed for a particularly critical piece and
Mata responded by quoting, almost in its entirety, the
article, which began, "Not since the tyranny of Santa Anna.

24

Stanley^R. Ross, editor, Fuentes de la Historia
Conteroporanea de Mexico, Peri6dicos y Revistas, [Mexico,
D.F., El Colegio de Mexico, 1965), pp. 235-237.; Diario del
Hogar, March 7 and March 18, 1893.
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Interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.; Diario del Hogar, April
2, 1893.
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..."

Still, Mata soft-pedaled Diaz's responsibility: "We

don't believe that the president of the republic, a man who
has shown in other times a passion for liberal ideals, gave
the order for this persecution." He did not excuse Diaz,
either: "But at the same time, he has not intervened."
The next day, Mata continued his verbal barrage,
predicting accurately the government closure of

El 93 and

La Oposicion. Mata, who rarely referred to himself in print,
noted that the directors of El Monitor, El Tiempo, and
Diario del Hogar were only at liberty because they had paid
a bond to a Mexico City court as insurance against
defamation and added that he, alone, was responsible for the
publication of this particular article in Diario. Another
prophetic article on the front page was headlined: "Opinion
of the Press: Near the End."

Publication of Diario was not

resumed until May 2, 1893.^
On May 12, Mata urged the government to pass a law that
would protect the press from the judicial system. The
coverage of the journalists incarcerated in Belen continued,
and at the end of May, Mata wrote, "The society of Mexico
hungers and thirsts for justice." Mata spent most of June in
prison, and the contents of Diario reflected his absence.
Mata referred to his own incarcerations only once, noting
Interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.,* Diario del Hogar, April
28, 1893.
^Diario del Hogar, April 29, 1893.
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dryly, "Yes, we have seen the insides of Belen." But his
adventures with the bravi were covered by other
publications, especially El Monitor Republicano,

until the

government forced that publication into permanent suspension
in 1896. Undoubtedly because of his relationship with Draz,
Mata received preferential treatment, at times even being
allowed to write articles inside the prison.

28

In early July authorities brought defamation charges
against Diario del Hogar for the 39th time that year. Mata
reported the event on July 11 in an article that shared the
front page with

one about Belen. Predictably, after those

articles, Diario concentrated on other news: European news
was given a fair amount of play, as were problems in
Nicaragua, speeches by U.S. President Grover Cleveland and
matter-of-fact reporting of elections in the Mexican
provinces. The lack of coverage of persecution of the press
indicates that in all probability Mata was in Belen, but he
was out by August 22 and brought his readers good news: an
amnesty had been suggested for journalists in Belen.
Enthusiastically, Mata called the idea of an amnesty "the
conquest of right" and actually praised the government for
the move, which he may well have begun in personal
correspondence with D^az. When the amnesty failed to
materialize, Mata took a different tack: he ran the names of
28

Diario del Hogar, May 2 and 30, 1893; personal interview
with Jane Dale Lloyd.

35

journalists incarcerated in Belen. For three consecutive
days the lists appeared: set in 8-point type with a 14-pica
column width, the lists ran 20 inches —

totaling 60 inches

of names. Then, again, the paper became silent on the
issue. 29
In late October, Daniel Cabrera, founder and editor of El
Hijo del Ahuizote and one of the few men who could claim as
much time in Belen as Mata, was arrested. Mata complained in
print, "We have had the opportunity to read the article
[which Cabrera was arrested for] and, frankly, we were
surprised at the proceedings because it dealt with a country
far away from Mexico."

Again, the tone of Diario changed

for a time. 30
Both Cabrera and Mata corresponded with Diaz during their
stays in prison. The dictator replied that while he would
like to help them their fate was out of his hands. He blamed
their situation on the attitudes of others in his
administration. Throughout his regime, D^az managed to
maintain friendly relations with the great majority of
members of the press, even those who were editorially
opposed his reelection. The real enemy for most of them was
not the man but the system, and by 18 93 the system had
almost succeeded in eliminating the opposition press in
.
P i a n o del Hogar, August 1 through 22, August 31 through
September 5, 1893; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
29

Diario del Hogar, October 27-30, 1893.
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Mexico. Many of the journalists incarcerated in 1893 did not
raise their editorial voices again for seven years. Although
1896 is the year Mexican historians identify as the
beginning of the great development of Mexican journalism,
marked by the founding of the cientifico-funded El Imparcial
and the use of Linotype machines in Mexico, the government
had come close to effectively stamping out opinion in the
press three years earlier.

31

By 1896, three independent papers were left in Mexico
City: Diario del Hogar, El Hijo del Ahuizote (Cabrera's
caricaturist weekly), and El Monitor Republicano. Perhaps
Diario and El Hijo de Ahuizote were allowed to continue,
albeit with frequent jail sentences for their administrators
and staffs, because of the publishers' old ties to D:faz. El
Monitor Republicano was not so fortunate and the government
permanently suspended its operations in late 1896. The paper
was replaced by the cientifico-oriented Monitor, and the
change was chronicled in Diario by Fabian Conde, a Diario
staff member responsible for much of the government
criticism that appeared in its pages during the late '90s.
An article headlined "Are there party politics in Mexico?"
praised the old Monitor as "The defender of honorable
politics, true liberties and the right of the people to know

31

P i a n o del Hogar, October 24, 1893; Ochoa Campos, p. 125.
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their institutions." The new Monitor, Conde predicted, would
/ .
1?
be nothing more than a vehicle for cientifico propaganda.
In early 1897, Conde began a series of articles on the
periodistas del gobierno (government journalists), referring
mainly to the staff of the new Monitor, also published by
Reyes Spindola. In the articles, Conde passionately accused
the Monitor staff of betraying everything from the
constitution of 1857 to the Catholic Church, labeling it as
a counter-revolutionary against the constitution of 1857.
"What kind of government would you have us have?" he asked.
Mata published an article disclosing the amount of
government money Reyes Spindola received for the Monitor
alone: a start-up subsidy of $100,000 (Mex.), an annual
subsidy of $52,000, and advertising revenues and jobprinting contracts that amounted to more than $12,000 a
month. The publishing business in porfirian Mexico reflected
the status quo: those with connections flourished and those
without struggled. 33
The porfirian administrators had the press in Mexico City
under control, but the same economic conditions that created
the market for growth of journalism in the capital were also
at play in the provinces where the federal powers were
32 Sandels, pp. 53, 54 and 59; personal interview with Jane
Dale Lloyd; Diario del Hogar, December 30, 1896 and January
9, 1897.
33
Diario del Hogar, January 26 and February 20, 1897;
Ugarte, p. 84; Mata, p. 55.
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filtered through state governors. In those areas, where
subsidies did not exist and the federal government could not
enforce the monopoly on newsprint, the conflict was between
the state governments and the publishers.
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Chapter 3
THE VIEW FROM CHIHUAHUA: 1899

Northern Mexico is a harsh land. The few officers of the
Mexican Army who served in Chihuahua in the 1800s called it
"the hot country." Cattle ranching and mining began there in
the eighteenth century, and the Spaniards and mestizos who
settled that desert area had to be as hard as the Apaches
from whom they took the land. Slightly less forbidding was
the high plateau where la Ciudad de Chihuahua was built, but
even there cattle ranches had to be mammoth to be
profitable.^
Far from Mexico City and economically tied to the United
States, the chihuahuenses, recognizing their unique
problems, advocated states' rights early in Mexican

V

N

independence. When asked what kind of government should rule
Mexico, a Chihuahua delegate told the national congress in
1824, "We are not interested in the problem. We want you to
help us fight the Apache." 2
That same year, the governor of Chihuahua brought the
first printing press in from Durango, and two years later
the first newspaper or, more properly, the first
journalistic publication, appeared in the city of Chihuahua.
i
Manuel Machado, Jr., The North Mexican Cattle Industry,
1910-1975, Ideology, Conflict, and Change, (College Station,
Texas, A&M University Press, 1981), p. 3.
^Sandels, p. 19.
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Titled "verdaderos y falsos independientes," it was a
document published by a state legislator to inform the
public of the dangers of Spanish domination in Spanish
America. In 1827, the weekly El Centinela was founded but
failed after seven issues. The small population of Chihuahua
simply could not support an ongoing newspaper at that time.
Publications in Chihuahua were short lived or one-time-only
papers with specific political purposes, such as explaining
a political belief or making a political nomination. During
the final years of the nineteenth century, the economic high
point of the porfiriato, the population in Chihuahua grew to
about 400,000 and the improved technology in the printing
trade made commercial journalism feasible in the border
state. Then, in 1890, several prominent chihuahuense
businessmen, including Enrique Creel, established a weekly,
El Imparcial.
Porfirian Chihuahua was ruled by Luis Terrazas, who owned
more cattle than any individual in the world. A popular
Chihuahuense story about Don Luis is that when a U.S. agent
asked him if he could supply 70,000 head of cattle to feed
the U.S. troops during the Spanish-American war, Don Luis
replied, "What color?" The son of a butcher, Don Luis became
rich as a result of the wars of the 1850s and 1860s. As a
3This overview of nineteenth century journalism of Chihuahua
was drawn from Francisco R. Alameda, La Imprenta y el
Periodismo en Chihuahua, (Mexico, D.F., Gobierno del Estado
de Chihuahua, 1943) .
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jefe politico, he was able to expropriate for the government
land owned by the church or landowners who supported the
losing side. He then purchased the property himself or sold
it cheaply to relatives.

4

Diaz and Don Luis knew and distrusted each other for good
reason. Don Luis became governor of Chihuahua in 1860 and in
1871 led chihuahuense forces against porfirian troops during
Diaz's revolt against Juarez. Diaz claimed victory in
Chihuahua briefly, placing one of his men in the governor's
chair. When Don Luis reclaimed the office after Diaz's
defeat in 1872, the peace accord between the two men
supposedly included a verbal promise from Diaz that he would
never again set foot in Chihuahua. After Diaz became
president in 1876, he replaced Don Luis with his own
appointee, but that man was rejected by the state
legislature in 1879 and Don Luis resumed the position.
Expediently, he declared himself a porfirista in 1880. Thus
began the uneasy truce between the president of Mexico and
the man in Chihuahua who not only controlled the cattle
industry but had or would have monopolies in the banking,
beer and iron works industries and who would eventually own
5
the telephone and urban transit companies of Chihuahua.

^Personal interview with Margarita Terrazas Perches. July 4,
1986.
^Sandels, p. 22-32.
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The split between Don Luis and Diaz never completely
healed and the two men avoided direct confrontation. In
1892, supporters of Diaz in Chihuahua informed him that Don
Luis was propably a secret supporter of Catarino Garza, an
expatriot Mexican journalist who tried, unsuccessfully, to
launch a revolt against Diaz from Texas. Diaz did not take
action on the information, correctly surmizing that Garza
did not represent a viable threat to his administration.
Ultimately, a young journalist who disapproved of Don Luis's
administration weakened public acceptance of the porfirian
regime in Chihuahua.^
In 1894, 21-year-old Silvestre Terrazas, a distant
relative of Don Luis, returned to his native Chihuahua from
Mexico City where he had studied business administration and
accounting and found work as the personal secretary to
Bishop Jesus Ortiz of Chihuahua. From these unlikely
beginnings, Terrazas emerged as one of the most unlikely
heroes of the revolution —

the man Francisco Bulnes would

someday call "the intellectual author of the revolution in
Chihuahua."7

Friedrich Katz, editor. Porfirio Diaz Frente al Descontento
Popular Regional (1891-1893), (Mexico, D.F., Universidad
Iberoamericana, 1986) , passim.
7Margarita Terrazas Perches, "Biografia de Silvestre
Terrazas", as published in El Verdadero Pancho Villa,
(Ciudad de Chihuahua, Chihuahua, Mexico, Talleres Griificos
de Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua, 1984), p. 323.
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Don Silvestre's social background made possible his
employment with the church, which allied itself with the
landed gentry. An ancestor had come to Chihuahua in the
early part of the eighteenth century, and while Don
Silvestre was not as rich as his grandparents' first cousin,
Don Luis, he inherited a considerable amount of property
from his parents as well as two estates from aunts. In
Chihuahua he enjoyed a reputation as a liberal thinker, but
his home life reflected the chauvinism of his time. He did
not allow his children to play with the poor children of
Chihuahua and he was adamantly opposed to any member of his
family marrying anyone who had even a trace of Indian
ancestry. His first public office was president of the
Bicycle Club of Chihuahua.®
In 1897, Bishop Ortiz, always politically active,
conceived the idea of a weekly publication, Revista
Catolica, to expound the views of the church. He named Don
Silvestre and Ortega Gonzales as co-editors, but the
responsibilities soon fell to Don Silvestre alone. That same
year, the enterprising young man also began his own
publication, La Lira Chihuahuense, a monthly literary
magazine. While poetry was the mainstay of Don Silvestre's
own publication, the Catholic weekly followed the church
line: that liberalism foolishly freed men from restraints on

8
Personal interview with Margarita Terrazas Perches.

44

their behavior, thereby creating secular evil that tore at
the fabrxc of society. 9
As a Catholic and especially as a journalist who
identified himself with the "Catholic press" of Mexico,
Terrazas probably shared the same misgivings concerning
positivism, the nominal guiding philosphy of the
cientificos. Church and state had been not only separate but
almost at war with each other since Mexico achieved
independence from Spain. Diaz had initiated a moderately
successful reconciliation policy. Positivism was not a
sacred cow in the Catholic press, which included El Pais, a
Mexico City daily with the second-largest circulation in the
country. But as a practicality, this conflict was probably
little more than an intellectual abstraction to the young
journalist. Don Sylvestre later was influential in the
founding of both the Catholic Press Association and the
l
Associated Press of the Mexican States, but in 1897 he dealt
with the realities of being an employee of the Bishop and a
vassal of Don Luis.^
Chihuahua enjoyed a flurry of journalistic activity during
the last decade of the nineteenth century, spurred by the
economic stability of the porfirian regime and the influx of

^Sandels, p. 67.
■^Leopoldo Zea, Positivism in Mexico, (translated by
Josephine H. Schulte. Austin, University of Texas Press,
1974), p. 15.
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U.S. dollars. In fact, several of the 40-odd publications
that began during that period were published in English,
aimed at the growing American population that was encouraged
to come to Mexico by both the porfirian regime and that of
Don Luis. Mexican publications were beginning to rely more
on advertising revenues than income from subscriptions, and
Don Silvestre, who had successfully managed two other
publications for two years, had the necessary contacts to
build an adequate advertising base. In the fall of 1898, he
decided to begin his own daily newspaper, to be named after
an earlier, unsuccessful, daily.
In a prospectus written in December 1898, Don Silvestre
promised to circulate daily 2,000 copies of El Correo de
Chihuahua beginning January 1, 1899. The paper, he wrote,
would include news of mining, agriculture and industry in
Chihuahua, as well as important national and international
news. The monthly subscription rate would be 50 centavos in
the city of Chihuahua and 60 centavos throughout the rest of
the state. Don Silvestre was confident of success but
continued as editor of La Revista Catolica and the Lira
12

Chihuahuense.

Three names adorned the masthead of El Correo, but the
work fell again to Don Silvestre. He did most of the writing
^Almada, pp. 25-28.
12Silvestre Terrazas, "Prospectus", December 1, 1898. M-B
Part 1, Box 110, Terrazas collection.

46

and probably some of the printing on the small press set up
in the lobby of a Chihuahua hotel to print the two other
publications for which Don Silvestre was responsible. El
Correo was four small pages and the "news" was tame:
articles on the Spanish-American War, local population
growth and the importance of the novel in nineteenth century
literature. The paper editorially aligned itself with the
Catholic church and offered its readers few surprises. Don
Silvestre did, however, publish an editorial that bemoaned
the state of Mexican journalism. Most papers, he wrote,
existed only so their publishers could collect the subsidy
and this was particularly true m

the capital. 13

Then, on March 1, 1899, an unknown assailant attempted to
gun down Severo I. Aguirre, editor of the Chihuahua daily,
El Norte, the president of the fledgling Chihuahua Press
Associaton and a friend of Don Silvestre. Aguirre survived,
and the Press Association published a complaint concerning
the lack of police efforts to apprehend the would-be
assassin. The criminal, according to the journalists, had
been hired by a local politico who had been verbally
attacked in El Norte. Don Silvestre and five other
journalists signed the protest, printed in El Correo.14

13

Correo de Chihuahua, January 1 through 16, 1899.

14Ibid. March 2, 1899.
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The public protest was only the second time Don Silvestre
had criticized local government; the first was on January
16, 1899, when he wrote an editorial criticizing the lack of
efficiency in the Chihuahua post office (something that
would become a life-long complaint of the publisher). The
protest would also be the last for at least three years: at
the end of March, the paper ceased publication and Don
Silvestre devoted his energies exclusively to the two other
publications.
In 1902 Don Silvestre re-established El Correo de
Chihuahua

and created his circulation by combining the

subscription lists of La Revista Catolica and La Lira
Chihuahuense. Work on these publications provided necessary
experience for Don Silvestre to launch a successful
publication. The new paper used a full broadsheet format and
from the beginning had an established wire service.
While the 1902 CQrreo de Chihuahua was still basically a
propaganda organization for the Catholic Church, changes
were in the wind —

changes that perhaps Don Silvestre was

unaware of. His early experience had taught him the
importance of the press organizations and his involvement
with the church gave him a sense of social responsibility.
Don Silvestre was painfully aware of certain problems in
Chihuahua, such as the abundance of American workers, which

■^Ibid. January 16, 1898; Sandels, p. 76.
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kept local residents unemployed; an incredibly high
alcoholism rate among the campesinos; and the lack of
educational opportunities for them.
Despite regional differences, the situation in Chihuahua
reflected national problems and the inability of the
government to address them at any level. Further,
interesting parallels existed between the power structure in
Chihuahua and the capital. Diaz ruled the capital, and Don
Luis, Chihuahua. The two men had each chosen proteges. Diaz
toyed with the idea of nominating Limantour as his
successor, but abandoned the scheme when politicians and the
press complained that Limantour, although born in Mexico
City, was the son of French parents. Enrique Creel, a U.S.
citizen's son who was born while his father was serving in
Chihuahua as U.S. Consul, faced similar objections when Don
Luis hand-picked him as governor of Chihuahua. But while
Diaz picked Limantour because of his keen financial
abilities, Creel's association with Don Luis was a bit
closer: Don Luis was his father-in-law."^
For reasons lost to history, a great animosity grew
between Don Silvestre and Enrique Creel. Ironically, it may
have been this animosity that hastened the downfall of the
porfirian regime. Don Silvestre would have never endorsed
Alfonso de Maria y Campos, "Porfirianos prominentes:
Ongenes y Anos de Juventud de Ocho Integrantes del Grupo de
los Cientificos, 1846-1876." Historia Mexicana. Vol. XXXVI,
April-June, 1985. pp. 610-640.
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violent revolt, but the Madero revolution began in and was
won in Chihuahua, largely because Don Silvestre had spent
years unwittingly preparing his readers for a moderate
revolutionary movement.
But those were things to come. When Don Silvestre returned
to the mundane business of publishing the church's weekly
and a monthly literature magazine, the history of Mexico was
being determined by a small group of men, mostly
journalists, who had decided that something had to be done
about the administration of Porfirio Diaz.
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Chapter 4
THE POLITICS OP SILENCE: 1906-1908

The first five years of the 20th century cast Mexico's
future. Due to self-interest, the porfirian administration
had left the country socially stunted, economically
constricted and politically intolerant. Both the Mexican and
international press kept the realities of Mexico from their
readers, either through ignorance or design.
Historians now acknowledge that Mexico reached its
economic breaking point in 1900, but this was not recognized
at the time. According to many U.S. papers, Porfirio Diaz
was the statesmen of his time. Seemingly single-handedly, he
had transformed Mexico from a revolution-prone, economically
backward country to a nation known to provide both
preference and generous guarantees to foreign investors. The
economic stability of Mexico was an illusion that made a
media event of the Pan-American Conference of 1901,attended
by diplomats from every sovereign nation in the western
hemisphere except Chile. The financial powers of the world
believed that the porfirian magic could be worked in other
parts of Latin America.
The conference in Mexico City began in the spring and
dragged on through November. The delegates failed to
accomplish their goal of establishing a system of
arbitration for international disputes in the Western
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Hemisphere. Still, reporters from all over the world, and
especially the United States, flocked to Mexico and coverage
of Mexican affairs was more common than at any time since
the short reign of Maximilian. The number of articles
appearing in U.S. papers increased dramatically from 1900 to
1901 —

the New York Times ran only 10 news stories about

Mexico in 1900 but 42 the following year. The articles
typically featured one of two Mexican attractions: business
or the colorful president.^
The international press painted a glowing picture of the
profits to be made from investments in Mexico and of the
president who made those profits possible. "President Diaz,"
according to the New York Times, "has succeeded in making
himself not only loved by the common people but by the socalled aristocracy of the republic." The moneyed classes may
or may not have loved Don Porfirio but they at least needed
him. Those not of the moneyed classes, particularly the 35
percent of the Mexican population that was indigenous, were >
lucky to be ignored by the Mexican hierarchy. When attention
was paid to the Mexican Indian and campesino, it usually
meant war, deprivation of land or involuntary servitude on
the henequen plantations of the Valle Nacional in southern
Mexico.

2

^New York Times, 1900-1901; Index to the New York Times,
1860-1910.
^New York Times, July 16, 1901.
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^

Those social conditions simply were not reported. The
foreign press reflected the imperialistic, exploitative
mentality of the times. In a professional mining journal, an
American mining engineer marveled at the capabilities of the
Mexican miners who were paid about 25

cents (U.S.) a day.

He described them as looking like "undersized boys" who
existed on a diet of corn and beans. "To see a group of four
load a motor weighing 470 pounds on the back of a fifth," he
wrote, "gives one a curious sensation." Anglo prejudice
relegated most Mexicans to sub-human status and their plight
was therefore ignored in the U.S. press. But for a Mexican
publisher, especially a Mexico City publisher, to report the
atrocities committed by the Diaz Regime was, at the very
least, economic suicide. Even the most radical of the anti
administration press presented abstract arguments concerning
law rather than objective reporting about the real problems
of Mexico. Publishers avoided criticizing Diaz only
partially because of fear of Belen. Many if not most of the
Mexican intelligencia believed the country would flounder
without D^az.^
In reality, the Mexican ecomomy was already floundering.
The porfirian-induced economic health was a house of cards,
supporting the rich at the expense of the poor. While
foreign investments came into Mexico by the millions of
2
Mark R. Lamb, "Mining labor and supplies in Mexico,"
Engineering and Mining Journal. December 26, 1908, p. 1,245.
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dollars, pounds and francs, the real income of the Mexican
population declined by 57 percent during the porfiriato.
Hardest hit were the campesinos who paid a 108-percent
increase for maize and a 163-percent increase for beans,
while receiving an average 60-percent increase in wages
during the same period. The middle class benefited
economically from the porfiriato, but it could not afford
the all-important symbolic trappings of affluence such as
imported clothing and furniture.^
The grievances of Mexico's poor, and even her middle
class, went almost unnoticed in the Mexican press, or what
was left of it after the porfirian repression of the 1890s.
In 1893, in headline-sized type, Filomeno Mata had printed
"The opposition press is inevitable under an unjust
government," but by 1900 there were only six important
newspapers left in Mexico City. On January 1, 1901, Diario
del Hogar listed them: El Pais, the pro-Catholic daily that
boasted the largest circulation; the heavily subsidized,
government-controlled El Imparcial; the equally wellsubsidized English-language daily, the Mexico City Herald;
Diario del Hogar which by then was printed only three days a
week; the often-cited weekly El Hijo de Ahuizote; and the
erratic Regeneraci^n, which appeared only when Jesus,

4
Cockcroft, p. 46.
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Ricardo and Enrique Flores Mag<£n were out of Belen, which
was not often.

C

All but Regeneracion and possibly El Pafs relied on
government subsidies. The slogan of the Diaz administration,
pan o palo (bread or stick), applied stringently to the
press. Papers that favored the Diaz administration found the
association profitable. El Imparcial and the Mexico City
Herald received government subsidies of about 50,000 pesos a
year. In turn, they printed articles favorable to the
administration. The Herald was particularly important as it
was the source of most Associated Press copy from Mexico
published in newspapers in the United States. The Herald was
the favored newspaper of the regime and could boast of
having the most (and most prestigious) advertising and the
most pages per issue. From 1900 on, it ran between 12 and 24
pages —

twice the size of El Imparcial, which was openly

controlled by the government. Unlike the Spanish-language
newspapers that relied heavily on subscriptions for
circulation, the Herald was distributed through street
sales, selling for 5 centavos in the city and 10 centavos on
the trains. While there is no record of its circulation, it
claimed to be "Mexico's largest" —

larger than El

Imparcial, which had reached a circulation of 40,000 by

5
P i a n o del Hogar, January 1, 1901.
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1900, and El Pais, which published more than 100,000 copies
a day in 1908.6
Publishers ignored the most important ongoing news story
of Mexico. Whether they were for or against Diaz, most
informed Mexicans recognized Diaz's age as the most pressing'
problem of the 1900-1910 decade. While this subject was the
theme of several articles in the New York Times, only one
Mexican publication dealt with it.
El Hijo de Ahuizote, a weekly newspaper that featured
political cartoons, was easily the most radical of the
ongoing publications in Mexico. Like Mata, Daniel Cabrera,
who founded El Hijo in 1885, had ties with Diaz that dated
from the days of the Juarez presidency. As publisher,
Cabrera gave the nod to caricatures that would be dangerous
even in modern times, while still relying on government
7
subsidies to upgrade his printing equipment.
Diaz was almost always portrayed as an aging, foolish man
in El Hijo de Ahuizote, and Cabrera paid a heavy price for
his sense of humor: he was probably one of the few long-term
Mexican publishers who spent as much time in Belen as did
Mata. In a particularly scathing portrait in 1900, a
crippled Diaz, supported by crutches labeled militarising and
^Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografla de la Revolucion Mexicana,
(Mexico, D.F., El Instituto Mexicana Cultural, 1964), p. 92;
Gomez Quinones, p. 97; Ochoa Campos, p. 126; Mexico City
Herald, Feb. 2, 1906; El Imparcial, Feb. 4, 1908.
7
Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
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clericalismo, limped down the stairs of unpopularity while
the people looked on and laughed. Diaz also appeared as a
disinterested observer of a hanging skeleton bearing the
words "The Constitution" and of rigged elections. When the
radicals of Mexico City sought to take over a publication it
is no wonder they turned in 1903 to El Hijo, the publication
that ran the words "Mexico for Mexicans" on its masthead.
Cabrera leased his publication while still in Belen and was
reincarcerated upon his release for being a party to the
"new" El Hijo.^
Two years earlier Mata's son, Luis, had gone to jail for
admitting to printing El Hijo de Ahuizote in his father's
print shop after authorities closed down Cabrera's presses.
Luis later praised his father for handling the situation
with journalistic restraint. Mata reacted to his son's
imprisonment by writing: "The violent repression of totally
hostile actions toward a system of government established on
a solid base of justice and morality . . .

to avoid

'unsettling germs'. . . [is] abuse that would completely
impede aspirations of progress." 9
The caricatures for which Cabrerra was persecuted were not
without a solid foundation in reality. In November 1900, the
71-year-old Diaz traveled to Oaxaca to hunt, but upon
^Eduardo del R:fo, Un siglo de caricatura en Mexico, (Mexico,
D.F., Grijalbo, 1984), p. 17.
^Mata, p. 59.
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becoming too ill to go out he returned to the capital. When
he remained bed-ridden and in semi-seclusion until spring,
concerns about the succession developed among the
politicians of Mexico. Already, the real power was slipping
from him and the administration reflected the ambitions of
the cientificos. Administration officials engaged in
political in-fighting —
cientifico porfirianos —

largely between cientifico and nonwhile the marginally independent

press called for a return to adherence to the system of law N
created by the 1857 constitution.1®
When Diaz regained his health, he proved he was still the
grand master of Mexican politics. Always adept at using the
press for his own ends, he planted in El Imparcial an
article accusing the cientificos of thievery and
malfeasance, and the story was circulated in many pro
government publications. In 1904 Diaz saw to it that the
constitution was again amended to provide him yet another
six-year term and the post of Vice President was created.

^

Diaz chose Ramon Corral for this position, a man so
unpopular with all factions that he afforded no real
political threat to the old man .11

10

(

New York Times, February 2, 1901.

■^Francisco Bulnes, El Verdadero Diaz y la Revoluci^n,
(Mexico, D.F., Editora Nacional, 1952), pp. 328-329; Peter
Calvert, Mexico, (Great Britain, Praeger Books, 1973), p.
56.
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Meanwhile, Filomeno Mata was reporting what he considered
one of the most important news stories of the decade: the
formation and growth of the Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga.
He wrote several stories about the organization in
January,and he attended the club's first meeting in San Luis
Potosi on February 5, 1901. The meeting had been called by
Camilo Arriaga, an engineer by profession, who was upset
about the resurgence in power of the Catholic church in
Mexico. Arriaga organized the meeting in response to a
Mexican bishop's statements at a general assembly of the
International Congress of Catholic agencies in Paris the
summer before. The priest had boasted that under Diaz,
clerical economic and political elites had been re
established in Mexico. Of the 50 official delegates to the
original meeting of the Club Liberal, nine were journalists.
One of their first mandates was to establish more liberal
clubs at local levels with the proviso that many of these
clubs would produce their own newspapers, a common
occurrence for political clubs in Mexico at that time. 12
From its anti-clerical beginnings, the Club Liberal Poncia
Arriaga developed into the Partido Liberal Mexicano and
became, with small clubs spread throughout Mexico, the first
real revolutionary threat to the Porfirian regime. In a
public speech in July 1901, Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, one of

1 2 Mata,

p. 62; Cockcroft, pp. 92-93; Taracena, p. 61.
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the organizers of the Club Liberal, described Diaz as a
"caudillo who betrayed democracy, who holds the horseman's
spur which today lacerates the horse and tomorrow
disembowels the people.” The speech was not covered in the
Mexican press.
Mata, one of the nine journalists at the original meeting
of the Club Liberal, took a different tack in addressing the
problem of Diaz. In June 1901 he urged Diaz, in print, to
give "a demonstration of affection to the people from whom
he took the power in 1876." The "demonstration of affection"
Mata sought was relief from the defamation laws and the
judges who administered the cases against journalists.*-4
Both Soto y Gama and Mata suffered judicial repercussions
for their statements, and before the government temporarily
closed Diario del Hogar in the summer of 1902, Mata wrote
that the independent press of Mexico should have the same
rights of every Mexican citizen. He advised fellow
journalists not to rest on their laurels and to set the
ideals of truth, good faith and honesty as a standard of
publication. While the administration's case against Mata
was in progress, he wrote: "We have received a lot of
attention these last few days because of the legal
proceedings of which we have been the subject. Our newspaper

Cockcroft, p. 98.
14

Mata, pp. 63,64.
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has always distinguished itself because of the frankness of
the political opinions expressed in this section [el
Boletin] without ambiguity/ reticence, rancor or
vacillation, and without subversive tendencies." 15
When the government shut down the offices of Diario del
Hogar in Mexico City, the core group from San Luis Potosi
assisted Mata in publishing the newspaper in that city.
During this period Mata used his editorial space to plead
for the freedom of Ricardo Flores Magon, the 28-year-old
✓ 16
editor of La Regeneracion.

La Regeneracion, the most remembered pre-revolutionary
newspaper, was begun in 1900 by Ricardo's older brother,
Jesus. The paper began as a legal review, intended for
scholarly publication covering judicial proceedings. Ricardo
Flores Magon, who had been jailed during the 1893 repression
of newspapers, had studied law and joined the staff as an
editor. In fewer than three months the paper displayed the
words "an organ of combat" on its masthead. Within six
months, all three Flores Magon brothers were serving time in
Belen because of a defamation suit brought against the paper
by a provincial governor. Released in the spring of 1902,
Jesds retired from anything that could be construed as
"revolutionary activity" and quit journalism. Ricardo and

15Ibid
^Diario del Hogar, May 30, 1893.
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Enrique leased El Hijo de Ahuizote from aging publisher
Daniel Cabrera who was serving time in Belen. The two
brothers were back in Belen before Cabrera was released, and
the old man's term was extended for leasing his publication
to them. Undaunted, Ricardo and Enrique published no fewer
than eight versions of El Hijo during the next two years and
were involved in the formation of the Mexico City chapter of
the Club Liberal.1^
In 1903 Ricardo Flores Magon's excited statement that "The
Diaz administration is a den of thieves" drew hisses and
boos from the moderate conservatives to the second national
congress of the Ponciano Arriaga convention in San Luis
Potos:£. The gap between the radicalism of Ricardo Flores
Magon and the San Luis Potosi group narrowed as conservative
members withdrew support.
As "liberals in this age of immense corruption," members
of the national organization of the Club urged the
"resurrection of the institution established by our fathers"
to place limits on the power of both church and state. "We
do not call you to revolution, but to save our country and
to begin the measures necessary for our salvation. To this

Regeneracion, various editions — 1901, 1902, (While the
Flores Mag<^n brothers were imprisoned in 1901, the paper
continued to be published by the staff. Throughout the fall
of 1901 and winter of 1902, Jesds ran a small advertisement
asking for employment as a lawyer); Cockcroft p. 98.
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end, we are asking for the formation of many clubs, and,
with a sharp pen, to give a brief history of our country."

18

That sharp pen, which called for a return to "order, the
sanctity of law and guarantees of liberty," may well have
been that of Ricardo Flores Mag<£n. His style of writing was
notable in that he addressed his audience directly, as did
the Manifesto: "Is there equality in our country? . . .No.
. . . Does business prosper in our country? . . . Only for a
few millionaires, mostly foreigners. . . . "

and so on,

through a list of grievances that included the plight of
agriculture, the lack of educational opportunities, the lack
of intellectual freedom and the lack of respect for human
life.19
In the summer of 1903, after publication of its Manifesto,
the Club Liberal convened in San Luis Potosi for a second
time. The Diaz regime outlawed the liberal clubs and
arrested the most visible perpetrators. Diario del Hogar
again carried the slogan "No Reelecci^n" on its masthead and
the paper covered the convention in San Luis Potosi and the
arrests that followed. In its coverage of persecution of the
activists, and especially the journalists imprisoned again
in Belen, Mata's publication clashed editorially with the

18

/
Manifestacion del Club Liberal "Ponciano Arriaga",
February 27, 1903. Reprinted in Texto de su Historia, pp.
301-302.
1 9 Ibid,

pp. 306-308.
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journalistic giants of Mexico City. When Mata reported that
Flores Magon and Juan Sarabia, both incarcerated in Belen,
had called for an investigation of the treatment of
prisoners in the prison, El Pais editorialized: "It is not
the Bastille!" Mata replied that the prison should indeed be
investigated, but that if Article 7 of the 1857 constitution
were to be invoked there would be no need of the
investigation because there would be no need of the
prison. 20
Earlier, Mata had complained of El Imparcial that while
some journalists languished in prison, "friends of the
government" were allowed to publish not only slander, but
falsehoods. Beyond that, Mata wrote, the Mexican press had
?1
adopted the "politics of silence."
\

But the worst, in Mata's eyes, was the Mexico City Herald,
which he claimed provided the world with completely false
information disguised as inept translating. In 1903,
according to Diario, El Imparcial quoted Limantour as
saying, "The plan does not contemplate placing Mexico on a
gold standard immediately." The Herald1s translation,
"Mexico will abandon the silver standard and adopt the
gold," had potentially serious effects since it was also the
copy used by the Associated Press. Although there was

Diario del Hogar, June 17, 1903, and July 1, 1903.
2 1 Ibid,

January 9 and May 19, 1903.
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intense international pressure for Mexico to adopt the gold
standard, the measure would further separate the rich from
the poor in the country that was the largest silver producer
in the world .22
The Mexican press was permitted to report business news
and, within reason, to lambaste the United States. Diaz
himself was credited with saying, "Poor Mexico, so far from
God, so close to the United States." Economics and foreign
relations made safe topics for news articles and drew public
interest. The revolution to come would be generated more by
bad fiscal decisions than desire for social change. The
social inequities existing in Mexico at the time stemmed
from the control of Mexican resources by foreign powers and
the extremely unbalanced distribution of real wealth in
Mexico. At the turn of the century, almost all major
industries, including the railroads, were owned by
foreigners, and, in a country with a population of more than
15 million, there were fewer than 150,000 land owners.

23

From 1900 to 1905, journalists wrote about economic policy
and the questions of re-election and foreign influence,
often skirting

dangerously close to the real concern of the

new liberals of Mexico: corruption in the D^az regime. Mata
pushed the complaint with the following editorial:

2 2 Ibid,

May 19.

23 Roger D. Hansen, p. 27.
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The continuing administration is the antithesis
of democracy. The people raised this administra
tion to power during the revolution of La Noria
and of Tuxtepec, and when the revolution was
triumphant, the fighters saw the end of their
work, and opened their hearts to hope.
When General Diaz ended his first term of office
and left the presidency, the hearts of his
constituency, his friends, his companions of the
struggle, [were] filled with glory, satisfied that
their country had attained the ambitions which
they had fought for. . . . Honor and Law give
life, and the law can only be sustained with
honor. . . . These principles, founded in the
constitution and the reform [La Reforma] are the
unmovable basis for progress and peace for
Mexico.
During 1903, 1904, and 1905, Diario del Hogar continued as
one of the few Mexican newspapers editorially denouncing el
continuismo, careful, as always, to phrase criticism against
the administration in terms of the bureaucracy and not Diaz.
When Mata, for instance, wrote about the problems of
Yucatan, where slavery and massive poverty were common, his
complaint centered not on social but on political
conditions.
During this period, another decisive split occurred in the
Mexican press. Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon had left
Mexico in 1904 to publish Regeneracion from the United
States. The brothers had faced continual persecution since
1900 and on June 9, 1903, a Mexican court ordered that any

?4

.
Diario del Hogar, September 1905. Reprinted m
65-66.
25 Mata,

p. 69.
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Mata, pp.

publication that printed articles by Ricardo Flores Magon
would be prosecuted under the defamation laws, including the
psicologia test. The Flores Magon brothers, like many
Mexican journalists before them, had no choice but to leave
the country if they were to continue publishing.
Unlike their predecessors, the brothers had no intention
of publishing a paper aimed at Mexican immigrants to the
United States. Because of their contacts through the Club
Liberal, they planned to use their American sanctuary to
attack directly what they perceived as the real problem of
Mexico. In one of the first issues, Enrique wrote what could
never have been published in Mexico:
Forever — for as long as Mexico can remember —
today's slavery wil 1 be identified with the name
of the devil that made it all possible. His name
is Porfirio Dfaz, and his bestiality is being
carried out in Mexico. . .the jefes politicos do
not send thieves and other criminals to jail —
rather they sell them as slaves. . . you may say
that Diaz does not benefit directly from this
human commerce. . . . But what about the governors
of Veracruz, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and other states,
and their cronies who do benefit? Who appointed
these governors? Porfirio Diaz. . . . But the day
of liberation is^coming. Prepare yourselves my
fellow citizens.
For the independent publishers in Mexico to provide
editorial support for the Flores Mag^n brothers and what was
becoming the Partido Liberal Mexicano would have been
26
27

Ethel Duffy Turner, Revolution in Baja, p. viii..

Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course of
Mexican History, (Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska
Press, 1967), pp. 485-486.

tantamount to calling for armed revolution, so three
distinct elements came to exist in the Mexican press. These
consisted of the official, heavily subsidized press, which
preached continuismo; the moderately subsidized "independent
press," which called for adherence to the constitution of
1857; and the Flores Magon brothers, who smuggled their
paper into Mexico 30,000 copies at a time. The papers that
had supported Ricardo Flores Magon in his struggles against
the government before his expatriation began to look askance
at the U.S.-based group that called for violent revolution
in Mexico, while the PLM regarded all newspapers in Mexico
as controlled organs of the corrupt regime.
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Chapter 5
"A MAN NAMED MAGOON": 1906

Ricardo Flores Mag6 n, his brother Enrique and fellow
journalist Santiago de la Hoz arrived in San Antonio, Texas,
on January 3, 1904. They represented the editorial force of
three important but defunct Mexico City publications —
Regeneraci^n, El Nieto del Ahuizote (an offshoot of El Hijo
del Ahuizote) and Excelsior, begun in 1902. The government
considered these the most radical independent newspapers in
Mexico and Closed all three.
The three men had just been released from Belen, and
prison officials informed Ricardo that the Diaz
administration intended to kill him if he continued
publishing in Mexico. From the perceived safety of the
United States, the Flores Magon brothers were to launch a
protest that would be a forerunner to the revolution of 1910
and, during the next four years, they were to become a major
ideological force against the Diaz regime.^
Born in 1874, Ricardo was the son of a soldier who had
fought for Diaz during the revolt of 1876. Of all the
independent journalists in Mexico, Ricardo probably had the
closest ties to the indigenous population. Although the
Flores Magons sent all three sons to Mexico City to be
educated, they maintained tribal customs in their home. The
^Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 60.
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family was not wealthy, though, and Jesus, the oldest, was
the only one to complete his schooling and obtain his law
degree. All three brothers, however,
m

.

.

journalism and politics.

developed an interest

2

Ricardo began opposing the Diaz regime in 1892 when, at
19, he joined the staff of the paper El Democrata. He and
other staff members of the newspaper were jailed in the
spring of 1893. After his release from Belen in the fall, he
stayed out of print for seven years. During this period,
Ricardo studied the political thinkers of his time and was
influenced by Marx and Engels, among others. From his
moderate beginnings, he began a life-long journey always
moving to the political left.
As editor of Regeneracion, Ricardo was jailed in 1900. As
editor of El Hijo del Ahuizote, he was jailed again in 1902.
As editor of El Nieto del Ahuizote, Ricardo was sentenced to
a Mexican prison for the last time in June 1903. By this
time, his name was synonymous with protest and the
administration would tolerate no more, officially decreeing
on June 9, 1903, that any publication printing his writings
was guilty of sedition and privately warning him to cease
his activity under penalty of death. But Ricardo was not to
be so easily intimidated. A heavy-set chain-smoker and hard
worker, always active and well organized, Ricardo was "a

2 Ibid,

pp. 14-15.

70

fanatic for his cause." While serving his final sentence in
Belen, Ricardo, with Enrique and several others, made plans
to move the publishing operation to the United States where
they could continue to print anti-Diaz information without
their lives being endangered.*^
Texas provided only false security, however. The drowning
of their friend, de la Hoz, further provoked the Flores
Magon brothers. De la Hoz, a widely known poet and
journalist, had been an avid opponent of the Di^az regime and
the brothers believed, with good reason, that porfirian
agents were responsible for his death. The incident made one
aspect of their situation clear to them: no matter where
they went they would not be safe from porfirran henchmen.

4

Their older brother, Jesds, remained in Mexico and mildly
opposed his brothers' fight against the regime. Jesus, who
founded

Regeneracion, retired from journalism after he had

been imprisoned in 1900 for his involvement with that
publication. While in Belen he placed a standing ad in his
newspaper stating his intention to return to the legal
i
profession and after being released he became a full-time
attorney in Mexico City. While morally and financially
supportive of his brothers, Jesus did not believe that the
A

Cockcroft, p. 114; Informacion Secreta que el agente N.N.,
de San Luis, Missouri, le dio al suscrito contestando al
siguiente interrogatorio, 1906. M-B 18 Part I, Folder 7A of
14, Terrazas collection.
4
Ethel Duffy Turner, pp. 65-66.
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people of Mexico would support a violent revolution. He also
feared for his brothers' safety. As a lawyer, he witnessed
the corruption of the porfirian courts and knew that in
5
Mexico protection under law was a facade.
Jesus assessed the situation correctly. While still in
Mexico,Ricardo found it necessary to surround himself with
supporters to protect himself from porfirian thugs. He
believed that he and his companions would find a haven in
the United States. He was wrong. His friend de la Hoz died,
probably at the hands of agents of the Mexican government
and, soon after the first issue of Regeneracion to be
published in the United States was printed in November 1905,
Ricardo was attacked by a man with a knife. When Enrique
intervened, police arrived and arrested him. The brothers
decided to move their operation to St. Louis, thinking it
would be safe to publish a paper in what Ethel Duffy Turner
described as "the heart of a nation that guaranteed freedom
of the press." Jesus agreed that the move to St. Louis was
prudent: "I'm glad to hear you're leaving San Antonio. I'm
sure that Saint Louis will be better and that you'll be able
to work with more freedom." He also advised Ricardo to

Jesus Flores Mag<5n to Ricardo Flores Magon, June 7, 1904.
M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection;
Regeneracion, 1901.
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consult with government authorities in Missouri and study
U.S. laws concerning extradition.®
JesiSs also believed that Ricardo could present before a
U.S. court a case that would force Mexico to allow
Regeneracion to circulate through the Mexican mails.
Distribution of the newspaper was one of two major problems
Ricardo faced as publisher. Because the Mexican government
banned the publication from the mail system, Ricardo
established along the Texas border a network of shopkeepers
who smuggled the papers into the Mexico. Private detectives
obtained actual subscription lists when they raided the St.
Louis office. One such list, most likely a bookkeeping
record from one of the border distributors, contained 693
names and addresses of subscribers. About one-third of them
were in the United States, mostly in Texas, while the
remainder were scattered throughout Mexico, but especially
in the northern states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango and
Sonora. These newspapers were often hand-delivered at
considerable personal risk —

rurales were known to shoot

people for possessing a copy of Regeneracion.^

/
Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 69; Jesus to Ricardo, March 15,
1905. M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection.
•7
Jesus to Ricardo, September 6 , 1905. M-B 18 part I, Folder
2 of 14; 15-page subscription list dated 190.6, M-B 18, part
I, Folder 11A of 14, Terrazas Collection; Cockcroft, pp.
123-124.
6
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The second problem —
publishing —

raising enough money to continue

proved harder to solve. Camilio Arriaga paid

for the brothers' flight from Mexico. Arriaga, too, was a
fugitive and had been an early influence on the political
thinking of Ricardo. Arriaga, a member of a well-to-do
mining family, had one of the best private libraries in
Mexico. From this collection Ricardo borrowed books by
famous leftists of the day. Arriaga, an acquaintance of some
of the most powerful men in Mexico (Frances Bulnes had sat
on Arriaga's thesis committee when he received his master's
degree in mining), had gone into exile to the United States
at the same time as the Flores Mag<£ns. He continued to fund
Regeneracion when it was published in San Antonio and
arranged a $2,000 (U.S.) loan from Francisco Madero to pay
for printing the paper. When the brothers and their
companions, now calling themselves the Junta del Partido
Liberal Mexicano or PLM, moved their operation to St. Louis,
Arriaga began to have misgivings. He recognized that Ricardo
was assuming leadership of the movement and worried that the
ties the Flores Mag^n brothers had with the radical left in
the United States, including anarchist Emma Goldman, would
discredit the movement. In early 1906, he separated himself
O
from the group and withdrew all of his financial aid.

8 Cockcroft,

pp. 123-124.
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Eventually, Regeneracion came to rely heavily on the U.S.
left for financial support, but while the paper was
published in St. Louis it was funded by small contributions
and money from subscriptions. During this period the
subscription list grew to more than

2 0 ,0 0 0 ,

with subscribers

in Mexico and the Mexican-American communities in the United
States. The junta, as the St. Louis group identified itself,
sold subscriptions for $3.50 (Mexican) and often received
additional donations, but much of this money, along with
accompanying requests for subscriptions, was confiscated by
both the Mexican and United States governments. In
September, 1906, a Mexican subscriber wrote, "It bothers me
greatly that you have not answered my previous two letters,"
and warned Ricardo to be extremely careful with his
9
correspondence.
How much money was received at the paper's office is
unknown, although the Flores Magon brothers could pay
themselves a salary of only

$10

or less a week during their

time in St. Louis. Jesus had been sending his brothers what
money he could, but by September he was becoming even more
disenchanted with the idea of revolution, writing to them:
g
Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 75; 15-page subscription list dated
1906, M-B 18, part I, Folder 11A of 14, Terrazas Collection;
Ancelmo Verlarde to Ricardo Flores Mag^n, September 15,
1906, M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection.
U.S. government involvement in the persecution of the PLM
was a reflection of its policy toward American leftists,
including the Industrial Workers of the World, which became
closely alligned with the PLM.

75

"Although you call me an alarmist, and many other things
that you may think but do not tell me . . . I will repeat a
thousand times that the road of revolution is that which the
least will follow." Later in the month he reiterated his
concerns: "I don't believe that the people are ready for a
revolution, and I also don't believe that you have enough
prestige to provoke a fight.
Whether or not Ricardo Flores Magon had the influence to
generate an armed revolution is still debatable, but both

\

the Mexican and U.S. governments considered him dangerous.
Governor of Chihuahua Enrique Creel, acting on behalf of
Diaz, hired a private detective agency to spy on the PLM.
The Diaz regime also sent gifts to officials in the united
States for their cooperation in the ongoing surveillance
operation. The U.S. Secret Service, operating under the
project code name, "Joe Priest," kept PLM

members under

surveillance and helped Arizona lawmen to arrest several PLM
members in Arizona during the fall of 1906. Despite
differences between U.S. and Mexican defamation law, U.S.
officials arrested Ricardo and Enrique Flores Mag6 n and Juan
Sarabia on Mexican defamation charges in October, 1905.
Twelve private detectives, undeputized and without a
warrant, raided the St. Louis office and confiscated the

"^Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 79; Jesus Flores Magon to R. Flores
Magon, September 19 and September 27, 1905, M-B 18 part I,
Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection.
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press and files. The journalists raised the $10,000 bond and
were released after spending two months in jail, but they
received from Mexico information that they would be rearrested and extradited to Mexico.

11

Isolating Ricardo's journalistic achievements from his
political endeavors is impossible, but it should be noted
that the U .S .-based Regeneracion provided not only anti-Diaz
propaganda but information that was not readily available in
the press, Mexican or international. Topics such as the
treatment of Indians in Mexico and the influence of the
American corporations on the Mexican government received
coverage, sometimes for the first time. These articles
eventually drew the attention of the American left wing,
whose ideals were close to those of Ricardo. Throughout
1906, Ricardo was convinced that the revolution was imminent
and that its success was assured. By this time, he had taken
the title of president of the PLM and his main concern was
that there were more PLM supporters in Mexico than arms.
"The triumph will be quick," he wrote a friend. PLM support
was particularly strong in northern Mexico where
Regeneracion was more accessible because of border traffic.
Governor of Chihuahua Enrique Creel, with the aid of the
U.S. government, intercepted more than 3,000 letters sent to
the junta, many containing subscription requests, word of

•^Cockcroft, pp. 125, 126 and 128.
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support and money. Creel kept lists of individuals and
groups supporting the PLM.

12

On March 16, 1906/ Ricardo and Enrique and Juan Sarabia
left St. Louis for Canada, leaving the publication of
Regeneracion to Antonio I. Villarreal, Librado Rivera and
Manuel Sarabia. Surveillance by the Pinkertons had become so
intense that Ricardo felt that work on the current PLM
project, the manifesto that would call for revolution in
Mexico, could not be continued. The group hoped that civil
liberties would be stronger in the United Kingdom and that
the Canadian government might afford them some protection
from the Pinkertons. They were wrong. They went first to
Toronto and then to Montreal, but the private detectives
stayed with them. The group was in Montreal when the strike
at Cananea occurred, but not for long. Ricardo interpreted
the strike as the first move in the coming revolution and
immediately made plans to leave for Mexico.

13

On June 1, 1906, Mexican miners struck against the CananeaCopper Company in Cananea, Sonora. The strikers demanded
that Mexican miners receive wages equal to those of U.S.
citizens who worked at the mine. Mexican miners were paid
less than half what workers from the United States received.

1O

Flores Magon to Antonio Balboa, September 3, 1906, various
letters, M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas collection;
Cockcroft, p. 128.
■^Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 83.
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The strike lasted fewer than 36 hours and was crushed with
the aid of 200 American "volunteers" from Arizona, but it
drew U.S. press attention to the growing problem of antiAmericanism in Mexico.

And, for the first time, the U.S.

public became aware of the possibility of revolution in that
country and the abundance of anti-U.S. sentiment in Mexico.
The strike was fostered by cooperation between PLM
supporters and the Western Federation of Miners, the U.S.
union that later spawned the Industrial Workers of the
World. To what extent the PLM was involved is uncertain
(although William Greene, the owner of the company, later
placed full^responsibility on the St. Louis Junta), but the
connection between the PLM and the American left wing was
solidified, at least in the minds of U.S. and Mexican
officials.^
While the U.S. government was aware of Ricardo Flores
Magon, neither the press nor the general public knew
anything about him. When the PLM junta was accused of
culpability for the strike, both the New York Times and the
Associated Press, in the articles they released reporting
Greene's allegations, displayed their ignorance of the
situation in Mexico and the personalities involved. The

^Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 84; New York Times, September 9,
1906.
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Times referred to Flores Magon as "a man named Magoon" while
the Associated Press called him "R. Flores Maghood."

15

Two weeks after the strike, the PLM issued its
proclamation calling for radical change in the Mexican
government. The program contained 52 separate points, all in
basic disagreement with the current regime, including
clauses that would prohibit the reelection of the president,
curtail the powers of military and political bosses, and
guarantee freedom of the press. The program was a doubleedged sword because not only did it criticize the Di!az
regime but it called for strict limits on foreign
involvement in the political and economic life of Mexico. It
urged Mexicans to choose between liberty and "humiliation
before the foreigners." Many PLM supporters worked on the
program. Although the Programa del Partido Liberal was not
as radical as Flores Magon would have liked, it was the most
radical document produced by Mexican politics, surpassing
the Constitution of 1917 that would draw heavily from the
ideas it contained, especially in labor and land reform .16
While the PLM program is revered in Mexican history, its
publication in 1906 was actually detrimental to the PLM
cause. Many well-to-do Mexican PLM supporters, beginning to

16 New York Times, September 9, 1906; Great Falls Tribune,
September 6 , 1906.

16Programa del Partido Liberal July 1, 1906, as reprinted in
La Revolucion Mexicana, Tomo I; Cockcroft, p. 30.
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feel the crunch of Mexico's fading economy and the world
wide economic depression of 1907-1911, withdrew their
support. The Mexican press, official and independent alike,
unanimously opposed the radicalism, and both Filomeno Mata
in Mexico City and Sylvestre Terrazas in Chihuahua broke
their ties with Flores Magon. He represented the threat of
violent revolution, something unacceptable to all publishers
in Mexico. These men continued to believe Mexico's future
would be best served by the simple enforcement of the
constitution of 1857.

17

Ricardo Flores Magon traveled from Canada to El Paso in
August to organize an armed revolution against Diaz. The
fortunes of the PLM were quickly waning. The junta could
only afford transportation to Texas for two men. Enrique had
to stay in Canada where he was employed as a day laborer for
$9 a week, and Librado Rivera struggled to continue
publication of Regeneracion in St. Louis. The publication
had been hurt in February by a U.S. postal decision that
dictated that all copies of the paper had to be sent by
first-class mail. PLM efforts were further damaged when
Francisco Madero publicly rebutted the PLM in September over
the program. "Diaz is not a tyrant," he told a reporter. "He
may be somewhat rigid, but he is not a tyrant."

17
18

Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
Cockcroft, p. 129; Turner pp. 94 and 103.
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PLM supporters, operating from Texas and Arizona, claimed
credit for several small revolutionary skirmishes in
northern Mexico between 1906 and 1908, but the
revolutionaries were easily defeated. In El Paso, Antonio
Villareal was arrested and jailed for several months.
Ricardo Flores Magon kept moving. He later described that
period: "The secret services of two countries chased me from
one place to the other, from city to city. It was a question
of life or death for me, because my arrest would mean my
immediate passage to Mexico and murder without any
appearance of justice." In February 1907, Ricardo Flores
Magon was in San Francisco and Librado Rivera had moved the
operations of Regeneracion to Los Angeles, where the name of
y

19

the publication was temporarily changed to Revolucion.

Flores Magon's fears were not unfounded. In October 1906,
Juan Sarabia and nine other PLM supporters were arrested in
Mexico. Some of the men were fined and sentenced to prison
terms from one month to two years. Those who were closely
linked with Flores Magon were given long prison sentences
and shipped to Mexico City where they remained in prison
until D^az fell from power in 1911. The government continued
its search for dissidents.

1Q
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Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 114.
Alameda, Tomo I. p. 114.
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Throughout 1906 and 1907, Mexican intelligence reported
names of PLM supporters to political officials. Vice
President Ram^n Corral and Chihuahua Governor Enrique Creel
traded information, making support of the PLM a dangerous
activity. Regeneracion had promised secrecy to PLM
supporters in 1906, but the raids on the newspaper offices
and confiscation of letters, both in the United States and
in Mexico, had made these people known and legal action was
taken against many of them. Even Mexicans living in the
United States were not safe. In March 1907, a politician in
Juarez wrote Diaz, telling him that there were 100 to 150
men meeting in El Paso, planning an armed revolt. He implied
the action would not come to pass, because the police chief
of El Paso was cooperative with the motives of the Mexican
government.21
On August 25, 1907, Ricardo Flores Magon, Librado Rivera
and Antonio Villareal were arrested in Los Angeles by the
private dectective Thomas Furlong, an operative working for
Enrique Creel. The three were charged by the Los Angeles
Police Department with resisting arrest, murder and robbery,
criminal defamation, murder of a "Juan Perez" in Mexico and
conspiracy to violate the neutrality laws. Furlong acted
without a legal warrant, and the charges spurred a three-

21

.
Various letters from jefes politicos,
etc. and,
specifically, Ricardo R. Rangel to Porfirio Diaz, March 18,
1907. M-B, Part I, Folder 14, Terrazas collection.
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year-long legal battle. The men remained in jail until 1910,
but what they had begun continued.

Ethel Duffy Turner, pp. 129-30.
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Chapter 6
TRODBLE IN THE NORTH: 1906-1908

Northern Mexico provided a natural setting for revolution.
In a sense, the area was to Mexico what the West was to the
United States, a distant land populated by independent
pioneers who resented the intrusion of foreign interests or
the federal government. Mining and railroads brought
fledgling unions to the "hot country." In Douglas, Arizona,
a newly-formed Western Federation of Miners chapter played a
part in the Cananea strike. Although the Mexican miners in
northern Mexico were among the highest-paid laborers in
Mexico, they became aware of how poorly their wages compared
to those of their counterparts in the United States and
those U.S. citizens employed at the mines.
Enrique Creel, governor of Chihuahua and son-in-law of
Luis Terrazas, spent considerable time and money keeping
track of the St. Louis junta and potential revolutionaries.
Thomas Furlong, a private detective tracking the Flores
Mag^n brothers, reported directly to Creel, who also
received information from politicians in Chihuahua. When
several junta members were arrested in the United States
during the fall of 1906, the Chihuahua politicians rejoiced
and predicted a quick end to the bothersome junta. They
gathered lists of junta supporters and suggested legal
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action against the disloyal. Creel sent a "black list" to
Vice President Ramon Corral in Mexico City .1
Silvestre Terrazas's name did not appear on any of those
lists. Don Sylvestre knew of the Flores Magons, and, at one
time, supported their cause. The publisher disagreed with
the PLM on the issue of armed revolt. El Grito del Puebla,
not El Correo de Chihuahua, was the "radical" newspaper of
Chihuahua. Don Silvestre, like many newspaper editors and
publishers in Mexico, believed that the answers to Mexico's
problems lay in adherence to existing law. In 1905, he
reprinted from the Veracruz newspaper, La Opinion, an
editorial that criticized the Diaz regime and opposed the
president's reelection. When other northern Mexico
newspapers criticized El Correo de Chihuahua for publishing
the editorial, Don Sylvestre replied in print that El Correo
had merely reprinted the opinion and not generated it.
Reprinting controversial articles from other publications
was a common ploy of publishers who tried, as did Don
.

.

Silvestre, to retain a level of political objectivity.

2

Until 1907, Don Silvestre prospered in the publishing
business and success made him an unlikely revolutionary. By
mid-decade, El Correo boasted adequate circulation and

1 S. Montemayor to Enrique Creel, October 21, 1906. M-B 18,
part 1, Folder 12A of 14, Terrazas Collection; Ethel Duffy
Turner, p. 107.

2

Jane Dale Lloyd interview; Sandels, p. 118.

86

advertising to expand and improve its facilities. In 1904,
Don Silvestre imported the first Linotype to northern Mexico
and celebrated its installation by inviting local
dignitaries, including Governor Creel, to a ceremony at the
newspaper's office. Don Silvestre constantly improved both
the design and content of his paper and was actively
involved in advertising sales. The newspaper he had
published in 1899 lacked advertising and legitimate news—
mistakes Don Silvestre would not fnake again. In 1906, El
Correo reduced its column size (which usually means an
increase in advertising revenues, even in four-page papers)
and increased its use of wire-service articles. Don
Silvestre hired his brother-in-law, Ignacio Perches Enrique,
as administrator. Clearly, Don Silvestre viewed journalism
as a business as well as a profession.
As a businessman, Don Silvestre had two on-going
complaints against the government. First, he had become an
ardent critic of the Mexican postal system, which he viewed
as overly expensive and inefficient. Secondly, he was
concerned with the price of newsprint. In his position as
head of the Catholic Press Association, Don Silvestre sent
queries to other Mexican newspapers, asking if they
purchased newsprint from foreign sources and how the prices
compared. These activities put him in constant touch with
a

Ibid, p. 80, El Correo de Chihuahua, June, 1906; personal
interview with Margarita Terrazas.
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fellow publishers and may have been the impetus for the
formation in 1908 of the Mexican Press Association of the
States, which Don Silvestre would serve as president.'*
Don Silvestre devoted considerable space in El Correo to
the strike at Cananea. In fact, one of the first, if not the
first, photographs published in Correo was of the U.S.
"volunteers" in Cananea. The coverage began four days after
the strike, a typical delay in coverage of Mexican news. El
Correo ran an accurate front-page news story, but ended it
by questioning government attitudes toward American and
Mexican interests. On June

8,

the paper reprinted a critical

article from El Tiempo of Mexico City that said, "It has
been shown that the Americans were responsible, and that the
[Mexican] multitude were disarmed and peaceful. . . . This
castigation [of the Americans] is necessary because it shows
foreigners that when they are in a different land, they
should respect the law."

5

Newspapers in both the United States and Mexico played the
I
strike as an important story, but with different emphasis.
The U.S. press, spurred by both imagination and a nearhysterical telegram from a U.S. consular official in Canaea
("all of our lives are in danger"), treated the story as an
indication of the rising tide of anti-Americanism in Mexico
^Questionnaire published by Terrazas for the Prensa
Catolica, undated. M-B, Part 1, Box 83, Terrazas Collection.
5
El Correo De Chihuahua, June 4, 6 and 8 , 1906.
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and unwittingly displayed U.S. prejudices against Mexicans.
For the inaccurate Associated Press story, the Great Falls
(Montana) Tribune created this headline:

—

MURDERED IN MEXICO
Enraged Greasers Slaughter
Forty-five Americans below Arizona Line
GREEN'S CAMP DOOMED
Drunken Mexicans using Dynamite to
Blow Up Great Mills and Smelters
in Prosperous Copper Camp
Troops Sent to Capture and Punish Ringleaders

Actually, only four Americans had been killed while 18
Mexicans died in the violence. Subsequent Associated Press
reports, as well as other sources, reported that there were
no dynamiters and

little, if any, drinking among the

Mexican strikers. El Correo de Chihuahua published this
information, as well as the major demand of the strikers: an
end to the bilateral wage system for Mexicans and U.S.
citizens. Don Silvestre had his own editorial bias. While
aware of the necessity of U.S. investment in Mexico, Correo
de Chihuahua indulged in the accepted practice of
criticizing U.S. activities and those of U.S. citizens in
7
Mexico.
Enrique Creel and Don Silvestre differed in their views of
U.S. interests in Mexico. The governor, soon to be named
ambassador to the United States, controlled the power

New York Times, June 2 and 3, 1906; Great Falls Tribune,
June 3, 1906.
7
El Correo de Chihuahua, June 4, 6 and 8 .
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structure in Chihuahua, which benefited directly from doing
business with the United States. Since 1898, Creel had
served on the board of El Banco Central Mexicano, used
heavily by the Mexican government. In Chihuahua, the
Terrazas-Creel clan owned 80 percent of the Banco Minero and
held monopolies in many businesses, including the Chihuahua
phone company and trolley system. By the end of the
Porfiriato, the family owned 7 million acres of land and
more than 1.5 million cattle. The total (U.S.) value of the
O
clan was estimated at more than $25 million.
Don Silvestre wrote to a populace he perceived as being
exploited by the United States. He believed U.S. investment
was good for Mexico but resented the attitudes of some U.S.
businessmen in Mexico. In August 1906, he criticized William
Greene, the man against whom the Mexican miners had struck:
He is permitted the luxury of cruising the
continent in sumptuous special cars; playing the
stock market which allows him to standwith
impunity, rifle in hand, pistol at hisbelt,
before a mass of workers, who answer rifle shots
with stones; for this [reason] he can employ
12,000 workers to whom he only pays a salary
imposed by a well known principle of political
economy, that teaches us that prices of property,
like salaries, are subject to supply and demand. .
. . It is false, foolish and stupid to assert that
he pays double what other companies pay. . . . In
Cananea he pays mine laborers 3.50 pesos . . . in
Santa Eulalia . . . where the cost of living is 30

y
Francisco R. Alameda, La Revolucion en el Estado de
Chihuahua, Tomo I, (Chihuahua, Biblioteca del Instituto
Nacional de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana,
1964), p. 90; Hansen, p. 153.
8
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to 40 percent less than in Cananea, they are paid
2.50 and 3.00 pesos.
Neither Don Silvestre nor Enrique Creel realized that
their perceived enemies were only that. The real conflict in
Chihuahua was between these two men and the groups they
represented— the privileged elite and the stymied middle
class. The Cananea strike exacerbated the conflict but was
basically unrelated, a skirmish from the lowest of Mexican
society against the highest.
The Mexican press, including the Mexico City Herald,
reported the strike as a Mexican-American conflict and
editors gave free flight to their nationalistic tendencies.
Don Silvestre did not support unions as there were no unions
in Chihuahua to support in 1906. However, he did support the
fraternal guilds of craftsmen formed in Chihuahua,
predecessors to unions. Further, Don Silvestre linked the
strike to problems in government and reprinted an article
from El Tercer Imparo that stated boldly: "The continuation
of power of General Diaz is a threat to both our democratic
form of government and to our national prestige."1®
Chihuahua, however, was a relatively safe place from which
to criticize Diaz. Don Porfirio did not rule Chihuahua: Don
Luis did. But Don Silvestre began attacking the Chihuahua
g
El Correo de Chihuahua, September 24, 1906, as translated
in Sandels, p. 108.
^ Mexican Herald, June
12, 1906.

6,

1906; El Correo de Chihuahua, June
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government in print. A staff-written article described the
state government as static because of its domination by the
Terrazas-Creel clan. The editorial reflected Don Silvestre's
belief that "A truly independent press . . .

is capable of

moving the world ."11
Don Silvestre gave editorial space to social issues, such
as education and alcoholism in Chihuahua, and acted on those
concerns by participating in local government. He served a
term as a Chihuahua city councilman from 1902 to 1904 and
introduced local ordinances to lower the consumption of
alcohol. His interest in alcohol, partially generated by
employees who occasionally came to work drunk, led to his
belief that poverty and lack of education were the primary
causes of alcoholism. Terrazas blamed the Terrazas-Creel
clan for the social conditions in Chihuahua but not, at
least at first, in print.

From 1906, though, the feud

between the Terrazas-Creel clan, specifically Enrique Creel
and El Correo de Chihuahua, was discernible to the casual
reader. 12
Enrique Creel was not the elected governor of Chihuahua,
but served as an interim governor acting on behalf of Luis
Terrazas, elected to replace a governor who resigned to

11 E1

Correo de Chihuahua, June 11 and 12, July

6

and 7,

1906.
12

Sandels, pp. 78-79; personal interview with Margarita
Terrazas.
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accept the governorship in another state. In June 1906,
Terrazas began publishing a "Talks on Law" column and one of
his main topics was the possible re-election of Don Luis.
Don Silvestre had always politically supported his "uncle,"
as he referred to the old man, but questioned the
technicality of his reelection and, through his contacts in
the publishing business, asked other newspapers in northern
Mexico to do the same.

13

In late 1906, Diaz named Creel ambassador to the United
States and it seemed that he would be out of the running for
the gubernatorial elections of 1907. When Don Silvestre
learned that Creel intended to run for governor anyway, he
used his "Talks on Law" column to quote a Mexican law that
stated that a governor of Chihuahua must be Mexican by
birth. Don Silvestre was adamant about this and was
prejudiced against non-Mexicans. "If we elect somebody named
'Green' now," he would tell his family, "pretty soon we will
elect somebody named 'Wong. 1
On April 3, 1907, Don Silvestre was arrested on the power
of the psicologia on defamation charges brought by a
Chihuahua policeman. In an editorial headlined "We Want
Guarantees," Don Silvestre accused the police of illegal

13 Sandels, pp. 126-127; personal interview with Margarita
Terrazas.
14 Sandels, p. 30; personal interview with Margarita
Terrazas.
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arrests and searches. The publisher spent 13 days in jail
and, on his release, discovered that advertisers with close
ties to the Terrazas-Creel clan had canceled their
advertising. Don Silvestre quoted other journalists who
asserted that the imprisonment illustrated the emergence of
political harassment in Chihuahua. Don Silvestre, however,
continued his editorials against the Creel nomination. 15
The conflict between Don Silvestre and Governor Creel
reached its zenith in 1908 over a bizarre incident that may
never be completely understood: the robbery of the Banco
Minero of 300,000 pesos on March 1, the largest bank robbery
in Chihuahua. The building that housed the bank still stands
in downtown Chihuahua. The walls,

which the

robbers

penetrated on a Sunday afternoon,

were between two- and

three-feet thick. At the time of the robbery, Enrique Creel
lived on the top floor of the building. His

brother Juan was

president of the bank.
After the robbery, the police arrested and/or detained
many people, often holding them incommunicado for several
days. Those arrested and released claimed to have been
tortured. Don Silvestre took special interest in the robbery
and later told his family that he knew that Juan Creel was
ultimately responsible.

■^Sandels, p. 131; El Correo de Chihuahua, March 16, 1907.
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Whether or not that was true has never been resolved, but
the remnants of the case, the suits against the Creel family
resulting from the various arrests made, lasted well into
the 1940s. The first people formally charged in the case
were released after Correo de Chihuahua published articles
placing the suspects far from the bank during the robbery.
Eight months after the crime, police arrested three
Chihuahua youths who confessed to the crime, but after they
were convicted, letters from them to President Diaz became
public. The youths charged that Juan Creel not only had
masterminded the robbery, but had come to the bank,
supervised the tunneling through the wall and collected the
loot himself.
When the boys were arrested, Juan Creel had advised them,
through a messenger, that if they confessed to being the
"sole authors of the crime" they would receive light
sentences, special treatment in prison and 20,000 to 25,000
pesos when they were released. In November, Don Silvestre
received those letters and published them in El Correo, as
he published all the legal documents generated by the case.
Don Silvestre was imprisoned briefly in 1909 because of
his outspoken criticism of the Creel family during the
investigation. The specific charges against him, though,
were tied to the "We Want Guarantees" editorial. Creel was
obviously upset by Don Silvestre's growing journalistic
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conscience. The feud between the two men would extend
through the revolution.

16

Some strange alliances were formed during the conflict. On
several occasions, Porfirio Diaz interceded, twice in
support of Don Silvestre. In 1911, when Abraham Gonzales
represented the revolutionary government as governor,
Francisco I. Madero intervened on behalf of Enrique Creel.
Madero wrote Gonzales: "It is impossible to attribute the
blame [for the robbery] to Senor Creel or any of them, since
four-fifths of the capital of the bank is precisely theirs."
Madero urged that trifles, such as Creel's personal
interrogation of suspects in the robbery, not be held
against him. Gonzales let the substance of the letter be
known, further discrediting Creel,
16

17

This account of the Banco Minero robbery is drawn largely
from Sandels, pages 144-147, but is also taken from the on
going coverage of the robbery in El Correo de Chihuahua,
information from "Biografia" by Margarita Terrazas and my
inspection in Chihuahua of the bank building on July 3,
1986, and an extended conversation with Margarita Terrazas
on this particular subject. According to Senorita Terrazas,
her "Biografia" was censored and the parts that implicated
the Creel family were removed. She republished her
"Biografia" in the Boletin de la Sociedad de Estudios
Historicos, October-December, 1984, Number 11, pp. 9-14, for
the specific purpose of publishing information about the
robbery. Unfortunately, the dates she used in this article
were incorrect. However, Senorita Terrazas was convinced, as
her father had been before her, that Juan Creel was the
mastermind behind the bank robbery for one simple reason:
only the president of the bank would have the audacity to
supervise a party of three men cutting a hole in the stone
wall of a bank in a business district on a Sunday afternoon.
l7
Personal interview with Jane Dale-Lloyd; Sandels, p. 149;
Alameda, La Revolucion en el Estado de Chihuahua, p. 92.
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While the bank robbery was being investigated and debated
in El Correo, Don Silvestre was also involved in
establishing the Mexican Press Association of the States.
Provincial editors held preliminary meetings in
Aguacalientes in January 1908,inviting newspaper publishers
from every part of Mexico except Mexico City to join. Don
Silvestre recognized that the publishers in the provinces
and those in the capital faced different problems. From his
earliest days as a journalist, he also distrusted the
newspapers of the capital because they were so heavily
involved with the subsidy system. That distrust did not
extend to Filomeno Mata, who wrote to encourage the idea of
a press association and to praise Don Silvestre for his
newspaper.

1 fi

The formation of the Press Association was an act of faith
on the part of the independent journalists of the Mexican
states. Don Silvestre published a lengthy poem by Guillermo
Aguirre y Fierro honoring the new organization: "In other
ages/ the press lost their rights because of immoral
tyrants/ but irr the evolution of the world/ they [the
rights] will be guaranteed." The poet concludes, supposedly

1 ft

Mata to Terrazas, July 28, 1910, M-B 18 part II, folder 4,
Terrazas collection; El Correo de Chihuahua, January 25,
1908? El Correo de Chihuahua, prospectus, December 1, 1898,
M-B 18, part II, Terrazas collection.
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speaking for all the independent journalists of Mexico: "We
19
are brothers."
Don Silvestre placed significance on the term "independent
journalist." Political clubs offered him postitions before
and after the revolution, but he declined, fearing it would
threaten his position as an independent journalist. After
the death of his friend Abraham Gonzales, he served Pancho
Villa as civilian governor of Chihuahua.

20

The press association met for the first time in Puebla in
May, 1908. Many Mexican publishers had learned to avoid
becoming involved in politics, but many who attended did so
to protest persecution of the press. Many of those same
publishers would also become involved in the anti-reelection
movement that would begin the next year. In many cases,
their reasons would be financial as well as political. Many
of the publishers of independent newspapers were losing
business to newspapers controlled and supported by local
governments, such as El Norte in Chihuahua. By 1908, in the
face of this competition, El Correo was published only three
times a week.

21

19

El Correo de Chihuahua, May 25, 1908. This is a simple
translation of the poem. No attempt has been made to
recreate poetic rhythm or rhyme.
20

William H. Beezley, Insurgent Governor, Abraham Gonzales
and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua, (Lincoln, Nebraska,
University of Nebraska Press, 1973), p. 23.
21

Ochoa Campos, p. 127.
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The emergence of the Press Association of the States
facilitated two specific kinds of information. First, the
Press Association became a clearing house for information
concerning persecution of newspapers, always a popular topic
among independent Mexican journalists. Secondly, the
Association facilitated the flow of copy from one paper to
the next. In 1908, Luis Cabrera, a radical Mexico City
journalist, began circulating an anti-porfirian column under
the pen name Bias Urrea. Newspapers throughout Mexico,
including El Correo- de Chihuahua, ran the articles, which
originated from El Partido Democratico. The publishers
defended publication of the anti-cientifico articles on the
grounds that they were merely reprinting information already
published. It did not work. Eventually, some 39 Mexican
newspapers faced legal charges for carrying the articles,
many of them Press Association members. 2 2
Another result of Don Silvestre*s involvement with the
/

Press Association was his acquaintance with many of the
people who would play prominent roles in the 1910
revolution, including Jos£ Maria Pino Suarez, a Press
Association member from Yucatan who would become Madero*s
vice president. The Press Association, in effect, became a
means by which various publishers —

OO

most of whom belonged

"El Segundo Capitulo de Cargos" published by El Partido
Democratica of Mexico, D.F. Reprinted in La Revolucion
Mexicana, Tomo II. pp. 145-178.
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to the economic class that would philosophically control the
revolution —

could transmit their complaints against the

porfirian regime. Many of those complaints were regional in
nature, such as illegal imprisonment in the Yucatan or high
taxes in Chihuahua. Many, if not most, of the publishers
were concerned with U.S. economic involvement in Mexico.
In 1908, two U.S. journalists came to Mexico. James
Creelman and John Kenneth Turner were political opposites.
Creelman, writing for the establishment press, is often
credited with starting the Mexican Revolution. Turner,
influenced by Ricardo Flores Magon, was responsible for
giving the U.S. public the first realistic view of social
conditions in Mexico under Porfirio Diaz.
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Chapter 7
THE AMERICANS AND MEXICAN POLITICS: 1908-1909

In 1908 and 1909, Mexican politicians and newspapermen
formed alliances that would last through the Madero revolt
of 1910-1911. The moderates claimed the first victory in the
series of revolts between 1910 and 1920, collectively known
as the Mexican Revolution. This faction opposed not only the
government but also the conservative out-of-power
porfiristas and the exiled PLM.
The moderates of 1908, not yet the revolutionaries of
1910, held a world view more similar to that of the
porfiristas than that of the PLM. Yet the PLM, not the
moderates, first addressed the problems of mass Mexican
poverty and, in so doing, gathered the kindling that fueled
the entire Revolution. The Revolution was fought by the
poor, illiterate masses, and the PLM alone believed it
should be fought for them.
Early in 1908, John Kenneth Turner, a reporter for the Los
Angeles Examiner, interviewed Ricardo Flores Magon in a Los
Angeles jail where the Mexican journalist-turnedrevolutionary awaited trial for violation of neutrality
laws. The PLM leader described social conditions in Mexico
and at first the 29-year-old Turner expressed skepticism,
especially about the exile's account of slavery in the
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Yucatan. In Barbarous Mexico he described his first response
to the charges:
"Slavery? Do you mean to tell me there is any
real slavery left in the Western Hemisphere?" I
scoffed. "Bah! You are talking like an American
socialist."
Turner probably wrote that to separate himself in his
readers' minds from the American socialists. When he
interviewed Flores Magon and the three other PLM junta
members in Los Angeles, he was a member of the Los Angeles
Socialist Party. Fellow member Job Harriman, attorney for
the junta members, had arranged the interview. The
socialists of Los Angeles adopted the PLM cause and when one
of the richest members, Elizabeth Trowbridge, offered to
post bond for the junta members, Los Angeles officials
refused the money.

2

Turner decided to expose the Diaz regime to the American
public and to that end he made plans to mount an expedition
to Mexico. Before his departure, fellow socialist John
Murray, funded by Trowbridge, traveled to Oaxaca to
investigate conditions there. After hearing Murray's report
substantiating the PLM description, Turner left for Mexico,
accompanied by PLM member Lazaro Gutierrez de Lara, who
acted as an interpreter. When Turner crossed the Mexican
■^John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous Mexico, (Austin, University
of of Texas Press, 1975), p. 5.
2

Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, pp. xiixiii; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 171.
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border in August 1907, he had worked as a journalist for 14
years and the trip, also funded by Trowbridge, proved to be
the high point of his career. Posing as a potential
investor, Turner witnessed firsthand the slavery rampant in
southern Mexico and learned of press persecution throughout
the country. Turner easily found proof that Flores Magon1s
charges were not exaggerated: at that time, more than half
of the Mexican population lived under some form of
■'
•
inheritable
debt peonage. 3
While Turner traveled through Mexico, his wife, Ethel
Duffy Turner, Murray and Trowbridge went to Tucson, Arizona,
where Trowbridge purchased a print shop. There they
published The Border, a magazine dedicated to exposing Diaz,
and a Spanish-language publication, El Defensor de Pueblo,
edited by Manuel Sarabia. Sarabia, the only PLM defendant
allowed his freedom on bond, later married Elizabeth
Trowbridge. Diaz's agents immediately placed the
publications' office under surveillance and eventually
ransacked the place, causing the end of the endeavor.^
Although Turner's ties to the PLM definitely affected his
work, he brought his own perspective to Mexico and viewed
the events and situations there much differently than did
3 ,
Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, pp. xivxv; Wilfred Hard Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929,
(Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1969), p.
190.
^Ibid.; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 173.
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the independent press. For instance, he referred to Diario
del Hogar as "an old and conservative daily paper."

Most of

the journalists who attracted Turner's attention were dead
or dying:
In 1907 the writer Augustin y Tovao died of
poison administered in Belem. Jesus Martinez
Carrion, a noted newspaper artist, and Alberto
Arans, a writer, left Belem to die in a hospital.
Dr. Juan de la Pena, editor of a Liberal
newspaper, died in the military prison of San Juan
de Ulua. Juan Sarabia, another well-known editor,
was also imprisoned there and for a long time was
supposed to be dead, until recently, when his
friends got word of him. Daniel Cabrera, one of
the oldest Liberal editors, was a cripple, and
many times was carried to jail on a stretcher.
Professor Luis Toto, an editor of San Luis
Potosi, was imprisoned and beaten in prison so
severely that he died. . . .
Turner held views similar to those of the unsubsidized
Mexican press on the subject of the persecution of
journalists, but his coverage of the treatment of the
Indians differed greatly. While Turner was investigating the
use and mistreatment of Yanqui Indians as slaves in southern
Mexico, Silvestre Terrazas was covering the latest flare-up
in the ongoing conflict between the Yanquis and the
Federales. Clearly unsympathetic to the Indians, Don
Silvestre reported that 3,000 to 4,000 armed men were in
Torreon ready to take the field against the tribe and noted

5
John Kenneth Turner, p. 143.
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that even U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., were concerned
with the "problem."®
The New York Times frequently published articles about the
Yaqui wars based on reports from the Mexican press, but
Turner's sympathetic reporting of the plight of the Indians
would not be available to the U.S. public for another year.
On his return from Mexico Turner worked briefly for the
doomed Border in the fall of 1908, then traveled to New York
City to find a publisher for his reports of conditions in
Mexico. American Magazine agreed to publish the articles,
scheduling the first for

October, 1909. Perhaps sensing

that great changes were in the wind, Turner planned to
return to Mexico as soon as possible.
But the single most important contribution of U.S.
journalism to Mexican history was, by then, long past. Many
books about the Mexican Revolution, both in English and
Spanish, begin with the James Creelman interview with
Porfirio Diaz, which appeared in the March, 1908, Pearson1s
Magazine. Unwittingly, the two men, reporter and
interviewee, had opened the floodgates.
The 45-page article was extremely laudatory, beginning:
From the heights of Chapultepec Castle President
D^az looked down upon the venerable capital of his
country, spread out on a vast plain, with a ring
of mountains flung up grandly about it, and I, who
had come nearly four thousand miles from New York
®John Kenneth Turner, p. 159; El Correo de Chihuahua, May
26, June 26 and July 7, 1908.
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to see the master and hero of modern Mexico — the
inscrutable leader in>whose veins is blended the
blood of the primitive Mixtecs with that of the
invading Spaniards — watched the slender, erect
form, the strong, soldierly head and commanding,
but sensitive, countenance with an interest beyond
words to express.
The article continued in the same vein and on the second
page, Creelman demonstrated the classic case of the "buried
lead:"
Yet today, in the supremacy of his career, this
astonishing man — foremost figure of the American
hemisphere and unreadable mystery to students of
human government — announces that he will insist
on retiring at the end of his present term, so
that he may see his successor peacefully
established and that, with his assistance, the
people of the Mexican Republic may show the world
that they have entered serenely and preparedly
upon the last complete phase of their liberties. .
The U.S. press largely ignored the revelation, the item
not even appearing in the New York Times.

The Creelman

interview, however, created a stir in Mexico. Then, as now,
many magazines were on the stands long before their official
publication date, and the interview was reprinted first in
Mexico by the Mexican Herald on February 28. El Tiempo, a
pro-Catholic newspaper, published a translation March 1, and
g
El Imparcial published yet another translation March 4.
^James Creelman, "President Diaz, Hero of the Americas,"
Pearson Magazine, March 1908.
8Ibid.
9
x
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Diego Arenas Guzman, Penodismo en la Revolucion Mexicana,
(Mexico, D.F., Biblioteca de Instituto Nacional de Estudios
HistOricos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1966), p. 4.
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The pro-Djfaz press in Mexico used the occasion of the
president's announced retirement for a series of laudatory
articles. The independent press, however, greeted the
announcement with much skepticism, partly because the
interview had been conducted by a U.S. reporter. Diario del
Hogar complained:
In the few lines we have copied, there are
omissions that demonstrate that the reporter
forgot or never knew Mexican history . . . [he]
wanted to pay elegant tribute to our president,
but forgot to record the politicians who formed
the base and actually won these rights for Mexico.
It doesn't surprise us that the Yankee made these
omissions, but it does surprise us that those
newspapers who claim to be friends of the
government didn't report them.
Many of the publishers of Mexican newspapers did not
believe that Dxaz would retire, among them Mata and
Silvestre Terrazas. The article, they pointed out, was meant
for American readership. Don Silvestre gave little credence
to the report, and, on March 18, El Correo de Chihuahua
published an article discrediting the Creelman interview,
quoting an unnamed friend of Dxaz: ''The president will
respond to the mandate of the Mexican people." In Chihuahua,
the Creelman interview was completely overshadowed by
coverage of the Banco Minero Robbery. The interview made the
front page only once, while information about the robbery
was published almost daily. Chihuahua was far removed from
Mexico City and Don Silvestre considered wishing Luis
^Diario del Hogar, April 15, 1908.
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Terrazas a happy birthday a more important use of El Correo
space than debating election results that would be
determined elsewhere and would have little or no effect on
Chihuahua. Six months after the Creelman interview was
published in Mexico City, El Correo reported, matter-offactly, that Diaz had decided to accept another term because
of the ongoing trouble with the Yaquis. 11
Immediately after the interview appeared in the Mexican
newspapers, though, Diaz refused to comment further on his
political plans, even to the pro-Diaz press. To this day,
his intentions are a matter of speculation, but the
interview indicates that Diaz may have had an overblown
estimation of his own popularity. The fact that a U.S.
journalist conducted the interview reflected Diaz's attitude
toward the Mexican press. By the time of the Creelman
interview, he routinely refused requests for interviews by
Mexican newspapermen.
Not all Mexican journalists wanted to interview him. A
growing contingent of labor-oriented publications found a
ready market among Mexicans working in mining, railroading
and industry. As long as they were not openly affiliated
with the PLM, Diaz ignored the inexpensive pro-labor papers
that began appearing throughout the country. Some of these
were radical in tone, such as El Diablo Bromista, a "Weekly
■^El Correo de Chihuahua, March 3, 16 and 18, 1908, June 22,
1908, July 7, 1908.
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for the working class, the whip for evil bourgeoisie." The
Diaz regime grew somewhat complacent toward unionism after
1907, when the administration ended union strikes in Mexico
by shooting down several hundred striking textile workers in
Rio Blanco, Veracruz. In that same year, the Diaz
administration succeeded in having the St. Louis junta
incarcerated m

a Los Angeles jail. 12

Support for unions continued to grow in Mexico, however,
reflecting a growing discontent among the populace. Those
Mexicans who found employment in the mines, on the railroads
and in the textile mills earned a better income than did
their fellow countrymen who worked in agriculture but
received much less than U. S. citizens working in the same
industries in Mexico. This discrepancy became a favorite
topic for some Mexican journalists, including Silvestre
Terrazas. "The American Problem," as Don Silvestre called
it, was another argument for political change in Mexico.
Political change depended on Dfaz's retirement. In October
1908, Filomeno Mata published an open letter to Diaz,
demanding that he confirm or deny the contents of the
Creelman interview. Diaz replied that his statements to
Creelman were only expressions of "personal desire." The
revelation, at least for Francisco I. Madero, came too late.

12

Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, Genesis
Under Madero, (New York, Greenwood Press, 1952), pp. 24 and
25.
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After the Creelman interview, several writers published
books calling for the formation of political parties and
urging political responsibility on the part of the masses.
Madero, a wealthy landowner, had written the most important
of these, The Presidential Succession of 1910, and arranged
for its printing. He was waiting only for final permission
from his family to continue.

13

Madero was part of the landed gentry of Mexico, coming
from a family that had massive estates in Coahuila and Nuevo
Leon. Educated in France, the 35-year-old hacendado had been
exposed to eastern mysticism while reading the Bhagavad
Gita, or "Song of Heaven," of the Hindu faith. According to
post-Revolution mythology, Madero began his involvement in
Mexican politics because of a "supernatural" experience he
had concerning "spirit writing" after returning to the
family hacienda in Coahuila.^4
At any rate, Madero adopted the Hindu belief that "there
is nothing better than a righteous battle," and in 1904
Madero became active in the Coahuila gubernatorial election.
He helped fund and wrote for the political weekly El
Democrata of San Pedro. His family did not look upon his
political ambitions kindly and his grandfather, the family
13

D i a n o del Hogar, October 27, 1908, as quoted in Ross, p.

14 Stanley Ross, Francisco Madero: Apostle of Mexican
Democracy, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1955), pp.
8 and 9.
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patriarch, wrote to Madero, warning him about fruitless
opposition and comparing his endeavors against the regime to
"the rivalry of a microbe with an elephant." Madero
reassured his family that he intended only to pursue
political ends within the law, and, as noted earlier,
withdrew his support of the PLM at the first hint of armed
revolt .15
Madero represented those Mexicans who wanted political
opportunity and who could appreciate, because of their
status and education, exactly what political opportunity
could mean for them. Conversely, Madero did not represent
the majority of Mexican people, who were chiefly concerned
with getting enough food to stay alive. Commonly, historians
cite the need for land reform as the major cause of the
Revolution and the majority of Mexicans did not own land.
Madero had no intention of advancing the cause of the
landless masses. As a member of the financial elite of
Mexico, Madero hoped only to break the political
stranglehold the cientifico's had on the country, not to
redistribute the land or wealth. He earnestly believed that
an open democracy would bring prosperity to the Mexican
people, but because of his comfortable background he lacked
the ability to appreciate the country's real problems.

1 5 Ibid,

p. 36.
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Madero's greatest and first hope, he wrote in La Sucesion
Presidencial en 1910, was that the office of vice president
would be filled in a democratic manner rather than by
presidential

appointment. He also expounded on the well-

used praises of the constitution of 1857. Mild enough to
meet with his family's approval, the book did not create an
immediate stir in Mexico after its publication in January,
1909. Madero sagely used much of the first few pages to
deliver a tribute to Diaz's virtues. In subsequent chapters,
Madero pointed out that under Diaz, the states had lost the
right to elect their own governors, jefes politicos were
appointed and so on. Madero reiterated an old theme: the
continuismo generated by D^az was a direct contradiction to
/

Diaz the statesman.

16

As Madero's book was being printed, John Kenneth Turner
returned to Mexico City to continue his research for
magazine articles and what would become, in 1910, Barbarous
Mexico. In neither the articles nor the book did he devote
much space to Madero. By this time, Turner was deeply
entrenched with the magonistas and his position in Mexico
City, as sports writer for the Mexican Herald, did not lend
itself to close association with would-be politicos.
Turner's lack of concern with Madero was a foreshadowing of

16

✓

Francisco Madero, La Sucesion Presidencial en 1910, as
reprinted in La Revolucidn Mexicana, Tomo II. pp. 60, 73-76
and 83-84.

112

a coming conflict between the maderistas and the magonistas.
Turner's first opinion of Madero's book was that it was not
suppressed because it did not represent a threat. He
credited the book with launching El Partido Democratico,
which nominated Reyes.

17

The formation of the party and the nomination brought
suspicion from the independent press, which viewed the party
as simply another government front. On December 25, 1908,
weeks before Madero received his family's permission to
publish La Sucesion Presidencial, Diario editorialized: "The
ruling party has prepared to organize El Partido Democratico
and has the idea that they alone have command of the
republic without bothering the rest of us with truth or even
disinterest, that they alone have the right to worry about
politics.
In February, El Circulo Nacional Porfista held a national
convention in Mexico City to nominate Diaz and Corral for
reelection. That same month, the first Club Anti
reel eccionista of Mexico met in Mexico City. Madero joined
as a charter member, along with radical columnist Luis
Cabrera and independent newspaperman Teodore Hernandez.
Filomeno Mata, who had run the slogan "No Reelection" as
part of his masthead since 1888, was also a member of the

l7
John Kenneth Turner, p. 163.
1R

Diario del Hogar, December 25, 1908.
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group. Goals of the Club included restoration of the powers
of the 1857 constitution and an amendment that again would
prohibit reelection of the president. 19
Diario del Hogar published a front page-article on Madero
in May, headlined: "The latest book about the Diaz
administration." Diario also included a photograph of
Madero, a rare bit of graphics that illustrated the
importance Mata gave to the the forthcoming elections. The
lengthy article dealt not only with Madero's book but also
with Carlos de Farnaro's Diaz, Czar of Mexico, published by
de Farnaro in New York. In fact, mention of Madero's book
did not occur until well into the article's continuation on
page two. The article then quoted Madero concerning "the
willingness of the Mexican people to fight" though Madero
had disavowed the PLM m

the opening chapter of his book.

Mata probably ran a larger risk than did Madero by
publishing information about de Fornaro, for de Fornaro
openly opposed Diaz. De Fornaro, an Italian journalist,
worked as an editor on Diario in 1908. The publication of
his book in the United States resulted in a criminal libel

19

Mancisidor, pp. 89-90.

20

Diario del Hogar, May 23, 1909; Francisco Madero, La
Sucesion Presidencial en 1910, as reprinted in La Revolucion
Mexicana, Tomo II, p. 61.
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suit brought by the Mexican government and the journalist
O]
spent a year m jail m New York.
Fortunately for Madero, the administration focused on the
movement to nominate General Bernardo Reyes, first as vice
president and then as an opponent to Diaz. The movement
flared up among the conservative but non-cientifico
contingent in the spring of 1909 but was quickly squelched.
Reyes bowed out of the "race" and elected to accept a
diplomatic post in Europe rather than risk enraging D^az.
In June, 1909, Madero began touring Mexico, taking
advantage of the vacuum left by Reyes' sudden departure. He
succeeded in converting many Reyista

clubs to Clubes de

Antireeleccionistas. He promulgated the idea of "no
reelection" and while both his book and his speeches showed
his complete lack of knowledge concerning the underlying
social and economic problems of Mexico, Madero's acceptance
as a political leader grew throughout the summer, much to
his family's dismay. His grandfather
. you should support a riotous crowd

wrote to him, " If . .
. . . I, with my 78

years, will be the first in the defense of the
government."22
Madero continually reassured his family that his mission
was not revolutionary, while he continued his tour. In

Ol
72
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Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, p. x v m .
John Kenneth Turner, p. 163; Ross, pp. 81-83.
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Yucatan, he met Jose Maria Pino Suarez, publisher of El
Peninsular, a member of the Associated Press of the States
and a frequent writer of letters-to-the-editor in Diario del
Hogar. Pino Suarez became a strong supporter of Madero and
perhaps impressed upon him the importance of newspapers.
About one-third of the 25 communities Madero visited during
his summer and winter tours had some vestige of the
independent press. In others, Madero helped establish
political antireelecionista clubs, and the first order of
any political club was to establish a newspaper. By mid
summer, Madero was so convinced that a daily newspaper was
necessary to further the cause that he went to his relatives
for funds. They refused him.
The growth of Madero's popularity and name recognition
during the summer and fall of 1909 can be attributed largely
to newspapers, either the small independent press of the
provinces or of the papers the anti-reelection clubs
published. Madero received little coverage by newspapers in
Mexico City, and he was not an eloquent spokesman. In fact,
while giving the first public speech of his tour, in a
theater in Veracruz, some of the audience doubted that the
speaker was the author of La Sucesi^n Presidencial en 1910.

^Diego Arenas Guzman, Jose Maria Pino Suarez,
(Villahermosa, Mexico, Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco,
1985) , p. 15; Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolucicjn
Mexicana, Mexico, D.F., Editorial JUS, 1965), p. 61; Ross,
pp. 80-94.
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Madero, a small, balding man, spoke in a high-pitched voice.
But his audiences were receptive to his message, which had
been foreshadowed by newspapers throughout Mexico for
several years.

94

Madero did not call for a radical change in Mexican
government, merely a reinstatement of the powers of the 1857
constitution. In this, he echoed the long-standing
sentiments of the independent press of Mexico. Furthermore,
Madero, unlike the Flores Mag^n brothers, belonged to that
economic class that traditionally involved itself in Mexican
politics. In light of the Creelman interview, though Diaz
had completely refuted his stated intention to retire by the
end of Madero's tour, Madero seemed to the independent press
a safe subject for articles.
The subsidized press ignored Madero and his movement, but
the small press, both the established independents and the
papers created to promulgate anti-reelectionism, took the
cause to the literate people of Mexico. By mid-summer 1909
Madero's desire for a daily newspaper was a reality. The
paper, El Antireeleccionista, had begun as a weekly staffed
by volunteers. Madero's brother, Gustavo, managed to raise
the money to staff and print a daily by selling shares in
the business. Although the money came mainly from relatives,
Madero's ability to raise the funds demonstrated a growing

94

Ross, p. 80.
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popularity. Undoubtedly, the young Coahuilan became
worrisome to more than just his family, but other events
/
.
,
25
diverted the attention of the Diaz administration.
In September, American Magazine previewed Turner's series,
promising its readers an expose of Mexico. In October the
series began with a piece entitled "The Slaves of Yucatan."
The magazine's editors added an editorial set in 14-point
type that concluded:
A great Dxaz-myth has been built up through
skillfully applied influence upon journalism. It
is the most astounding case of suppression of
truth and the dissemination of untruth and halftruth that recent history affords. . . . Diaz is
an able autocrat who has policed the country well,
used his power for the benefit of the few and
neglected the welfare of the great body of people.
In Mexico they say "after him the deluge, if
indeed he is not swept away by it."
The articles were the first anti-Dxaz material widely
distributed in the U.S. press (at the time that Turner's
articles were published, American Magazine claimed a
circulation of 300,000) and the regime responded immediately
by having favorable writings concerning Porfirio Dxaz
appear. Its method was standard: bribery. Porfirio Dxaz made
substantial gifts to several American reporters and hired
James Creelman outright. Gratuities went to Harrison Gray
Otis, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, who owned land on

Cumberland, p. 81.
Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, p. xvii.
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the Baja peninsula, and to William Randolph Hearst, who
owned a huge ranch m

Chihuahua. 2 7

The series of articles that ran in Sunset magazine, a
publication that Turner claimed was owned by the Southern
Pacific Railroad, typified the pro-Diaz propaganda. Sunset
editors justified the series, "Mexico As It Is," because of
the forthcoming elections but never mentionedany candidate
except Diaz. An anonymous socialite of Mexico

City

supposedly wrote the articles, which began in February 1910,
and spared no accolade to Diaz:
In spite of the fact that President Diaz has
expressed his desire to withdraw from power and to
rest— the people have acclaimed him a candidate
for the coming presidential term, and with him
also Senor Corral, to continue as vice-president
of the republic. With this popular informal
nomination, Mexico has demonstrated that she is
resolved not to abandon for a moment,^the program
of peace and progress which General Diaz has
carried out with such remarkable results.
Sunset ran the series for three months. In May the
magazine published an article explaining that the Yaquis,
blood-thirsty killers that they were, had to be deported to
Yucatan for the safety of the Mexican populace. The author
praised the tactic and claimed it had been successful. The
Yaquis, he wrote, had been pacified because of fear of
deportation and were no longer being shipped to the Yucatan
77

.

Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 1.3; personal interview with Jane
Dale Lloyd.
^®Gaspar Estrada Gonzales, "Mexico As It Is," Sunset
Magazine, Volume 24, January-June, 1910. pp. 73-74.
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where they "stand in the same relationship to their
employers as the rest of the field laborers in that
state.
Dxaz diffused the effect of Turner's articles. For unclear
reasons, American Magazine discontinued the series after
December 1909. Turner charged that the Dxaz administration
had bribed the publishers. Indeed, the magazine was
susceptible. The publication owed $400,000 and scheduled the
series in hopes of increasing its circulation. Muckraker
Upton Sinclair later corroborated Turner's theory. After
American Magazine canceled the series, Turner published
several more articles in limited-circulation, left-wing
publications. In the summer of 1910, Turner decided to
publish his articles in a book. Although Barbarous Mexico
did not appear until December of that year, Turner created a
sensation by charging that the U.S. government had
y

persecuted antx-Dxaz Mexxcan refugees.

if)

After the initial publication of the articles, the Turner
affair preoccupied the porfiristas and during this period,
from the fall of 1909 to the spring of 1910, the anti
reelection movement and Madero gained support. Local
authorities, however, continued their persecution of

29

Robert Hammond Murray, "Mexxco and the Yaquis," Sunset
Magazine, Volume 24, January-June, 1910. p. 626.
30 Sinclair Snow, xntroduction to Babarous Mexico, p. xxixxii.
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newspapers in their jurisdictions. Enrique Creel, still
enmeshed in his animosity with Silvestre Terrazas, wrote
Vice President Ramon Corral and urged the government to take
severe action against the opposition press. Creel, part of
the established power structure in Chihuahua, had strong
ties with the Dxaz regime and undoubtedly distrusted the
anti-reelection movement. He knew Don Silvestre had joined
the anti-reelection club of Chihuahua. It mattered little to
Creel that the journalist had

declined to serve as an

officer, saying the position would compromise his position
as a journalist.

O 1

Creel jailed Don Silvestre briefly in the fall of 1909,
ostensibly on old charges from the "We want guarantees"
article, but he confided in Corral that he had made the move
to damage the anti-reelectionist movement in Chihuahua. The
arrest probably inspired Don Silvestre to Madero1s cause.
The publisher, judging from his selection of editorial
material, had a better grasp than did Madero of the reality
facing most Mexicans. Like Madero, Don Silvestre was part of
the landed gentry, but as years went by he was forced to
sell much of the land he inherited to continue publishing El
Correo. This was especially true after Creel began using his

31
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influence to convince the Chihuahua business community to
stop advertising m

the paper. 32

In April the anti-reelection party of Mexico formally
nominated Madero for president. On May 29, 1910,
representatives of the independent newspapers of Mexico City
met to endorse Madero. Mata was absent, serving yet another
jail sentence, but a son and daughter attended the meeting,
carrying a placard with Diario del Hogar scrawled in large
black letters denoting mourning. Later, newspapermen and
members of the Mata family carried the placard to the
National Palace as a sign of protest, but to no avail.
As the election drew near, the regime increased its
persecution of anti-reelectionists. In an open letter to
D^az, Madero complained:
At Coahuila the public officials have
arbitrarily forbidden demonstrations in our honor,
preventing also the spread of our principles. The
same has happened in the states of Nuevo Leon,
Aguascalientes and San Luis Potosi. . . . In the
states of Sonora and Puebla the conditions are
serious. In the former state an independent
journalist, Mr. Caeser del Vando, was thrown into
jail. . . . At Cananea the prosecutions are
extreme against the members of my party, and
according to late news received from there more
than thirty individuals have been imprisoned,
among them the full board of directors of the Club
Anti-Reeleccionista de Obreros [workers], three of
whom were forcibly enlisted in the army.
At Puebla, Atlixco and Tlaxcala, where untold
outrages have been committed against my followers,
32 .
Sims, p. 397; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
^Mata, p. 85.
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raises intense excitement. The last news received
shows the condition of the working classes to be
desperate; they may at any moment resort to
violent means to have their rights respected.
The Dxaz regime, working through state governors,
persecuted journalists who openly supported Madero simply
because they made the easiest targets. As early as October
1909, Jose Marxa Pino Suarez complained in a letter in
Diario del Hogar that more than 100 newspapermen nationwide
had been imprisoned under false pretenses and that at least
50 others had been conscrxpted xnto the Mexxcan army. IS
Madero's candidacy proved too much for Dxaz. On June

6,

more than a month before the scheduled election, Madero was
arrested in Monterey. The original charge was, according to
Luis Mata, stealing the cuttings from a bush. By this one
act, the government turned Madero into a revolutionary.
Oddly, Dxaz probably would have won the election. The force
that rose against him in future months would not use the
ballot.

34

John Kenneth Turner, p. 165.

35Piario del Hogar, October 19, 1909.
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Chapter 8
THE REVOLUTION OF 1910: THE END AND THE BEGINNING

On September 16, 1910, Mexico celebrated its centennial of
independence from Spain. Festivities in Mexico City lasted
the entire month, and President Diaz, reelected
"unanimously," was busy unveiling monuments and entertaining
the diplomatic corps that came to pay tribute to the "maker
of modern Mexico."
The electoral "triumph" of Diaz in Chihuahua was typical:
a few people, nine in Juarez and 16 in Batopilas, actually
voted for Madero. In Juarez, election officials had told
voters that Madero was not an' eligible candidate. In
Batopilas, the police jailed the leader of the club antireeleccionista. Nationwide the government jailed more than
5,000 Madero supporters on election day.^
The fraudulent elections did not diminish the ardor with
which the celebrators in Mexico City honored D^az. To the
foreign visitors, the capital displayed, at least on the
surface, the modernity and affluence that had become the
trademark of the Di!az regime. Many new electric street
lights had been installed for the occasion: the national
palace, the cathedral and the Plaza de Constitucion had been

■'"Francisco R. Alameda, La Revolucion en el Estado de
Chihuahua, Tomo I, (Chihuahua, Biblioteca del Instituto
Nacional de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana,
1964), p. 158; Ross, p. 107.
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illuminated. The President and Senora Diaz sponsored a
"garden party" at Chapdltepec Castle, and banners
proclaiming "Peace, Liberty and Progress" hung over the
well-lit streets.

2

The U.S. press covered the celebrations with a pro-Diaz
bias. The New York Times published an article from an
unnamed special correspondent typical of the articles
generated by the U.S. press:
Mexico's celebration of the 100th anniversary of
martyred Father Hidalgo's proclamation of
independence has been coupled with an equally
impressive celebration of the eightieth
anniversary of the birth of that wonderful old
man, Porfirio Dfaz. Who can doubt that the
supposedly lesser includes the seemingly greater?
Mexico's centennial of independence is
unquestionably another manifestation of the power
of its president. . . .One's first impression of
President Diaz justifies the idea formed of him in
reading. He is surely a man of great personal
power. Short of stature physically, his
personality is large. He stands erect, he walks
briskly. His face in repose is grave and stern,
but it lights up wonderfully when he is greeting a
visitor he is glad to see, or discussing a subject
that interests him. . . . H e goes about daily in
his limousine unguarded. At the National Palace
soldiers surround him, but he fearlessly exposes
himself. Probably he has no cause for fear. . . .
To the U.S. press, Madero's attempt to become president
was the "ravings of a mad man" and had become an historical
anachronism. The Times special correspondent wrote:
Genaro Garcia, "Las Fiestas del Centenario," from Cronica
oficial de las fiestas del primer centenario de la,
Independencia de Mexico, reprinted in La Revolucion
Mexicana, pp. 205-207.
•^New York Times, September 24, 1910.
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Poor Madero, under surveillance somewhere far
from the capital, has his admirers. There were
cries for him in the densely crowded streets last
night. The rurales soon silenced the cries and
placed the patriots who uttered them where they
could sleep off the effects of too much tequila or
mescal. . . . But as ^a matter of fact there is no
real opposition to Diaz, organized or unorganized.
While he retains power, the prosperity of the
country will remain unchecked by any outbreak of
the revolutionary spirit so strong in the Latin
blood, and foreign enterprise, so needful in the
development of the country, will be protected.
Mexican prosperity, like the Pax Porfiriano, was an
illusion. The decline of silver prices, the world depression
of 1907 and subsequent drop in demands for Mexican exports
all affected Mexico's ailing economy. Diaz's international
popularity had resulted largely from the fact that he paid
the Mexican debt of the 19th century. In 1910, Jos£ Yves
Limantour, his minister of finance, traveled to Europe to
renegotiate Mexico's foreign debt

During the last few years

of the Diaz regime, rampant inflation seriously affected the
price of staples. The government found itself threatened on
two fronts: Mexico's international financial credibility was
in danger, and the poor and middle classes were becoming,
understandably, discontent.
The Mexican government had formally charged Madero with
fomenting a revolution and insulting authorities in Mexico

4
E.D. Trowbridge. Mexico To-Day and To-Morrow, (New York,
Macmillan Company, 1919), p. 132; New York Times, September
24, 1910.
t;
Cumberland, pp. 13-14.
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City. U.S. Consular officials, however, informed the State
Department that Madero1s only crime was "being a candidate
for office." After meeting with Limantour, who stopped in
San Luis Potosi on his way to Europe, Madero was allowed to
post bond. He was permitted restricted freedom and was
ordered to remain in San Luis Potosi. On October

6,

Madero

disguised himself as a railroad mechanic and fled to the
United States. Both the Mexican government and newspapers in
the United States and Mexico presumed correctly that Madero
would launch a revolution, but neither predicted success.
After all, the PLM had called for revolution since 1906, to
no avail.®
From San Antonio, Madero issued El Plan de San Luis
Potosi. The plan was dated October 5, the last day he was in
Mexico, to avoid open violation of the nuetrality laws.
Madero sent the manifesto to many newspaper publishers in
Mexico in early November, but none dared print it. Madero's
supporters also received copies of the plan. In the
manifesto, he set the date of revolution for November 20,
1910. Aquiles Serdan, a shoe salesmen in Puebla, is often
credited with firing the first shot of the Mexican
Revolution. When Puebla police went to arrest Serdan, a
member of the Club Antireeleccionista, at his home on
November 18, Serdan and his family opened fire on the

®Ross, pp. 105, 109; New York Times, June 12, 1910.
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police. Police and Federales finally killed the family and
discovered a cache of arms and ammunition in the home. El
Imparcial reported these events the next day, under the
banner headline "Viva Gen. Diaz!" ("Hurray for General
Diaz!")J
Madero did reenter Mexico on November 20, but the
revolutionary army that he planned to lead did not
materialize, so he again left the country. Enrique Creel,
with permission from Diaz, sent to the New York Times a
letter, assuring U.S. citizens that the political situation
in Mexico "does not present any danger and the lives and
interests of all strangers are absolutely secure. . . .
O
this moment order is complete in the whole republic."

At

Earlier in the month, on November 4, a lynch mob in Rock
Springs, Texas, burned a Mexican national to death, setting
off a wave of anti-American riots that swept through Mexico
and generated support for the revolutionary cause. In Mexico
City, a mob, comprising both magonistas and maderistas,
threw a bomb into the U.S. embassy, then attacked the
offices of El Imparcial and the Mexican Herald. One U.S.
citizen was lynched, and police killed two demonstrators.

9

7Silvestre Terrazas, El Verdadero Pancho Villa, pp. 30-35;
El Imparcial, November 20, 1910.
p
Enrique Creel to the editor of the New York Times, November
24, 1910.
9
/
Regeneracion, November 12, 1910.
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The riots in Mexico City, which preceded the outbreak of
maderista hostilities, illustrated that those who would
actually fight the revolution drew little distinction
between Madero and Flores Mag^n, who had been released from
prison in the United States on August 3. Their focus was
anti-Diaz and their first targets, after the American
embassy, were the two newspapers most closely associated
with the Diaz regime. The government, in turn, was quick to
deal with the threat of the independent press.
In November, Mexican authorities arrested Mata, his son,
Filomeno Jr., who was editing the paper, and several other
staff members of Diario del Hogar on charges of defamation
against a minor official. From his prison cell, Mata wrote
one last editorial about the anti-reelection movement and
titled it, "No Reelection Was a Debt."

He traced the

history of the Diaz regime, pointing out that Diaz was
opposing the very cause that he had trumpeted in his early
years. He concluded: "It is time. The people want the
freedom to name his [Diaz's] successor.
The revolution sputtered in northern Mexico. Maderistas
threatened Torre<£n briefly and gathered on the outskirts of
Chihuahua. Revolutionary forces cut telegraph wires and
briefly controlled some spur rail lines in northern Mexico,

■^Mata, pp. 88-89.
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but by November 23, Creel prematurely declared the
revolution had been "crushed."

11

In Chihuahua, Silvestre Terrazas published an article
about the Madero revolt as his lead story November 20. On
November 13, there had been an anti-American riot in the
city and Don Silvestre had concentrated his coverage on "the
American problem," treating Madero's threat of revolt as
secondary. On the 20th, however, El Correo de Chihuahua
published the banner headline "Madero in Laredo, Texas." The
following day, the lead story concerned the efforts of the
Mexican government to have Madero extradited. On November
22, El Correo published another update on the Madero revolt
under the headline "The Delicate Situation" and two days
later it announced with the largest banner headline yet,
i2
"Madero m Coahuila."
On November 26, agents of the Chihuahua state government
arrested Don Silvestre at his office. He was taken first to
the state prison where he was held incommunicado for several
days, then transferred without a judicial order to
Lecumberri prison, known as the "Black Palace," in Mexico
City. The exact charges against Don Silvestre are unknown.
His daughter claims he was arrested because he published the
complete Plan de San Luis Potosi, which he did not. In fact,

^ New York Times, November 23, 1910.
12 E1

Correo de Chihuahua, November 20, 21, 22 and 24, 1910.
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his objective coverage of the Madero revolt demonstrated
that Don Silvestre was not yet a Maderista. His ongoing
editorial bias had not been against Diaz, but against the
Terrazas-Creel power structure in Chihuahua, and the logical
assumption is that Don Luis preferred to have Don Silvestre
out of the way during the coming tumult. 13
The initial phase of the Madero revolt had been suppressed
by the government as easily as it had quelled the magonista
attempts between 1906 and 1910. Both the U.S. press and the
subsidized press in Mexico declared the emergency over by
December. Even Madero, now in New Orleans, was disheartened.
But in Mexico, a ground-swell movement was occurring.
Maderistas and magonistas were banding together, much to the
chagrin of Flores Magon who considered himself the
indisputable head of the revolutionary movement. At this
point, the Mexican revolutionaries coalesced because of
their common opposition to Diaz.
E.D. Trowbridge (no relation to Elizabeth Trowbridge), a
writer in Mexico during the revolution, described the events
that resulted as the rumors of the maderista revolution
swept the country. Diaz began concentrating his troops,
leaving many garrisons deserted or understaffed. This act
lent credence to the idea of the revolution, and in many
areas the people rose against those whom they considered
1

3 .
.
.
.
Margarita Terrazas, p. 331-332; personal interview with
Margarita Terrazas.
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their immediate oppressors, either the local rich or the
remaining soldiers. Trowbridge wrote about the adventures of
one such band, formed by Gabriel Hernandez:
Hernandez, an Indian lad 24 years of age,
started with three men at the village of
Chignahuapan, in the state of Puebla, to raise a
Maderista band. Within a few days he had picked up
fifteen or twenty men from neighboring villages
and had obtained horses and arms from
sympathizers. It was an easy matter to take
possession of several small towns and villages,
and in each more recruits were obtained, and
farmers were induced to contribute horses "for the
cause." The band, all mounted and now numbering a
hundred men or more, took the town of Sacatlan, a
place of considerable importance, then occupied
Xico, and then Hanchinanago, the county seat.
As 1910 ended, the press reported that the uprising was
basically over, although accounts of fighting still
appeared. This was not unusual: articles concerning
revolutionary activity in Mexico had appeared in the New
York Times since June. For those involved in that activity,
it did not matter what the newspapers in the United States
or Mexico printed, except, perhaps, for one.
Flores Magon had resumed publishing Regeneraci^n on
September 3, while Madero was still a prisoner in San Luis
Potosi. In the first issue of the Los Angeles-based paper,
Flores Magon correctly predicted that the revolution was at
hand: "The calmness of today is the revolution of tomorrow."
But that revolution, he warned, would be for nothing unless
it "carried the convictions of both political and economic
■^Trowbridge, pp. 133-34.
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liberties." Simply put, Flores Magon did not take Madero
seriously as a revolutionary because Madero, a rich
hacendado, belonged to the class against which the
revolution had to be fought .15
Flores Mag&n, heavily influenced by the American left,
held close ties to the economic philosophy of the Industrial
Workers of the World. His main concern, though, had long
since evolved to ideas based on economic reform. He wanted
not only to redistribute the wealth but to change the system
that created it. The articles he wrote for the new
Regeneraci^n designated the capitalist as the enemy.
As the Madero revolt gained momentum, so did the rivalry
between Madero and Flores Magon. Madero reportedly offered
the provisional vice presidency to Flores Magon, who flatly
rejected it. Supposedly, Flores Magon suggested to Madero
that if he wanted to become a revolutionary, he should
become a magonista.16
Flores Mag6 n found himself in the same situation as Camilo
Ariaga had in 1905. As Flores Mag^n had usurped the position
of revolutionary leader from Arriaga, now Madero usurped
that postion from him. According to Ethel Duffy Turner, the
early victories in Chihuahua during December 1910 were

1S

,s
Regeneracion, September 3, 1910.

1

Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd; Ethel Duffy
Turner, p. 218.
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fought by magonistas, but the spoils were to be enjoyed by
the maderistas.

i7

Meanwhile, from December 1910 to February 1911, Silvestre
Terrazas languished in Lecumberri. When he was moved from
Chihuahua to Mexico City, one of the guards who accompanied
him was ordered to claim ley fuga and kill him but refused.
The orders obviously came from Chihuahua, not Mexico City.

18

Don Silvestre's wife followed him to Mexico City and once
there wrote Sefiora Diaz, asking her to intervene. The
president agreed to interview the prisoner. Diaz asked
Terrazas about the situation in Chihuahua, which by February
1911 was the center of revolutionary activities. Don
Silvestre responded by making a speech against the TerrazasCreel clan and its various monopolies in that state. Diaz,
perhaps thinking that Don Silvestre represented no threat to
his personal image in Chihuahua, had him released. However,
one of Don Silvestre's first articles after returning to
Chihuahua was an interview with Madero. 19
Don Silvestre asked Madero if the rift between the
magonistas and maderistas was irreparable. Madero replied
that it was not certain, but he had stopped worrying about
it. He had not had any contact with Flores Magon since

17Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 217.
18
19

Personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
Silvestre Terrazas, p. 60.

134

coining to the United States in October and claimed he did
not know why Flores Magon attacked him in his newspaper.20
Madero, in all probability, was lying. In January, Antonio
Villarreal, who had edited Regeneracion in St. Louis after
Flores Magon had fled to Canada and who was responsible for
moving the newspaper to Los Angeles, had broken with Flores
Magon and joined Madero. The maderistas distributed a
circular claiming that Flores Magon had accepted the
position of provisional vice president, and with
Villarreal's help published and circulated a bogus
Regeneracion in northern Mexico during the critical months
of January and February, 1911.
Flores Magon responded in Regeneracion with a scathing
editorial entitled, "Francisco Madero is a traitor to the
cause of liberty." Madero was closer to Diaz than he was to
Flores Magon, at least according to Flores MagOn:
Mexicans, open your eyes. Why doesn't Madero
fight with el Partido Liberal? Because el Partido
Liberal fights for the poor, whose interests are
opposite those of the rich. . . . The rich need
the poor to work and for this Madero will not
support el Partido Liberal because he wants the
poor to remain, that is, be the slaves of the
rich.
Flores Magon repeated this theme many times. In April, he
wrote:

2 0 Ibid,
21

pp. 62-63.

/
Regeneracion, February 25, 1911.
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El partido maderista represents the interests of
the rich class because they care only about the
fall of the tyrant Diaz, to recreate the vigor of
the constitution of 1857; in a word, to give the
people political liberty. The people would then be
free to vote, to have meetings, to show their
thoughts [free to publish], but there would still
be misery afoot because what law is there to
abolish misery?
Flores Mag<^n continued his campaign against Madero, even
after Madero became president of Mexico. In 1911 Flores
Magon would launch an abortive revolution in the Baja, but
his supposed allegiance with Madero may have helped turn the
tide in Chihuahua. On May 10,y 1911, maderista forces took
the city
On

of Juarez. The end was in sight.

May 21, representatives of the D^az regime and the

provisional government met in El Paso and signed a peace
treaty. The document d-icatated that an interim government,
made up mostly of porfiristas, would rule Mexico until
elections could be held in October. Madero left for Mexico
City and Porfirio Diaz left for Europe.
Shortly before Diaz's departure, Filomeno Mata was
released from prison for the last time. The last seven
months in Belen had destroyed his health. Mata made one last
decision at Diario del Hogar; he named Juan Sarabia, the PLM
member who had been captured in northern Mexico in 1907, as
editor. Mata had fewer than three months to live and his

Regeneracion, April 15, 1911.
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family reflected bitterly that DiTaz was sailing to Europe,
safe and sound. 23
The duty of escorting the fallen president to the dock at
Veracruz fell to General Victriano Huerta, an old
professional soldier destined for his own infamy. At the
dock, so the story goes, Diaz turned to him and said:
"Madero has unleashed a tiger. The question is, can he
control it?"

^Mata, p. 89.
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Chapter 9
"LA DECENA TRAGICA"
THE BEGINNING AND THE END: 1913

Francisco Madero ruled Mexico for 14 months, but his
regime was doomed before it began. According to the Treaty
of Ciudad Juarez, which ended the Revolt of 1910, Francisco
Le<5n de la Barra, who had served Porfirio D^az as foreign
minister and ambassador to the United States, was to serve
as interim president from May 26, 1911, through the
elections in October and the inauguration in November.
De la Barra's presidency created at least two ongoing
problems. First, as de la Barra was a longtime porfirian
politician, he did not initiate massive personnel changes.
Many government administrators who had served under Diaz now
served under de la Barra and continued to hold their
positions even after Madero took office December 1. Madero
did not seem to recognize that Mexicans hungered for massive
changes.
Secondly, many Mexicans believed de la Barra was
"president in name only" and that Madero had the power. Had
Madero been an astute politician, this might have happened,
but he simply did not have the ability to control de la
Barra. Maderistas asked their leader for political changes
and favors that he could not deliver.1

i
Calvert, p. 85.
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The de la Barra government increased the size of the
Mexican army and tried to disband and disarm the remaining
revolutionary forces. Some of the revolutionary leaders,
like Emiliano Zapata of Morrelos, refused to lay down their
arms, sensing correctly that the revolution was not
finished.
In June 1911, during the first month of de la Barra's
presidency, Madero tried to make his peace with Ricardo
Flores Magon who had staged an unsuccessful revolution in
Baja, California. By this time, Flores Magon had lost all
credibility as the leader of the revolution, but because of
his proximity to Baja and his connections with the IWW,
which provided many of his soldiers, he still represented a
threat to the Mexican government. Madero sent four men to
Los Angeles to meet with Flores MagOn: Juan Sarabia, who was
now publishing Diario del Hogar intermittently; Abraham
Gonzales, who would serve as governor of Chihuahua under
Madero; Antonio Villareal, who was responsible for editing
the bogus Regeneracion in early 1911 after supporting Flores
Mag6n for many years; and Ricardo's brother Jesus, by then
an ardent maderista.
Sarabia and Jesds met with Flores Mag^n on June 13. The
results of the meeting were inconclusive. On the following
day, Los Angeles police arrested Flores Magon, Librado
Rivera and another Regeneracion staff member. The three were
charged with conspiracy to break U.S. neutrality laws. Their
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bond was set at $2500 and the PLM could raise only enough
/
O
money to obtain Flores Magon's release.
On July 2, Flores Magon published an issue of Regeneracion
containing an article entitled: "Juan Sarabia, Judas."
Sarabia republished the article in Diario del Hogar and
wrote in an adjoining article that he was not, and had never
been, a maderista. In August, Sarabia and Villareal again
published a paper called Regeneracion, this time in Mexico
City. Flores Magon referred to the new paper as
/

"degeneracion."

3

Although Flores Magon's concerns about land reform
influenced the Mexican Constitution of 1917, his popularity
among liberal Mexicans dwindled after 1911. He died in the
U.S. penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1922, almost
blind, terribly unhappy and deserted by his own country.
After his death, the Mexican government carried his body
back to Mexico City in a special train and gave him a hero's
funeral, but in 1911 he was important only in so far as he
demonstrated Madero's complete lack of ability to unite the
various factions that divided Mexico.
Madero's popularity was indisputable, however. On October
1,

in what may have been the only honest presidential

election held in Mexico, Madero was elected president and

2Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 261.
2 Ibid,

p. 262.
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Jose Marina Pino Suarez vice president. Pino Suarez was not
well liked, especially among journalists. He had been
accused of persecuting journalists in his native Yucatan
where he had served as interim governor; still, Madero chose
him as a running mate because of a political debt: Pino
Suarez had spent 80,000 pesos in 1909 on a daily newspaper
espousing the antireelecionista cause. But repayment of that
debt carried a high price for Madero: Pino Suarez became
highly unpopular when he used existing laws against two
newspapers in January 1912 and jailed a reporter after an
unfavorable interview. These were the only transgressions
against the press by the Madero government, but they were
enough. 4
In January 1912, Madero supporters complained bitterly to
the president concerning the independent press. In turn,
journalists countered with articles defending the freedom of
the press. Articles on the persecution of the press again
became popular m

Mexico City newspapers. 5

Madero obviously recognized the importance of the press
early in his political career and used it to his advantage.
But the impressive array of pro-Madero newspapers created
during the 1909 campaign was gone. Mata was dead, replaced
by Sarabia, and Madero's only support in the press came from
^Bravo Ugarte, p. 82; Guzman, Jose Maria Pino Suarez, p. 57;
El Correo de Chihuahua, January 4, 1912.
^Bravo Ugarte, p. 82.

Nueva Era, a daily founded by his brother Gustavo, and
Diario Official. During the revolution Madero had proclaimed
that freedom of the press was "one of the most sacred
principles of the revolution." When he actually came to
power, he was beset by a series of minor revolutions and
newspapers frequently published grievances against him.
Madero responded by ignoring the press. In December 1912, he
said, "I don't read the press, and if I would, I would not
believe the articles." He did, however, try to end the
subsidy system, but beyond ending blatant abuses such as
imprisonment of newspapermen, Madero did little to change
the laws concerning the press. Perhaps because of this
journalists charged that Madero's promises of a free press
C
were empty.
Gustavo Madero, over his brother's objections, tried
economically to control several of the larger dailies in
Mexico City, but to no avail. Though Ernesto Madero,
Francisco's uncle and minister of finance, was nominal
publisher of El Imparcial, the paper remained anit-Madero.
The Mexican Herald, another paper highly critical of Madero
(and which sent its critiques over the wires of the
Associated Press) received subsidies through Gustavo.
Members of Madero's cabinet, in an attempt to diffuse what
they perceived as a dangerous situation, drew up plans to

Ibid, pp. 82, 85; Taracena, p. 256.
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revise Chapter Seven of the constitution, and when this news
was made public the press accused Madero of tyranny and
suppression of free speech.

7

El Imparical, El Pais and the Mexican Herald remained
critical of the new government and Madero could not be
convinced to use coercion to bring them into line. His
actions and attitudes rested entirely on theoretical ideals
rather than reality. On several occasions he interceded on
behalf of journalists charged with defamation and when his
supporters urged him to control the press he refused,
saying, "I prefer to sink with the law than to sustain
myself without it." The lengths to which Madero actually
carried freedom of the press now seem incredible. While
Zapata was in open revolt against him in 1912, Madero
personally approved the publication of Zapata's call for
Q

revolution in Diario del Hogar.
The press had good reasons, real and imagined, to
criticize Madero. From the left, he was charged with
nepotism, being a limantourista and failing to keep the
promises he made during the revolution. From the right, he
was criticized as being incompetent and, when he appointed
Jesus Flores Magon to his cabinent, too radical. El Manana,
a Mexico City newspaper, published an article that asked,

^Ross, pp. 233-235; Calvert, p. 114.
®Ross, p. 234; Calvert, p. 96.

"What remains for us of the order, peace and prosperity
internally and the credit, respect and prestige abroad which
Mexico enjoyed under the government of General Diaz?" El
Pais also criticized Madero: "Legality is not enough, the
Q
country needs to be governed."
Madero had to contend with a multitude of counter
revolutions. In addition to Zapata in the south and Orozco
in the north, minor revolutionary outbreaks led by
conservatives General Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz flared
up in 1912. Government forces easily put down the latter
two, and Reyes and Diaz were both imprisoned. Not only did
Madero not have them shot, he had them moved to the
penitentiary in Mexico City.
In covering the revolutions against Madero, Mexican
newspapermen gave full vent to their animosity toward the
idealistic president. When Porfirio Diaz had faced
dissension in the nation, the press most often ignored the
violent outbreaks. If they did report revolutionary
activity, the articles always negated the possibility of
victories against the government. Porfirian journalists
dismissed revolts as the rumblings of malcontents who did
not have the intelligence to appreciate the benefits of the
Pax Porfiriano.

9El Manana, as quoted in Ross, p. 233; Taracefia, p. 256; El
Pais, January 29, 1913.
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Under Madero, however, the press reported most
revolutionary outbreaks as threats to the republic and
blamed Madero for not being able to control the country.
Anyone who read El Imparcial in January 1913 would have
concluded that Mexico was being ripped apart. Daily reports,
usually on the front page, of Zapata's revolt in Morelos as
well as several articles about revolutionary activities in
Juarez and strikes by railroad mechanics, factory workers
and printers appeared in El Imparcial that month.10
The Mexican Herald published similar reports during
January, making them available to U.S. papers through the
Associated Press. Madero appeared to the U.S. public as a
weak, ineffectual leader. Madero's image in the U.S. press
was further damaged by his ambassador to the the United
States, Manuel Calero, who admitted to a Chicago reporter in
1912 that the fighting continued in Morelos and elsewhere.
"The only way the government will be able to deal with these
people," he said, "is to exterminate them ."11
Flores Magon published that statement in Regeneracion and
continued his anti-Madero campaign, printing articles in
both English and Spanish. According to Flores Magon, many of
the men fighting with Zapata were members of the PLM. He
also claimed to have a growing number of supporters, both
1 ^E1

Imparcial January 1 through 30, 1913.

11

Mexican Herald, January 1-30, 1913; Ethel Duffy Turner, p.
288.
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hispanic and anglo, in the United States. His most famous
anglo supporter had decided to confront Madero personally. 1 2
John Kenneth Turner returned to Mexico in January 1913 to
discuss land reform with Madero. To help finance the trip,
Turner planned to sell a series of articles to El Pais on
U.S. influence in Mexico. Turner met with the president, who
greeted him warmly. Turner wrote to his wife:
Big News! Last night El Senor Presidente
received me, sending various personages away to
talk with me. He greeted me with "You are a very
famous man." We talked for 45 minutes, walking up
and down the same balcony wh^re Creelman had his
highfalutin interview with Diaz. . . . he said
that "Barbarous Mexico" had helped him very much
in the revolution of 1910, as it gave the American
people the knowledge he was fighting for liberty.
. . .[Madero] gave me the thing I wanted — a
sweeping letter ordering all the authorities,
military and civil, in the republic, to give me
all the data I asked for . . .
At the end of January, Silvestre Terrazas was also in
Mexico City and met with Madero on February 1. Terrazas, as
did many journalists, had misgivings about the president.
Terrazas thought that Madero had not been strong enough in
his support of those who had waged the revolution. When
Madero offered Terrazas the ambassadorship to Brazil, he

■^Ethel Duffy Turner, pp. 288-289.
13 John Kenneth Turner to Ethel Duffy Turner, January 28,
1913, quoted in the introduction to Barbarous Mexico.
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took umbrage. "What would I do down there?" he asked his
family .14
Madero simply did not inspire confidence —

neither in the

domestic and international press nor in his own governors.
In December 1912, Governor Vestuniano Carranza of Coahuila
arranged an informal meeting of the governors of Chihuahua,
Sonora, San Luis Potosi and Aguascalientes. At the meeting,
Carranza criticized the Madero government for its weakness
and urged the governors who had come to power as a result of
the revolution to band together to face the coming
difficulties.
On February

i

r

8,

the introduction to Turner's series

appeared in El Pais. In the lengthy front-page article,
Turner presented his Mexican readers with a number of
questions, including, "Is American intervention a fact or
fantasy?" Promising to write the truth because he was "an
American against intervention," Turner wrote that he would
answer the questions he raised in subsequent articles. But
these articles were not forthcoming. The next day El Par's
became one of the many casualties of the first day of what

14Madero to Silvestre Terrazas, January 31, 1913, Box 110,
Terrazas Collection; personal interview with Margarita
Terrazas.
1 5 Ross,

p. 278.
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Mexicans now call La Decena Tragica —

the Tragic Ten

Days.^ ^
During the pre-dawn hours of Sunday, February 9, a
conspiratory force, comprising Mexican Army troops and
military school cadets, broke General Reyes and Felix Diaz
out of prison and marched toward the National Palace in the
center of the city. They planned to capture the National
Palace and Madero. In front of the National Palace is a
large square, called the Zocalo, used primarily for military
parades during official functions of state. The
revolutionaries charged across the plaza, into the waiting
machine guns of loyal government troops.
General Reyes and 400 others were killed in the first
skirmish, but the insurgents captured Gustavo Madero, who
was later released. Diaz and his men retreated southeast
through the city streets to the Ciudadela, a large stone
armory built in the 1700s as a tobacco warehouse. Its
granite walls were

10

feet thick in some places, and it

contained enough ammunition and small artillery to maintain
the small army.
Oddly enough, had Diaz moved straight east to the Alameda,
he would have captured Madero. When word of the revolt came,
Madero was not at the National Palace, but at the castle at
Chupdltepec and Diaz had reached the National Palace before

^ E l P a i s , February

8,

1913.
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Madero. Madero waited in a shop across the street from the
Alameda, about five blocks from the Zocalo, until the battle
was over.17
More than 1,000 people had been wounded at the fighting at
the Zocalo, including the commander of the loyal troops.
Madero replaced him with General Victriano Huerta, Porfirio
Diaz's escort to Veracruz. Huerta, who had commanded several
military excursions against rebels, notably Orozco in
Chihuahua, was to command the troops defending the National
Palace and retake the Ciudadela. Huerta had the advantage of
numbers and the fact that in a recent remodeling windows had
been placed in the previously impenetrable walls of the
Ciudadela. It was vulnerable, but Huerta's efforts to take
it were greatly restrained. What began on February 10 would
be called a sham artillery duel in which badly placed guns
hammered at the civilian population while Huerta, Felix Diaz
and Henry Lane Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico,
decided the fate of the country.
Henry Lane Wilson had little faith in Madero and had few
qualms about expressing his sentiments in the reports he
sent to Washington. His indulgence in repeating rumors in
the reports finally drew comments from State Department
officials. Wilson's bluster made him unpopular with U.S.
citizens living in Mexico, 40,000 of whom filed complaints
17

This account of the fighting at the Zocalo is drawn from
Ross, Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy, p. 282-285.
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against him. Many Mexicans disliked him because of his
inability to speak Spanish well. Both Mexicans and Americans
knew Wilson as "a man who liked to drink and not only got
pleasure in the taste of alcohol but delighted in drinking
himself into the semi-conscious state of the habitual
drunk.” Wilson served in Chile before coming to Mexico
during the last days of the porfiriato and owed his
appointment to his brother, John Wilson, Republican senator
from the state of Washington and publisher of the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer.18
Still, his position as U.S. ambassador made Wilson one of
the most important members of the international diplomatic
corps in Mexico City and most reports appearing in the U.S.
press agreed with his perspective on Madero and Mexico. On
February 16, the New York Times published an editorial
praising Henry Lane Wilson for his efforts to safeguard the
lives and property of the 25,000 foreigners in the Mexican
capital. John Kenneth Turner provided a different view of
the ambassador. On the same day the New York Times editorial
appeared, Diaz forces detained Turner and took him to the
Ciudadela. Later he wrote:
I was taken to the Ciudadela. After General
Mondragon had seen me, I was thrown into a hole,
with drunken soldiers for fellow prisoners, and
kept there for seven hours.
18

Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914 — The
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, (New York, Cambridge
Press, 1968), p. 39; Mancisdor, p. 190.
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I sent for Ambassador Wilson, who came and
promised to get me out that night. Then he said he
had lost a great deal of time and would let me
stay there over night, but I would be perfectly
safe, he said.
Up to that time I had given a false name, but
when Ambassador Wilson said he would have to look
up some of my friends, I told him my right name.
He took umbrage at this and brusquely asked me why
I had given a false name. I told him I had done so
because my life would not be worth the purchase
price if the Diaz people knew I was the man who
wrote Barbarous Mexico, describing the atrocities
of Porfirio Diaz.
Ambassador Wilson practically compelled me to
give my right name to the lieutenants of Felix
Diaz.
In so many words, Mr. Wilson told me that the
only thing that in any way made me deserving of
the punishment they intended for me was the fact
that I had criticized the policy of the American
administration.
Felix Diaz afterwards accused me of plotting to
assassinate him. Fortunately, after my arrest and
before reaching the arsenal, I had destroyed a
letter from President Madero which I had been
carrying. It commended me to all his officers,
assuring them that they could give me with safety
any information at their disposal, and informing
them that I was criticizing the administration of
President Taft. If this letter had been found upon
me, I should have been summarily put to death.
Three times I was sentenced to be shot, but each
time something happened to prevent the execution.
Notwithstanding the Ambassador's promise, I was
three days in the arsenal.
On February 10, the New York Times published news of the
revolution on the front page, saying "indications are that

i9
New York Times, February 16, 1913; New York World, March
8 , 1913, as quoted in Snow, introduction to Barbarous
Mexico, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
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the disorder will spread across the country." The Times
predicted the downfall of Madero "and his weak and vain
policies" and called him "above all an idealist."

20

The fighting continued, for the most part in the vicinity
of the Ciudadela only a few blocks from the American Embassy
and the Zona Rosa, the European neighborhood of Mexico City.
Both sides claimed to be in control of the city. Madero told
the Spanish ambassador, "I will die before I resign," while
Diaz felt confident enough of the outcome of the battle that
he refused to bring in from army posts in the provinces
replacement troops who vowed allegiance to him. 21
•
By February 16, Huerta had decided to breakwithMadero
and that decision was known to Diaz.

The twomen did

not,

however, agree on the succession until the evening of
February 18 when they met at the American Embassy. In what
came to be known as the Pact of the Ciudadela, arbitrated by
Wilson, Huerta would become interim president and felicistas
would control the cabinet. The hostilities did not end
immediately: Huerta told his generals to fire shells
containing shrapnel, which would explode ineffectively
against the stone walls of the Ciudadela, and ordered row
after row of troops loyal to Madero against the fixed
machine gun positions there. Meanwhile, forces under Difaz

on

New York Times, February 10 and 14, 1913.

^ N e w York Times, February 16, 1913.
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fired their cannons randomly into the residential areas of
Mexico City.

22

On February 17, Gustavo Madero ordered Huerta arrested.
Francisco Madero had the general brought to him in the
middle of the night and reinstated him after Huerta
professed fidelity. In fewer than 12 hours, Huerta would
betray him. On the afternoon of February 18, Huerta ordered
the arrest of Madero and Pino Suarez at the National Palace.
That same afternoon Gustavo came to a particularly gruesome
end. Huerta supporters shot him to death, but not before
blinding him and beating him insensible.
Madero and Pino Suarez were held at the National Palace
for four days while their families tried to obtain their
release. On February 19 both resigned, after being
guaranteed their own safety and that of their families.
Ambassador Wilson suggested that Madero be placed in an
institution for the insane. "Madero is crazy, a fool, a
lunatic and ought to be declared legally unfit as far as his
capacity to exercise his office," he said. The crux of the
statement was reported by the New York Times, which
predicted a sanity hearing would be held. Wilson reported to
the U.S. Department of State that during the last days of

22Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914 —
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, p. 118.
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The

the shelling Madero's mental capacities, "always abnormal
and fragile," had deteriorated.
During the bombardment, El Imparcial was the only major
daily to continue publishing. The paper, usually 12 pages,
ran only four during the fighting and those pages contained
only advertisements and information concerning the revolt.
Mobs had looted El Pais and had burned the building, which
housed the pro-Madero Nuevo Era. Telegraph services to the
provinces had been stopped and details of the fighting in
Mexico City —

sent regularly to the New York Times and

other U.S. papers —

were not published in Mexico's

provincial newspapers for weeks.
When the fighting ended, the Mexico City newspapers were
unified in their support of the Mexican government, although
it was unclear who the government was. El Imparcial ran a
photo of Huerta embracing Diaz, the man Ambassador Wilson
had heralded as the "Savior of Mexico." El Pais, again able
to publish, proclaimed "Maderism has been tumbled noisily
and tragically, never to be born again." 25

23

New York Times, February 22, 1913; Mancisidor, pp. 191192.
24
>El Imparcial, February 10 through 23, 1913; El Correo de
Chihuahua, March 6 , 1913; New York Times, February 10
through 23, 1913; Ross, pp. 310.
25El Imparcial, February 20, 1913; El Pais February 20,
1913.
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Wilson reported to the State Department that one of the
unwritten agreements of the Pact of the Ciudadela was that
freedom of the press would be observed. Perhaps this was
formality on the part of Wilson, but it was definitely not
to be. In the justifiable criticism the Mexican press
unleashed on Madero, it had unwittingly destroyed its
greatest ally.
On the evening of February 22, Madero and Pino Suarez were
murdered by the escort who was to take them from the
National Palace to the Penitentiary. After the two men were
killed, the escort riddled the automobiles with bullets to
lend credence to the pre-concocted story that Madero's
supporters tried to free him and he was killed in the
fighting. The London Times commented: "It is curious that no
one else was wounded in the battle." The reaction in the
U.S. press was stronger. On February 24, the New York Times
reported reactions from 20 U.S. newspapers, all of which
condemned the Huerta government. El Imparcial reported the
events exactly as the government dictated them.

27

More than a month later Governor Carranza would take the
formal action that would plunge Mexico into civil war. In
the fighting that followed, each faction would publish
newspapers and when the revolutionaries emerged successful
26R o s s p. 311.

27

London Times, February 24, 1913; New York Times, February
24, 1913;. El Imparcial, February 23 and 24, 1913.
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at the the end of the decade, the Mexican press would resume
its porfirian-style relationship with the government. The
dream of an independent press for Mexico died on the street
with Madero.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS: THE PORFIRIAN STYLE OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
WITH THE MODERN PRESS IN MEXICO
Porfirio Diaz consolidated his power between 1876 and 1888V
when he was able to effect his own reelection. According to
Enrique Krauze, author of a recent biography of D^az, Don
Porfirio developed twelve distinct elements to control the
government. One of those elements was control of the press,
but the manner in which he achieved this was found in the
other elements. Taken as a whole, Krauze's list

could be

considered the porfirian style and it was the porfirian
style that was and is used to control the press in Mexico .1
Don Porfirio took control of the Mexican government by
force, but he held it with a system of unwritten policies,
many of which had an impact on the press and are still used
to control the press. Don Porfirio, for instance, adeptly
"divided and conquered" his opponents. To this end, his
government occasionally subsidized "opposition papers" that
Enrique Krauze, Porfirio Diaz, Mistico de la Autoridad,
(Mexico, D.F., Fondo de Cultura Econ<£mica, 1987) , pp. 31-32.
Krauze's complete list is:
1. Repression or pacification
2. Divide and conquer
3. Control and flexibility in government
4. Ineffective suffrage — re-election
5. Control of legislative power
6 . Control of judicial power
7 * Pan o Palo (bread or stick)
8 . Political reconciliation with the church
9. Creating the image of "statesmanship" outside Mexico
10. Control of the press
\
11. Control of the intellectuals
12. Development of a personal following.
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V

portrayed the Mexican government so maliciously that readers
discounted the information and began to look askance at
serious opposition journalists, such as Filomeno Mata or
Luis Cabrera. In 1976, Uno Mas Uno, a liberal tabloid daily
began in Mexico City with a government apoyo (grant). The
newspaper became guite popular. In 1980, the government
partially funded the beginnings of another liberal tabloid
daily, La Jornada.
Of all the elements of porfirian style, the best known is
pan o palo (bread or stick). The publishers who adhered to
porfirian precepts, such as Spindola Reyes of El Imparcial,
became wealthy while publishers who guestioned porfirian
policies, such as Filomeno Mata, faced ongoing financial
difficulties. Today in Mexico, it is possible to ascertain
any daily newspaper's political leanings by the amount of
advertising it contains.
Don Porfirio correctly surmised that holding power in
Mexico meant keeping power from other people, which included
the press. He did not rule the country by force. In fact, as
today, the majority of Mexicans supported the government.
While the abuses of the Mexican system seem readily
apparent, perhaps more so to outsiders, there is a necessary
reciprocity between the people and the government, a
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reciprocity in which the media plays a crucial part and
without which the government cannot continue. 2
With the exception of Victoriano Huerta, all the men who
ruled Mexico in the decade following the resignation of D^az
died of gunshot wounds. Although the Mexican Constitution of
1917 set the governmental form of Mexico, Mexican
politicians learned much from Porfirio Diaz. For Mexican
journalists, that constitution is as much a "dead letter" as
the constitution of 1857 was for Ricardo" Flores Mag^n in
1902.
The constitution of 1917 does not guarantee freedom of the
press, but establishes limits. A Mexican journalist cannot
legally publish articles containing material which attacks
private life or interferes with the public peace. Even
though the laws are regulatory in nature, they play no
effective part m

newspaper operation. 3

For the most part, the availability of information in
Mexico today is governed by the principle of autocensura,
which can be defined as an editor's ability to understand
what he can and cannot publish. Autocensura exists in all
Mexican media and is most severe in popular entertainment

a

Rafael Loret de Mola, Denuncia,
1986) , p. 111.
3
"Ley de Imprenta, Reglamentana
As reprinted in Oswaldo Baqueiro
Estado, (Mexico, D.F., Editorial
publication date), passim.
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(Mexico, D.F., Grijalbo,
de Los Articulos 6 and 7."
L^pez. La Prensa y el
Nuestra America, no

such as movies and television, is present to a great extent
in newspapers, to a lesser degree in magazines and almost
non-existent in book publishing because many books are self
published. In short, intellectual freedom in any given
medium is dependent on financial accessibility. One can read
about the indiscretions of Mexican politicians in books
which are too expensive for many Mexicans to buy, but rarely
m

newspapers. 4
Carlos Jiminez edits the arts and leisure section of the

Mexico City News and has worked as a journalist in Mexico
for 30 years. Jiminez has never been personally involved in
a law suit and could not remember being on the staff of a
paper that was. "The laws are there," he said, "but to get
involved in a libel suit would be impossible because they
[the libel suits] just go into the bureaucratic judicial
system and disappear."

5

When asked about Mexican press law, Glenn White, managing
editor of the Mexico City News, the largest English-language
daily newspaper in Mexico (35,000 press run, founded in
1951), replied: "We don't get involved with press law. I

Margarita Terrazas claimed that the first edition of her
biographical essay of her father included in El Verdadero
Pancho Villa was censored. Like many books in Mexico, El
Verdadero Pancho Villa was self-published.
5
Personal telephone interview with Carlos Jiminez. March 6,
1986.
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simply follow the dictates of the publisher and that's
that ."6
Romulo O'Farrill, Jr., owns and publishes the Mexico City
News as well as Novedades, a Mexico City daily founded in
1936 which claims a 200,000 press run. O'Farrill, Jr., also
owns a television station in the capital and he and members
of his family own several newspapers in the states. Some of
these operations are managed by members of the O'Farrill
family, others by recognized political associates.
O'Farrill's multi-media ownership reflects a basic trend in
Mexico. Mario Vazquez Rana, who now owns the controlling
interest in United Press International, owns 42 dailies and
is said to be funded by Luis Echeverria, former president of
Mexico.
Mexican newspaper publishers receive financial support
from the Mexican government, both in the form of paid
advertising (see Appendix A) and unreported subsidies. Few,
if any, Mexican newspapers could survive without government
subsidies and few Mexican newsmen could survive without the
common types of remuneration available for favorable
coverage of government institutions and politicians.
Agencies regularly issue monthly stipends to beat reporters
(chacotes), politicians pay reporters to feature their name
prominently in news articles (embutes), and Mexican
6Personal telephone interview with Glenn White. March 5,
Mexico City.
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advertising salesmen are adept at sobornes, a form of
political blackmail. Journalists also receive gratuities in
the form of gifts, entertainment and free rent for
7

apartments.

In turn, the Mexican government has, until recently,
overtly controlled the press through its monopoly of
newsprint. In recent foreign trade agreements, the Mexican
government has allowed importation, thereby formally
relinquishing complete control of newsprint. This does not
represent a liberalization on the part of the government but
a response to modern technology. The Mexican government
enacted a statute by which it owns all hardware used by
newspapers to receive satellite transmissions.
Government monopoly of newsprint is not the only means of
controlling the press but it remains an important one, as
shown both by the Echeverria-backed take-over of the El Sol
chain by Mario Vazquez Rana (paper was denied to the
previous owner) and the fact that no newspaper in Mexico is
able to publish more than 250,000 copies. However, putting
its power to withhold newsprint into effect usually
constitutes a last-ditch attempt by the government to
control a publication. More often, the "revolutionary
family," that group of individuals who comprise the "power

^Personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, Jefe del
Departamento de Ciencias de la Comunicacion, Universidad de
las Americas. March 9, 1987.
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elite" of Mexico, concern themselves with influence rather
than control. To exert that influence, they must ensure that
Mexican publishers remain dependent on the financial elite.
^

This dependency is imposed not only on publishers, but on
the entire system. Traditionally, journalism in Mexico has
been a low-paying profession but one in which the
possibility of accepting bribes was rife. Columnists,
important in Mexico since the days of Luis Cabrera, are
notably underpaid, a situation which creates financial
benefits for the newspaper and opportunities for the ruling
O
elite to influence what appears in print.
In the case of some papers, the government maintains
financial control in the form of subsidies. Both Uno Mas Uno
and La Journada, supposedly left-wing newspapers, were
established with apoyos (grants) from the government and
continue to receive financial support. But even those
newspapers that do not get direct subsidies receive ample
amounts of government money in the form of advertising
revenue (see Appendix A).
Government-press relations have been further strengthened
by the development of the position of jefe de publicidad

^Personal interview with Jaimie'‘Septien, instructor of
communication at Universidad de Iberoamericana and columnist
for Uno Mcts Uno, March 23, 1987; personal interview ^ith
Francisco Prieto, Jefe de Departamento de Comunicacion,
Universidad Iberoamericana, March 21, 1987.
9 Ibid.

x
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(news director) in many government agencies since the mid1960s. A jefe de publicidad acts as a public relations man
for the government agency and insures that the coverage of
the political agency is favorable, using whatever means,
including money, that the agency places at his disposal.
This position has become the professional goal of many
Mexican journalists because the pay is greater, the hours
more reasonable and the chances of political and economic
advancement greater. Beat reporters are less eager to
provide unfavorable coverage of prospective employers.^
The labyrinth of economic and political power in modern
Mexican journalism represents a problem to U.S. reporters
covering the ongoing rash of murders of journalists in
Mexico. It is difficult to determine to what extent these
killing have been related to the murdered journalists'
involvement with bribery and information control. While
Manuel Buendia, a columnist for Excelsior, has come close to
public deification since his murder in a Mexico City parking
lot in 1984, both working journalists and others maintain
that Buendxa probably died because he became too involved in
accepting embutes from conflicting sources within the PRI
structure.

11

10Personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, March 9, 1987.
■L1 Ibid.
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There have been notable attempts by editors to upgrade the
ethical standards of Mexican journalism, the most important
being Julio Scherer Garcia's editorship (1968-1976) of the
employee-owned Excelsior. How the Mexican power elite dealt
with that particular situations is more telling than why.
The workers, both editorial and production, who owned
Excelsior elected Scherer editor in 1968 and during his
eight year tenure, Scherer accomplished an almost
unthinkable task. He developed Excelsior into a publication
that was respected for its integrity, objectivity and
commitment to the ethical practices espoused by U.S.
journalists. Scherer was extremely aware of the problems of
corruption in the- Mexican press and surrounded himself with
an editorial staff that shared his views.
The conflict between Scherer and other members of the
cooperative dated from the mid-1960s when conservative
elements within the co-operative lost political control of
the co-operative and were replaced by a liberal element
called "the group" which included Scherer, Manuel Becerra
Acosta and Manuel Granados Chapa. Under the leadership of
Scherer, the editorial department of Excelsior rid itself of
many corrupt practices such as selling front page news
stories for $8,000 (U.S.). The editorial staff's position
was further bolstered when Luis Echeverria became president
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of Mexico in 1970, as he espoused dedication to a free
press. 12
A rift between the editorial policy of Excelsior and
Echeverria, or more accurately, the PRI party, was
inevitable. It began in the early 1970s with the newspaper's
criticism of the government-controlled Mexican television
network, Telesistema Mexicano (today Televisa), when the
network began gathering its own news rather than relying on
Mexican newspapers as news sources. The immediate result of
this conflict was that government agencies and conservative
businessmen stopped advertising in Excelsior, placing the
newspaper in an extremely precarious financial position
which was exacerbated by a boycott of U.S. firms who pulled
their advertising from the paper in 1972 because of
Scherer's critical stance toward U.S. president Richard
Nixon .13
President Echeverria came to the aid of Excelsior,
arranging for direct financial aid to the paper, and for an
extension of the paper's credit with Productora e
Importadora de Papel, S.A. (PIPSA), the government-owned
company which had a monopoly on all newsprint sold in

✓
Baqueiro Lopez, page 174; Armando Vargas. "The Coup at
Excelsior." Columbia Journalism Review. September-October,
1976.
12

13Raul Trejo Delarbre, coordinator, Televisa, el Quinto
Poder, (Mexico, D.F., Claves Latinoamericas, 1985), p. 33;
Baqueiro Lopez, page 176; Vargas.
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Mexico. This concession of credit would return to haunt
Scherer.14
In 1976, Echeverria, prohibited by the constitution from
seeking re-election, was preparing to turn the government
over to the PRI presidential candidate, Jose Lopez Portillo.
Traditionally, presidents of Mexico begin to lose their
almost godlike powers during the last two years of their
term and become vulnerable to press criticism. Through the
outgoing president, the press has some opportunity to
criticize the PRI party for its monopoly of power. Excelsior
did that in November of 1976, but the hierarchy of the
newspaper was not prepared for the backlash that would
emanate from the PRI party or the conservative elements in
its own cooperative m

the spring of 1976.

1 15

In November of 1975, Excelsior criticized Echeverria for
directing the Mexican ambassador to the United Nations to
vote for an Arab-sponsored resolution which condemned
Zionism as racism. The editorial, along with another that
called for the resignation of the Mexican foreign minister,
was "an unprecedented use of its [Excelsior1s] critical

14*
/
Ibid. p. 177; Vincente Lenero, Las Periodistas, (Mexico,
D.F., Joaquin Mortiz, 1978), p. 198.
15

Vargas; personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, March
9, 1987.
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powers." The foreign minister did resign, but Excelsior
would pay a heavy price.

16

Excelsior came under attack from all sides: advertising
decreased; government agencies spent hundreds of thousands
of dollars placing ads in other Mexican publications
questioning the paper's patriotism; Televisa newscasters
criticized the paper at every opportunity and government
officials disputed anything about their various agencies
that was published in Excelsior. The "group" at Excelsior
had no doubt that Echeverrxa was behind the anti-Excelsior
campaign. Not only did the outgoing president hold a grudge,
he was also trying to consolidate a power base for his
future political aspirations which included becoming a
substantial share holder in El Sol newspaper chain, the
largest in Mexico .^
During the first week of June, PIPSA began a series of
meetings with the upper-echelon management of Excelsior. The
paper owed the agency money and this time credit would not
be extended. To add insult to injury, the management of
PIPSA called high-level Excelsior editorial staff members,
including Scherer, to meetings that amounted to bureaucratic
harassment. PIPSA officials accused Excelsior management of
incompetence, even though Excelsior business manager Hero

■^Vargas .
■^Ibid; Lenero, passim.
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Rodri*guez Toro showed them that the newspaper's gross
profits had increased by fifteen percent from 1970 to
1976.18
On June 10, 1986, the government launched a new attack on
/

Excelsior, this time on the economics of the cooperative. A
well-organized group of slum-dwellers, led by a PRI
politician, took over a 218-acre tract of land owned by the
Excelsior cooperative. The property, purchased in 1959 as an
investment to generate money for the cooperative, was to be
the site of a housing development with a projected value of
$40 million. Land invasions were not uncommon in Mexico
during the 1970s but were usually dealt with quickly and
severely by federal police. In this instance, however, the
squatters were bussed to the site, fed hot meals brought in
on government trucks and made celebrities by the Mexican
media. Their leader, a PRI congressmen-elect, told reporters
the squatters would not leave "until Scherer is expelled
from Excelsior ."19
Excelsior1s lawyers immediately obtained a statement from
the secretariat of agrarian reform which recognized the
cooperative's title to the land, but were told by Mexico
City officials, "We have been instructed not to receive any
complaints in this case." Scherer and the group began

1 8 Ibid,

pp. 132-135.

19Vargas.
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arranging meetings with Mexican politicians, looking for
some compromise that would allow them respite from both
PIPSA and the PRI-sponsored land-grabbers. They even spoke
with president-elect Jose Lc^pez Portillo who said he could
not help them. Finally, a cabinet member told them that he
might be able to help them after July 8, but not before. 20
The "group" decided to take their case to the people, and
published an editorial on July 7 which read:
The passivity of the police and the authorities
is alarming. Nearly a month has passed since the
crime was committed and nobody has lifted a finger
against it. We have to ask ourselves if this
governmental passivity is caused by its lack of
will.to act or in its lack of power to enforce the
law.
That evening, the government-controlled television news
aired a special feature on the situation, which amounted to
a 40-minute attack on the newspaper. But the "group" had
already decided on a stronger editorial statement, a full
page gacetilla (announcement) warning the Mexican people
that the freedom of the press in Mexico was under attack.
The statement was signed by 50 editors, reporters and
intellectuals of Mexico, many of whom wanted to see the
announcement on the front page of Excelsior, an idea vetoed

20
21

Ibid.; Lenero, p. 159.
Vargas.
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by Scherer. Finally, it was decided to run the announcement
on an inside page xn the July 8 edxtxon.

22

The announcement was never published. Between 2 and 3
a.m., 60 supporters of the conservative element of the
cooperative took over the presses of Excelsior and removed
the offending page. As the mutilated edition was being
distributed to the street vendors of Mexico City, the
editorial staff was gathering at the Excelsior office. By 5
a.m., 200 editorial workers were present to support Scherer.
At noon, the conservatives of the cooperative called for an
assembly and, their numbers swelled by several hundred
people who had never before seen the inside of the Excelsior
offices, they expelled Scherer, the Excelsior business
manager and five of the paper's editors. More than 200
reporters resigned their positions in support of the ousted
23
editor-xn-chxef.
Scherer and the other members of the "group" never
returned to Excelsior. Later that year, Scherer founded the
weekly news magazine Proceso. Although the impact of his
work is lessened, he remains one of the most respected
journalists in Mexico. Also in 1976, Manuel Becerra Acosta
founded the leftist daily tabloid Uno Mas Uno, a publication
that was, ironically, founded with a grant from the

2 2 Ibid;

23

Lenero,‘pp. 191-192.

Vargas.
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government and depends on government subsidies to survive.
In 1980, Miguel Xngel Granados Chapa, one of Scherer's
closest associates at Excelsior, was part of the editorial
group that began, also with government help and ongoing
subsidy, La Jornada.24
Excelsior, under Scherer's leadership, represented the
first vestige of a free popular press since Madero. Since
his expulsion from Excelsior there have been altercations
between individual journalists and the Mexican power
structure, but these conflicts have been settled, usually by
removing the offending journalists, before any of the
material gets into print. Most recently, a U.S. editor,
Peter Hamill, was removed from an editorial post at the
Mexico City News simply because he wanted to cover both
sides of a strike. Last year, the editorial staff of the
weekly magazine Impacto was rearranged because the magazine
began to criticize the government.

25

As a nation, Mexico has made great progress since the days
of Porfirio Diaz. Educational opportunities, federal
expenditures for social services and the average real income
of most Mexicans have increased. Yet Mexicans, as a people,

24

✓
Personal interview with Jose Villamil Duerte, manager of
Medios Publicitarios Mexicanas, Mexico City, March 19;
personal interview with Jaimie Septien.
25

Punto, February 23, 1987; personal interview with Dr.
Gabriel Molina, Jefe del Departamento de Ciencias de la
Comunicaci^n, Universidad de Las Americas, March 9, 1987.
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seem to be as much of an enigma to themselves as to the rest
of the world. When Ignacio Rodriguez Zarate, a
communications instructor at Universidad Iberoamericana,
analyzed the impact of a political columnist on the
presidential selection of 1982, he found it necessary to
begin his thesis by explaining three theories of the Mexican
presidential succession. Mexico remains a mystery to most
Mexicans, and the press, controlled by the same mechanics
that Don Porfirio perfected in the last century, remains the
servant to that small group of men who rule Mexico.

26

y

Ignacio Rodriguez Zarate,, "La Sucesion Presidencial de
1982 en un Columnista Politico: Salvador Gonzalez P^rez,
Cuarto Poder," (Tesis por Departamento de Comunicacion,
Universidad Iberoamerica, 1985), p. 27.
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APPENDIX
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AN INFORMAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING
IN TEN MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPERS

From Monday, February 23, 1987, to Sunday, March 1,
1987, I took an informal survey of 10 of Mexico City's 31
daily newspapers to determine what percentage of their
advertising was paid

for directly or indirectly by the

Mexican government. As I

was lookingat the purchase of

advertising as a means of control and influence, I divided
advertising into two categories: government and commercial.
Neither area is beyond question, but my conclusion that the
Mexican government is the major source of advertising
revenue in Mexico is

not new: Robert N. Pierce studied the

Mexican press during

the 1970s and discovered not only an

abundance of government-based advertising but also that the
government was paying an average of three times the
commercial rate .1
The advertising I selected as government based was that
advertising which could be controlled by the government. I
included in that selection all advertising of television
programing because of the severe censorship that the media
are subject to in Mexico, the visible connections between
television and the Mexican power structure and the fact that
television stations, while they purchase an inordinate
Robert N. Pierce, Libertad de Expresion en America Latina;
Tecnicas Y sistemas de control de la Prensa, (Barcelona,
Spain, Editorial Mitre, 1982) , pp. 250-251.
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amount of advertising space in the daily newspapers,
actually pay a higher rate than do commercial advertisers. 2
In the charts I have included a commercial and non
commercial rate to give the reader an idea of the
discrepancy between rates charged to private firms and what
advertisers linked to the government pay. My source, the
rate and data book published by Medios Publicitarios
Mexicanos, S.A. of Mexico City, included a much more
extensive breakdown, listing rates for various sectors and,
in some cases, discounts for long-term advertisers. However,
the one consistent element was the fact that commercial
advertisers paid less for their advertising than did those
that fell into the category of government-controlled
advertisers.
I have also included the number of copies printed, as
listed in the rate and data book. Since there is no
recognized entity for the auditing of newspaper circulation
in Mexico, these numbers are supplied by the publishers and
are not considered reliable, even by the staff of Medios
Publicitarios. Jose" Alberto Villamil Duerte, the general
manager of that firm, emphasized that these figures
represented supposed numbers of papers printed and not

s
Jose A. Villamil Duerte, Tarifas y Datos Medios Impresos,
(Mexico, D.F., Medios Publicitarios Mexicanos, February,
1987) , passim..
2
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circulation, adding, "It's simply too dangerous to run
3
circulation numbers."
The tables indicate weekly averages and I have given
some background information concerning the specific papers,
including format, history and known political connections.
The information in the profiles of the newspapers has been
confirmed by at least three of five sources: Senor Villamil;
Gabriel G. Molina, Jefe del Departamento de Ciencias de la
Comunicacion (chairman of the communications department) at
the University of the Americas at Puebla); Dr. Francisco
Prieto, Jefe del Departamento de Comunicacion at Universidad
Iberoamericana; Jaimie Septien, an instructor at UIA and a
columnist for Uno Mas Uno; Mario Beauregard, a freelance
television commentator who has worked on the staff of both
Ovaciones and Novedades.

•5

Interview with Jose Alberto Villamil Duerte, March 19,
1987.
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EXCELSIOR
press run...........................................

200,000

single issue cost................................. 200 pesos

4

commercial rate.................6,924 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate............17,568 pesos per column inch
no. of
pages

classified
ad pages

inches
available

92

13

13,272
no. of
inches

advertising total space
inches_______ in ads
7,554

56%

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

3,055

23%

39.5%

commercial
advertising

4,499

33%

59.5%

Excelsior (founded in 1917), despite controversies in
its recent past (see Chapter 10), is the most respected
newspaper in Mexico and claims to be the oldest generalinterest newspaper in Mexico City. Like several other Mexico
City newspapers, it claims to be a national newspaper. In
reality its importance probably lies in the influence it has
as a media leader both in the capital and in the states.
Excelsior is staff-owned.

At the time of this survey (February 23, 1987, to March 1,
1987) the exchange rate was approximately 1050 pesos to the
dollar.
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EL UNIVERSAL
press run........................................... .85,000
(includes 8,800 papers sent outside Mexico City)
single issue cost

200

pesos

commercial rate................10,728 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate.......
no. of
pages

classified
ad pages

95

14

15,804 pesos per column inch

inches
advertising
available
inches
13,608
no. of
inches

4,468

total space
in ads
33%

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

1,958

14.5%

44%

commercial
advertising

2,510

18.5%

56%

El Universal (founded in 1916) is reputed to be the
daily newspaper most closely linked with U.S. interests in
Mexico.
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EL HERALDO
press run..........

209,600

single issue cost
200 pesos
commercial rate.................8,460 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate................................ unlisted
gacetillas..................... 25,020 pesos per column inch
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
65

2.7

inches
advertising
total space
available
inches_______ in ads
8,172
no. of
inches

3,373

42%

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

1,407

17%

42%

commercial
advertising

1,966

24%

58%

El Heraldo (founded 1965) is considered the newspaper
that reflects the interests of the Mexican business
community.

180

NOVEDADES
press run..........

210,000

single issue cost.................................

200

pesos

commercial rate............. ....8,460 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate............ 12,600 pesos per column inch
gacetilla.......................24,840 pesos per column inch
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
71

3

inches
available

advertising
inches

total space
in ads

3,620

44%

8,160
no. of
inches

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

1,838

23%

51%

commercial
advertising

1,782

21 %

49%

Novedades (founded in 1936) is published by Romulo
O'Farrill, Jr. O'Farrill is a major figure in the Mexican
media, owning the English-language Mexico City News and a
television station in Mexico City and is second only to
Mario Vazquez Rana of the El Sol chain in ownership of
newspapers in the states.
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EL DIA
press run......... ................

unlisted

single issue cost.................................. unlisted
commercial rate.................................... unlisted
non-commercial rate................................ unlisted
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
28

---

inches
advertising total space
available_____ inches______ in ads
457

3,528
no. of
inches

% of
total space

12%

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

333

9%

73%

commercial
advertising

124

3%

27%

El Dia is a small daily, unlisted in the rate and data
book, said to be closely aligned with the Catholic church in
Mexico.
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EL NACIONAL
press run........................................... 181,375
single issue cost................................. 250 pesos
commercial rate............... 10,728 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate........... 15,804 pesos per column inch
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
45

---

inches
advertising total space
available_____ inches______ in ads
1,042

5,760
no. of
inches

18%

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

835

14%

80%

commercial
advertising

207

4%

20%

El Nacional is the only Mexico City daily owned by the
government*
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UNO MAS UNO
press run............................................ 75,000
single issue cost
200 pesos
commercial rate................10,788 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate
no. of
pages

classified
ad pages

32

1

16,128 pesos per column inch
inches
advertising total space
available______ inches______ in ads
2,480

730

29%

no. of
inches

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

480

19%

66 %

commercial
advertising

250

10 %

34%

Uno Mas Uno was established in 1977 after Julio Scherer
Garcia was removed from the editorship of Excelsior. Scherer
began a magazine, El Proceso, but staff members who left
Excelsior at the same time began this tabloid with a
government grant and it continues to receive financial aid
from the Mexican government.
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MEXICO CITY NEWS
press run............................................ 35,000
single issue cost................................. 200 pesos
commercial rate.................8,040 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate............14,592 pesos per column inch
no. of
pages

classified
ad pages

37

3

inches
available

advertising
inches

1,632
no. of
inches

442

total space
in ads
27%

% of
total space

% of
advertising
55%

non-commercial
advertising

242

15%

commercial
advertising

200

12%

45%

The Mexico City News (founded in 1950) is one of the
most appealing newspapers for those interested in Mexican
history, as it so closely follows the editorial bent of the
Mexican Herald during the porfiriato. The most recent
example of press control in Mexico occurred at this paper.
(See Chapter 10)
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LA JORNADA
press run............................................ 50,000
single issue cost..300 pesos (reflects recent price change)
commercial rate.................3,011 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate................................ unlisted
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
35

---

inches
advertising total space
available_____ inches______ in ads
2,835
no. of
inches

570

20%

% of
total space

% of
advertising

non-commercial
advertising

372

13%

65%

commercial
advertising

1.98

7%

35%

La Jornada (founded 1980) is another tabloid that was
begun as a result of Scherer's departure from Excelsior.
Like Uno Mas Uno, La Jornada is left-wing and established
with government support. It continues to accept financial
aid from the Mexican government.
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EL SOL DE MEXICO
press run............................................ 90,000
single issue cost................................. 130 pesos
commercial rate................. 7,116 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate............16,548 pesos per column inch
no. of
classified
pages_____ ad pages
62

6

inches
available

commercial
advertising

total space
in ads

1,774

19%

8,960
no. of
inches

non-commercial
advertising

advertising
inches

% of
total space

% of
advertising

1,114

12%

63%

660

7%

37%

El Sol de Mexico (founded 1965) is the capital city
daily of the El Sol newspaper chain, which, with 42 papers,
is the largest in Mexico. Its publisher, Mario Vazquez Rana,
also owns United Press International and is said to be
financed by Luis Escheviera, former president of Mexico. In
Denuncia, a book by Rafael Loret de Mola concerning the
murder of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola in 1985, Rana was
severely criticized for political and financial malfeasance.
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